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My dissertation emphasizes a cognitive account of multimodality that explicitly 
integrates experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so 
many composition and technical communication programs. In these disciplines, 
multimodality is widely conceived in terms of what Gunther Kress calls “social-
semiotic” modes of communication shaped primarily by culture. In the cognitive and 
neurolinguistic theories of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, however, multimodality 
is described as a key characteristic of our bodies’ sensory-motor systems which link 
perception to action and action to meaning, grounding all communicative acts in 
knowledge shaped through body-engaged experience. I argue that this “situated” 
account of cognition – which closely approximates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, a major framework for my study – has pedagogical 
precedence in the mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical 
training, and I reveal that training’s multimodal dimensions through a 
phenomenological exegesis of the concept mimesis. Plato’s denigration of the mimetic 
tradition and his elevation of conceptual contemplation through reason, out of which 
developed the classic Cartesian separation of mind from body, resulted in a general 
degradation of experiential knowledge in Western education. But with the recent 
introduction into college classrooms of digital technologies and multimedia 
communication tools, renewed emphasis is being placed on the “hands-on” nature of 
inventive and productive praxis, necessitating a revision of methods of instruction and 
assessment that have traditionally privileged the acquisition of conceptual over 
experiential knowledge. The model of multimodality I construct from Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, ancient Sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, and current neuroscientific 
accounts of situated cognition insists on recognizing the significant role knowledges we 
acquire experientially play in our reading and writing, speaking and listening, 







In this dissertation I emphasize a cognitive account of multimodality in an effort to 
integrate experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that currently 
informs so many college-level composition and technical communication programs in 
the United States. I argue that mainstream versions of this pedagogy privilege 
conceptual knowledge and learning. A paradigm that posits multimodality as a 
function of cognition brings greater attention to their experiential dimensions. As we 
know, “experiential learning” is a kind of buzzword in colleges and universities, 
expressing the assumption that students learn best when there is a significant “hands-
on” component to their education. I share that assumption but have also wondered: 
What is the nature of knowledge-work in such a paradigm? This dissertation offers an 
account of that type of “work” that I then apply pedagogically to the curricular areas 
of Rhetoric-Composition (“Rhet Comp”) and Technical Communication (“Tech Com”).1 
Multimodality is a site in both fields where an account of experiential knowledge can 
be profitably developed and applied pedagogically. 
 We need, however, to think a bit differently about multimodality. In Rhet-
Comp, it is often envisioned in terms of what I call the “Big Three” modes of 
communication: Written, Spoken, and Visual Communication. In addition, these modes 
are usually articulated and taught within social and cultural contexts. The pioneering 
multimodal theorist Gunther Kress, for instance, tells us that all modes of 
communication are “social semiotic” in that they are shaped ultimately by the context 
that is culture. In some emerging branches of cognitive neuroscience, however, 
multimodality is described quite differently. The neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese and 
the neurolinguist George Lakoff use “multimodality” to describe what they believe to 
be the primary characteristic of our sensory-motor system, which links perception to 
action and action to meaning. They argue that this neurological-perceptual system 
shapes language and hence all of our communication practices. Culture plays a role, 
yes, but it is not the only one. Such a model insists that our primary way of learning is 
always-already experiential. We experience the world by interacting with it, and our 
interactions are mediated by multiple sensory and perceptual modalities. I argue that 
this mostly unconscious, dynamic, ongoing cognitive process is knowledge work – work 
done not by our “minds” but by our bodies – and in this dissertation I associate that 
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knowledge work with the ancient Greek concept of mimesis. We learn quickly and 
experientially because the multimodal sensory-motor systems are mimetically attuned 
to the situations our bodies move through and are enmeshed in. Mimesis is what 
situates us in what is essentially a cognitive environment. It is an essential function of 
our sensory-motor systems and operative as what I will call in later chapters body-
engaged learning. 
 The work of Gallese and Lakoff and many other thinkers whose work I draw on 
in this dissertation all subscribe to the theory that cognition is situated; that is, that 
thinking and knowing is equivalent to doing and interacting with the people and things 
that constitute our immediate situations. This theory of situated or embodied 
cognition2 that in recent years has made significant inroads in cognitive psychology and 
several branches of neuroscience is actually not new. The work of the French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty posited such a theory as early as the 1940s by 
emphasizing the integrated relationship between the body’s perceptual apparatus and 
the people and things the body comes into contact with. His phenomenology of 
perception, along with his theories on the role of imitation in habituating the body to 
its surroundings, will serve as the primary theoretical framework for this study. By 
putting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into conversation with neuroscientific 
theories of situated and embodied cognition, especially those of Vittorio Gallese (one 
of the discovers of the so-called “Mirror Neuron System”), a philosophy of mind as 
inextricably bound to the body emerges, one which shares significant similarities with 
the strongly mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical training. As 
rhetorical scholars like Debra Hawhee have shown, the first “schools” of rhetoric in 
ancient Greece developed in public gymnasia.3 Students learned the arts of rhetoric in 
relatively dynamic spaces where no clear distinctions existed between philosophy and 
athletics, rhetoric and wrestling, civic education and the musicopoetic arts. These 
gymnasia were perhaps the first sites in Western history where experiential learning in 
rhetoric, philosophy, civics, and art took on its first formal shape. It is here too where 
mimesis emerged as a vital pedagogical technique – bodily knowledge-work through 
repetition – as well as a rhetorical strategy for both invention and delivery, one that 




 This ancient rhetorical pedagogy, which Hawhee describes as a “bodily art,” 
would take a back seat to new forms of education that emerged with the dawning of 
classical philosophy and the formalization of rhetoric, first by Aristotle, into telos-
driven persuasion. Interestingly, Aristotle’s formalization of rhetoric resulted through 
a kind of recovery effort of a practice that his former teacher, Plato, so famously 
denigrated. As the founder the first “Academy” whose thinking significantly shaped 
the tradition of Western education, Plato launched a prolonged attack against the 
practitioners of what he called rhetorike, the Sophists, and the mimetic tradition that 
had become associated with them and other so-called “poets,” the rhapsodes or 
public performers, who bewitched and enchanted the public with their songs and 
stories of historical events. The arguments and rhapsodies these public figures made 
created a false impression of the world which Plato believed was an inferior 
manifestation – a mere “copy” – of a more profound metaphysical Truth. In denigrating 
techne – the practical and technical art of builders and craftsmen - and elevating the 
“forms” and “ideas” of episteme, Plato helped set the stage for what would become 
an institutionalized privileging of conceptual knowledge and learning throughout the 
West. This is one reason why knowledge acquired experientially through body-engaged 
learning has been traditionally devalued along with the school programs that cultivate 
it. One thinks here of secondary level physical education programs, “Phys Ed,” or of 
the industrial and vocational curricula that were once called “Shop,” which have 
historically been treated as supplements to “academic” curricula in mathematics and 
computer technologies, the social and physical sciences, even the arts and humanities. 
The privileging of conceptual over experiential knowledge work contributes to a 
stratification that still permeates most institutions of formal education and manifests 
itself in a hierarchy which promotes theory over practice, research over teaching, and 
critique over creativity. I believe that this hierarchy has its structural roots in Plato’s 
separation of metaphysical mind from material body, an epistemology that reached its 
culmination in the dualistic logic of the modern thinker Rene Descartes and lives on 
through the designs of the modern institutions created within its conceptual 
framework. 
 However, since the early 20th century, this paradigm has been slowly shifting. 
Pragmatist inquiry that developed in the United States around the turn of the century 
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was highly skeptical of Cartesian logic and the reifying conceptual structures of 
European philosophy, giving birth to progressive education and the concept of 
“experiential learning.” In the world of 20th century continental philosophy, post-
structuralism and deconstruction disrupted the dichotomous logic upon which the 
hierarchies that support absolute distinctions are based, while phenomenology has 
displaced the subject of classical humanism – “Man” – by insisting that the “human 
being” is not a unique entity but an amorphous state of being-in-the-world. 
Neuroscience has grounded the “mind” in the very material processes of the body’s 
central nervous system, and cognition, as noted above, is increasingly seen as 
extending beyond brain and body to include the environment in which that body is 
situated. Theories of relationality have worked their way into educational philosophy 
as well, supporting pedagogical models of collaborative learning that advocate 
meaning making as an intersubjective rather than solitary enterprise. Meanwhile, the 
advent of digital technologies and multimedia communication tools is rapidly 
transforming traditional classrooms into smart environments, ushering in learning 
outcomes that increasingly reflect hands-on components to academic work. I think, 
then, that multimodality – a term in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com that is primarily 
associated with digital technologies – is a good site to build a theory on what 
experiential knowledge is and, hence, what “experiential learning” actually means 
beyond project-based assignments and ethnographic field work in undergraduate 
curricula. 
 
My Pedagogical Objective and Methodology 
In his “Memorial Address,” Martin Heidegger claims that just as a composer is present 
in his or her composition, so too is meaning present in everything that exists. He 
compares humans to plants that are meant by nature to rise from the earth in which 
they are rooted to bear fruit in the sun (47).4 However, in the modern West, people 
have lost their rootedness – their autochthony – due to the hegemony of a mode of 
cognition he calls “calculative thinking” (46-49). This kind of thinking has replaced the 
kind of “meditative thinking” humans are naturally inclined to (56). Whereas 
calculative thinking “computes,” “plans and investigates,” meditative thinking 
“contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is” (46). It has so 
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objectified the world that “Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy 
source for modern technology and industry” (50). In order to recover our rootedness, 
Heidegger claims, we need to cultivate our capacity to think meditatively. Being open 
to that which does not lend itself easily to calculation – Heidegger calls it “the 
mystery” – seems, to me, to be not just a way to think meditatively but to act 
mimetically since such “a vision of a new autochthony . . . someday even might be fit 
to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form” 
(55). 
I would like to suggest that calculative thinking as described by Heidegger is 
enabled in part by the West’s emphasis on conceptual knowledge as an abstract series 
of metaphysical principles, disembodied “laws of Nature” that, once ascertained 
through rigorous study and experimentation, can then be hylomorphically imposed on 
dumb matter in the production of significance – or, in the case of calculative thinking, 
of some kind of usable resource. It seems as though calculative thinking disembodies 
concepts whereas meditative thinking, by “rooting” cognition in the actual world of 
experience, seeks to embody them; in this sense, meditative thinking may be the 
cognitive mode of the recent paradigm of embodied mind, which George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson famously claim “challenges” the entire tradition of Western thought.5 It 
therefore also challenges how we think about teaching and learning. I believe that the 
currently popular model of persuasive rhetoric that informs instruction, curricular 
development, and assessment protocols not only privileges conceptual knowledge 
acquisition over experiential knowledge making but anchors rhetoric in a model that 
encourages calculative thinking. The classical rhetorical paradigm of persuasive 
argumentation contributes to a linear transmission view of communication. As such, it 
tends to support a nonmaterial account of information as a set of principles a skilled 
rhetor draws on when imposing an argumentative strategy on a predetermined 
situation and audience. Under certain circumstances, this rhetorical paradigm is very 
useful. But is the best approach to all situations and audiences necessarily persuasive? 
Can and should rhetoric be employed in ways that do not subscribe even tangentially 
to the model of a skilled rhetor appealing to passive audiences with the calculated 
intention of persuading them? 
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My answer to this question is yes, and I want this dissertation to contribute to 
the development of new rhetorical models that integrate experiential knowledge-work 
into our undergraduate curricula. I believe that education will be stronger if 
conceptual knowledge-work is appropriately balanced with the experiential. At this 
point, I should explain more precisely what I mean by these terms. In the context of 
this dissertation, conceptual will signify the following: an educational model invested 
primarily in the transmission of ideas through the replication or imposition of 
identifiable forms and formats (the eidos of episteme); it is concerned primarily with 
the symbolicity of meaning and meaning-making; it is generally hypothesis-driven; and 
it has a strong commitment to critique and “critical thinking.” It seeks to cultivate 
knowledge with recourse to the “mind,” a construct that comes with a coded 
architecture that needs to be programmed by filling it with information obtained 
through critical contemplation, logical analysis, and credible research methods. The 
term experiential, on the other hand, will be used in support of a model that attends 
to knowledge-work as material praxis (techne); attends to the role of affectivity in 
meaning-making; is generally data-driven (with data being conceived as material 
information, not just empirical evidence in support of specific claims); it emphasizes 
creative engagement with others and with things, and bases communication on 
reflexivity rather than transmission. In this model, knowledge is first grounded in the 
body’s sensory-motor system and emerges through that system’s mimetic attunement – 
a word I borrow from Thomas Rickert and use throughout this dissertation6 - to the 
conditions of the situation in which that body is situated. 
I should make it clear that I am well aware of the constructed nature of the 
dichotomy I posit here between the conceptual and the experiential. I do not believe 
that these classifications reflect what some call “the Real”; rather, I see them as 
reflective of a dichotomous logic shaped by cultural convention and entirely 
susceptible to Derridean desconstruction. At the most basic levels of cognition there is 
no real distinction between these two seemingly distinct forms of knowledge work.7 
But Western culture’s historical adherence to dichotomous logic has helped create 
conditions whereby certain world views are privileged at the expense of others. My 
dissertation represents an effort to trouble what I argue is one such privileging. As I 
hope I have clarified above, I do not want argue that conceptual knowledge is 
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calculative thinking and experiential knowledge is meditative thinking. All humans 
naturally conceptualize, but not all humans calculate in the sense Heidegger means it. 
Again, calculative thinking arises from the privileging of conceptual knowledge over 
knowledge that I am calling experiential, one manifestation of which might be 
conceived as what Heidegger calls meditative. 
I would like now to describe my methodology and theoretical orientation. For 
this dissertation I used a modified version of “Grounded Theory” (GT). GT was 
developed by the sociologists Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser in the 1960s and used 
for their 1965 book Awareness of Dying. In their work with terminally ill patients, both 
men entered the caretaking environments with no preconditions other than to learn 
about how people coped with their lives knowing that death was imminent. In the 
process, they collected enormous amounts of data – personal notes, interviews, audio 
and film recordings, observations of interactions between patients and their families 
and caretakers, books that were circulated, medicines that were compared – from 
which their theoretical concepts emerged and upon which they are “grounded.” As is 
evident by this description, GT takes a data-driven rather than hypothesis-driven 
approach to qualitative research. Most traditional research methodologies require the 
application of a theoretical model to the phenomenon being studied. GT takes an 
opposite approach, beginning not with a hypothesis but with the collection of data. 
Once a sufficient amount of data has been amassed, GT researchers look for patterns 
or “key points” that emerge from the data and which are then “coded” (Strauss, 14-
15). This initial stage of “open coding” naturally leads to one called “axial coding” in 
which these coded data are grouped into concepts. At this point, coding becomes 
more “selective” as clear relevant patterns emerge. These coded patterns are then 
arranged into structured categories that are the grounds for “theoretical codes” (25-
26) The final stage of this research process is marked by the emergence of a theory, or 
a state of “theoretical saturation,” when no relevant new patterns can be ascertained 
outside of the scope of the research area (25-26).  
 This approach seems particular appropriate given the phenomenological 
framework of my study, informed as it is by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenomenology, as described by one of its pioneering figures Edmund Husserl, grounds 
study of the world in the phenomena that are “things themselves.” So-called 
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“objective” interpretations of the world do not represent “the Real” so much as they 
are abstracted from it. He believes that, first and foremost, we inhabit a “lived 
world” (lebenswelt), the appearances of which do not exist as “objects” in a 
geometrically mappable space and behind which exist the “real.” Instead, “the Real” 
is generated in our perception of phenomena, in how the things of the world appear to 
us not through analysis and contemplation but by literally experiencing them. Our 
“theories” about the world, the “meaning” and “significance” of life, do not pre-exist 
experience but rather emerge through it. In this sense is GT phenomenological: it is 
grounded in phenomena and the theoretical suppositions it advances arise from the 
ground in which it is always rooted. 
 I write above that I take a “modified” GT methodology. Because GT is 
associated primarily with the social sciences, it is conceived as a method for studying 
people in specific social contexts. As open-ended as Glaser and Strauss’s study was, its 
focus was clearly on the personal struggles and interpersonal relationships observed of 
people in the mid- to latter-stages of terminal illness. The theoretical framework of 
this dissertation, however, did not arise from an ethnographic observation of people 
but rather from an extensive engagement with a wide variety of texts. As early as 
2009, I began to read texts that had a loose thematic affiliation among them – 
specifically, theories that took into account the nonhuman dimensions of our worlds. I 
read books and articles (I also read blogs and watched online videos) that related to 
Posthumanism, Actor-Network Theory, Object Oriented Ontology, and many others 
that were not easy to classify. My readings spread across multiple fields and research 
areas – philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, critical theory, animal studies, cultural 
studies, cognitive neurosciences, reader response theory, composition studies, 
technical communication. In the process of my readings I encountered the 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My first exposure to his work came through 
secondary texts like Glen Mazi’s Humans, Animals, and Machines and David Abram’s 
Spell of the Sensuous, both of which apply Merleau-Ponty’s theories in such a way that 
the nonhuman dimensions of experience were rendered both palpable and compelling. 
I then read his Phenomenology of Perception, followed by a number of other texts that 
I cite throughout this dissertation, and developed an interest in focusing on the body 
as our (and these are his words) medium for having a world. 
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 At the same time, I encountered references to the ancient Greek concept of 
mimesis that seemed to lend themselves well not only to Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, but to theories of material rhetoric and embodied cognition that 
were emerging in my readings. My first encounter with mimesis was Morris Berman’s 
1981 text The Reenchantment of the World. It popped again in Mark Hansen’s 2000 
book Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, where Hansen develops a 
theory of “corporeal mimesis” drawn from the Marxist philosopher Walter Benjamin in 
advancing a theory of embodiment that was phenomenological as opposed to 
“epistemological.” I then remembered how mimesis had popped up in other works, 
including Debra Hawhee’s 2000 study Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient 
Greece, a book which sheds light on an ancient pedagogy that one reviewer has called 
experiential learning.8 It was quite by accident, fortuitously enough, that I came 
across Merleau-Ponty’s use of the concept of mimesis in his essay “The Child’s 
Relations with Others.” His description of mimesis provided me with the basic building 
blocks for a model for what I call experiential knowledge, something that I attempt to 
trace the contours of in this dissertation. 
 I took an old-school approach to the data-collection process. I photocopied and 
kept print copies of numerous articles and book sections in files that were arranged by 
authors’ last names. In the “open coding” stages of my research I annotated these 
print copies, writing notes in the margins and summarizing the article’s key points in 
an available area of white space, usually on the last page. I then copied onto 3x5 
notecards passages from the texts – mostly direct quotations, which, like the files I 
kept, were arranged by authors’ last names and arranged alphabetically in plastic 
containers. After having amassed literally hundreds of these data, I entered the stage 
of “axial coding,” sorting cards into groups that designated some kind of thematic 
consistency. Each group of notecards morphed considerably; it was not uncommon for 
two groups – each suggesting a sort of semi-concept – to be combined with one or two 
other semi-concepts, forming a more identifiable concept. Arranged across a variety 
of physical surfaces that included two kitchen counters, a covered piano keyboard, the 
cushions of my couch, and two small tables, these groups of cards slowly – with my 
help, of course – arranged themselves into categories that later became the chapters 
of my dissertation and the sections of these chapters. Although what I ended up with 
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(an account of experiential knowledge and how to integrate that into composition and 
technical communication programs) was quite different from what I began with (an 
investigation into our relations with nonhuman others), there remains an underlying 
thread that weaves together both process and product. As Merleau-Ponty might 
observe, I tapped into a “certain style,” a pattern with which I developed familiarity, 
that culminated ultimately in an expression – a theory, a dissertation – that my effort 
and knowledge-work helped to enact.  
 
Mimesis: An Overview of this Dissertation’s Dominant Concept 
I want this dissertation to contribute to a recovery effort of a lost dimension to 
mimesis – a dimension that I call “phenomenological” in that it attends to the lived 
world of everyday experience and takes as primary our bodies’ perceptual engagement 
with the things we encounter. I am not interested, nor capable, of recovering any 
“original meaning” for these words. In fact, I use recovery somewhat hesitantly 
because in many ways my project is concerned with uncovering something that has not 
been “lost” so much as metaphorically buried under misconstruals, reductive 
definitions, and cultural prejudices. Conceiving of mimesis as the manner of producing 
a direct copy of something cannot account, for example, of blurs boundaries between 
categories that have historically kept far apart. One important example would be the 
human and nonhuman. Some of the earliest recorded references to the word group 
mimos, from which mimesis derives, reveal aesthetic and even intellectual intercourse 
between the human and nonhuman worlds. The Thebian lyric poet Pindar employed 
the verb mimeisthai to describe a choreography in which dancers were instructed to 
match the movements of animals (Halliwell, 19). The fifth-century philosopher 
Democritus believed that humans learned certain crafts, including music, through the 
imitation or emulation of animals, a point Aristotle later tried to “correct” in his 
History of Animals by observing how many mimemata (analogies, resemblances, but 
not imitations) cut across both human and animal life (154). Aristotle also famously 
described the aesthetic function of mimesis as an imitation9 of “nature” (phusis), 
implying thereby that the mimetic arose through active observation by the human of 
nonhuman patterns and activities. 
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 Unfortunately, as evidenced by the pejorative connotations of the word 
“imitation,” which is the most common English translation of the Greek concept, 
mimesis has endured a largely negative reputation. This is primarily Plato’s legacy. 
Plato’s objections to mimesis were in part the result of his philosophical conviction 
that representation simply imitated the world of mere appearance, thrice removed 
from the ideational forms of Truth. In Platonic metaphysics, the couch upon which 
Socrates sat was a mere material “copy” of true metaphysical Couchness. But Plato’s 
distrust of mimesis went beyond that. According to the classical scholar Stephen 
Halliwell, Plato’s distrust of mimesis was primarily psychological, “grounded in the 
assumption that there is a continuity, even equivalence, between our relations with 
people and things in the real world and to people and things presented in mimetic art” 
(78). Halliwell contends that for Plato the highest degree of psychological absorption 
was akin to what we know today as empathy, a state at which “the mind experiencing 
the poetic representation is so immersed in the mind of the character as to have no 
room for emotional or critical dissociation” (80).10 When audiences “surrender” 
completely to the point of view of a performer or artistic representation, they fix 
themselves ever more adhesively to the illusory imitations of reality projected on the 
walls of the cave in which Plato so famously located the intellectually stunted masses. 
So absorbed are they in the material appearance of things that they cannot rationally 
detach themselves to contemplate epistemic matters of truth. In a sense, the 
empathetic identification with others through the enactment of an event or 
experience created an uncritically accepted false consciousness not unlike that which 
the twentieth century Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht sought to disrupt in 
audiences.11 The only difference is that where Brecht desired to disrupt conformity to 
the ideological status quo, Plato desired to uproot all obstacles blocking the ascension 
of an intellectual orientation based on reason. 
It is clear that mimesis to Plato was more than just mindless imitation. The 
“imitative arts” seen in poets, performers, and public speakers were transformative of 
a “real” that in essence was intransigent. Thrice removed from the true forms and 
ideas that constituted authentic knowledge, they operated in a world of mere 
appearances, hoodwinking all nonphilosophers who bought into the illusion. Despite 
Aristotle’s efforts to reconstitute mimesis – something I will address in Chapter 2 – the 
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term never fully recovered from Plato’s disparagement. Reduced to the category of 
imitative repetition and representation, mimesis carries the pejorative sense of being 
trite and limiting, an obstacle to be overcome. For example, in 2010 Spring Press 
published Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science as part 
of its series Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science; the text explicitly 
advocates moving “beyond” notions of mimicry, similarity, resemblance, convention, 
and imitation in the arts and sciences. And for another example: In support of his 
argument that rules governing human conduct should be slippery enough for people to 
elude coercive traps social orders set for them, the political theorist Richard Flatham 
cites the ability of such rules to “diminish the incidence of rote, mechanical, mimetic, 
or otherwise submissive behavior” (qtd in Bennett, Enchantment, 155). Like Plato, 
Flatham associates mimesis with the “submissive behaviors” of audiences. He also uses 
another term that is often associated with mimetic imitation: “rote.” 
 In the field of rhetoric, mimesis is often figured in this fashion. Mary 
Carruthers associates it with the aesthetics of “truthful representation” and artistic 
“realism,” and she opposes its “rote” learning strategies to the complex memory 
architectures used as rhetorical invention strategies by Medieval monks through the 
practice of mnesis (2-3, 72). Nathan Stormer similarly cites mnesis as a way of moving 
beyond the “age-old predilection to treat memory as mimetic,” as “copying” 
(“Recursivity” 38), and elsewhere associates mimesis with “representational practices 
of human beings seeking recognition” (“Encomium,” 225). No doubt these significant 
scholars are thinking of mimesis through its popular representation as imitatio, a 
doctrinal formulation of mimesis begun by the first-century BCE Greek rhetorician 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus that promoted the emulation of literary and historical 
works. Centuries later imitatio would be taken up and given new force by the Latin 
rhetorician Quintillian and the Renaissance thinker Erasmus, whose widely-read 1512 
textbook Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style instructed rhetors in how to adapt 
pre-existing texts into their own compositions. In Chapter 4, informed by concepts of 
Merleau-Ponty and others, I will offer an interpretation of imitatio that I hope will 
bring to light its enactive and “expressive” dimensions which have fallen to the 
wayside by the emphasis on the reproduction of ready-made forms. 
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Although I work toward a reconceptualization of mimesis that is more positive, 
I want to be clear that my dissertation will not shy away from aspects of mimesis that 
some compelling thinkers have argued devalues individual identity, erases difference, 
or reproduces static or idealized versions of “reality.” In Chapter 2, I will, for 
example, look closely at the work of Rene Girard, for whom mimesis is the origin of all 
that has plagued humankind from the inception of culture. But in doing so, I will point 
to how difficult it is, for Girard as well as for Horkheimer and Adorno – in fact, even 
for Plato and Aristotle – to pin the concept down to a single signification. Mimesis is 
and has for long been a slippery idea. As the literary scholar Matthew Potolsky fittingly 
puts it: 
Mimesis takes on different guises in different historical contexts, masquerading 
under a variety of related terms and translations: emulation, mimicry, 
dissimulation, doubling, theatricality, realism, identification, correspondence, 
depiction, verisimilitude, resemblance. No one translation, no one 
interpretation, is sufficient to encompass its complexity (1) 
The classical scholar Stephen Halliwell, in a study of the aesthetic tradition of 
mimeticism,12 argues along similar lines for broader conception of mimesis. He 
describes one of the guiding aims of his study as tracing and exposing “the complex 
diversity of mimeticism, from Plato to the present,” and he cites the “still regrettable 
translation of mimesis as ‘imitation’” as the greatest obstacle to a “sophisticated 
understanding of all the varieties of mimeticism” (13). It should be noted that 
Halliwell uncovers varieties of the concept within a framework restricted to aesthetic 
mimesis – mimeticism – and intentionally does not attend to its nonaesthetic 
dimensions. 
In this dissertation I will attend explore the nonaesthetic dimensions of mimesis 
and argue for why I think they are important for education, both in general and for the 
fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com where multimodality continues to emerge as a 
significant force. I therefore concur with the mimetic scholars Gunter Gebauer and 
Christoph Wulf that 
[c]onventional understandings of mimesis fall short of the complexity and 
significance of the concept. It is restricted in some cases to aesthetics, in 
others to imitation. These definitions reveal neither the anthropological 
 19 
 
dimension of mimesis nor the variety of meanings that can be and have been 
attached to the term (1). 
With this dissertation I join these scholars and others who seek “to expose the buried 
dimensions of [mimesis] and to correct and move beyond reductions . . . that result in 
an impoverishment of the term (7).  
To sum up, my particular approach to mimesis will employ a phenomenological 
framework informed by key concepts drawn from the work of Maurice Merleau Ponty. 
In the process, I hope to develop a phenomenology of what Walter Benjamin calls the 
“mimetic faculty,” a cognitive model of mimesis that I will frame as multimodal and 
offer as a paradigm for praxis in writing and communication. Mimesis is a vital function 
in our sensory-motor perception and hence central to body-engaged doing, making, 
and learning. I will link my reading of Merleau-Ponty to recent neuroscientific theories 
throughout my study. This will help me to show reconceive the largely disparaged 
term imitation – and its rhetorical instantiation as imitatio – as a key component of 
experiential knowledge. Through our social interactions, we all automatically – some 
might say instinctively - engage in a form of imitation that Vittorio Gallese calls 
embodied simulation, a term that captures how our bodies intentionally attune 
themselves to situations and contexts and to other humans who inhabit them. 
Experiential knowledge, from which all of our concepts derive, is cultivated in this 
basic mimetic capacity that all human beings, like many other species, possess.13 I 
believe that the mimetic theory I develop in this dissertation aligns nicely with recent 
incarnations of rhetoric as a form of attunement to situations conceived multimodally 
(Rickert would use the term ambient here)14, an attunement that is originary in the 
what the Greeks called phusis and which Enlightenment philosophers and Romantic 
poets idealized as “Nature.” Conjoined with Merlea-Ponty’s phenomenology, I will 
offer a pedagogy that I will call, simple enough, mimetic-multimodalty with the hope 
that it will influence scholars and teachers in the fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. I 
will now provide some background to my putting into pedagogical conversation 






The Organization of this Dissertation 
In addition to this introduction, my dissertation is divided into five chapters. Each one 
is subdivided into sections. My conclusion is integrated with Chapter 5 and in that 
section I provide an account of the kind of rhetorical theory I would like to see 
balanced with the current emphasis on persuasive argumentation. Endnotes can be 
found at the end of each chapter and a comprehensive bibliography (Works Cited) is 
provided at the conclusion of Chapter 5. I will conclude this introduction with a brief 
overview of the chapters that lie ahead. 
I begin Chapter 1 by first situating Merleau-Ponty in the philosophical 
movement known as phenomenology whose founder was Edmund Husserl and which 
includes as well the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Where Heidegger provided theories 
of relationality between people and their worlds, Merleau-Ponty focused on the actual 
“lived body” as the medium of those relations. For this reason, he was interested in 
how the body played a role in knowledge making and communication and identifies 
mimesis (in a version of the concept he borrows from the developmental psychologist 
Henri Wallon) as a key function of what he refers to throughout the corpus of his work 
as the body schema – a formulation that approximates what today is called by 
cognitive neuroscientists the sensory-motor system.15 Because Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion is foundational to the reconceptualization of mimesis that I develop in this 
dissertation, I trace its shaping power through several of his key ideas, including the 
body schema, his theories of style and expression, and the thin line between the 
actual and virtual - the experiential knowledge of the body and the conceptual 
knowledge that derives from it and has long assumed to stem from “the mind.” Of all 
of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, though, intercorporeity perhaps best aligns his 
phenomenology of perception with neuroscientific theories of situated cognition whose 
nexus, I argue, supports the mimetic-multimodal pedagogy I will develop in the last 
chapter of this dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 provides a phenomenological exegesis of the concept of mimesis, a 
continuation and elaboration of the rough sketch I provide above. I argue that the 
historical reduction of mimesis is in part the result of an overemphasis on its 
representative aspects, on rote “copying” in the service of aesthetic realism, which 
has effectively buried its nonrepresentational dimensions. Using Merleau-Ponty’s 
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phenomenological framework and drawing on the recent work of several mimetic 
scholars, I reveal how this expressive dimension is inherently bodily (which is one 
reason for its suppression by metaphysical conceptualism) and hence expressive and 
enactive, not just representational. I will show how this “dual-aspect” of mimesis that 
Stephen Halliwell sees as central to Aristotle’s theory of mimesis reveals itself in the 
work of even its most vitriolic critics, including Plato, Rene Girard, and (less 
virulently) Theodor Adorno. After attending to some of its more compelling 
problematizations, I consider Aristotlean mimesis from the vantage point of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and map its cognitively embodied instantiations in the 
philosophy of Walter Benjamin, the neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, and the affect 
theorists Anna Gibbs and Mark Hansen. 
 My objective for Chapter 3 is to pose my philosophical reconceptualization of 
mimesis for pedagogical application in embodied and material rhetorics. I begin by 
pointing out how the denigration of mimesis by Plato was intimately linked to his 
attack on the “imitative art” of rhetorike as practiced by the Sophists. The hegemony 
of Platonism in Western educational philosophy resulted in the privileging of high-
minded conceptualism, marginalizing the mimetic experiential pedagogy linking 
ancient rhetorical training with athletics (specifically grappling and wrestling) that 
took place in ancient gymnasia under the Sophists tutors. However, what Debra 
Hawhee calls the “bodily arts” of these ancient training regimens persisted in 
rhetorical education through the school the Romans called imitatio – a term that, in 
this dissertation, should be seen as a somewhat doctrinal formalization of the Greek 
mimesis. I argue that the “law of propriety,” which the Greeks called to prepon and 
the Romans saw as a key strategy of imitatio, preserved – and, in fact, exploited - the 
expressive and enactive dimensions of mimesis through the stylized representational 
enactments of epideictic oratory. I argue that the imperative to enact through 
language, vocalization, and gesture historical events in such a manner that listeners 
would palpable experience them speaks to an affective and thoroughly material 
rhetoricity that subtends symbolic representation and is a significant force in 
persuasive influence.  
 Chapter 4 applies the mimetic theory I have developed to multimodal 
composing. I begin by noting how the multimodal compositionists Kristin L. Arola and 
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Anne Frances Wysocki offer Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the body is one’s primary 
medium – “taking medium here in its grounding sense of that which is between, in the 
middle” (3) - in advancing a view of media not as a carrier of messages but as a living 
environment in which we are “always already embedded—embodied—in mediation” 
(4). The communication scholar Anna Gibbs takes this perspective even further by 
conceiving the body as an affective site of what she calls mimetic communication16 in 
which it “is not so much a medium as a series of media, each of which connects in its 
own way with technological media, including writing” (201). These and other recent 
theories of media allow for a phenomenological investigation of the sometimes 
ambiguous relationship between “multimedia” and “multimodality.” Where some feel 
we need to distinguish both terms, I argue in favor of the ambiguity. While distinction 
is important in production-based contexts of a course, I believe that in process-based 
contexts the blurring of the distinction between “modes” and “media” (a distinction 
even Gunter Kress struggles to maintain) can be pedagogically useful in having 
students cognitively situate themselves in creative or ambient environments. I believe 
that a cognitive rendering of multimodality insists on the (at least occasional) blurring 
of modalities and medialities, and between expression and representation, since 
similar perceptual and sensory overlaps occur sensory-motor body schemas and 
cultivate the experiential ground in which even conceptual knowledge is rooted. I 
believe that students (and instructors) should be able to think and experience multiple 
modes/media together for the purposes of invention as well as to distinguish one from 
the other for purposes of production. 
 In my fifth and concluding chapter, I offer pedagogical application of what I 
call mimetic multimodality to the disciplines of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. I believe 
that we need to explicitly integrate this approach into the rhetorical pedagogy that 
informs so many undergraduate composition and tech writing programs. I begin by 
critiquing the standardizing of rhetoric in undergraduate curricula as persuasive 
argumentation, a model that subscribes to a transmission view of communication and 
is invested in conceptual knowledge work. I end by offering a re-envisioning of 
rhetoric as receptive and enactive of influence as opposed to being beholden always 
to persuasion. While the broader category of influence includes persuasive 
argumentation, influencive rhetoric17 opens our disciplines more fully to the 
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experiential dimensions of communication – embodied, material, affective – which I 
view as reflexive and, following Merleau-Ponty and Gallese, intercorporeal before it is 
intersubjective. In between these two ends, I argue for a body-engaged (as opposed to 
hands-on) approach to teaching and learning in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. This 
involves, first, recognizing how the mimetic tradition of classical imitatio lives on 
through the increasingly popular pedagogy (especially in multimodal composing) of 
remediation and remix – the repurposing of the old to create the new. It also involves 
attending much more to the role of play (tinkering, fiddling, playing with) as a form of 
knowledge-building praxis; a re-envisioning of information (conventionally viewed 
conceptually as disembodied facts and details for transmission purposes) as enacted in 
material spaces or “cognitive ecologies”; and a re-integration of “writing” into a 
communicational model that inextricable weaves it with reading, speaking, and 
listening. I call such a model OVAL (an acronym for Oracy, Visuacy, Auracy, and 
Literacy) and offer it as an alternative to current writing-centric models whose forms 
and formats dominate undergraduate composition and technical communication 
courses. 
Finally, I would like to say a few words about my slightly heterodox critique of 
persuasive argumentation, which I see as the dominant rhetorical theory informing 
undergraduate composition and technical communication programs. While my model 
of mimetic multimodality could perhaps be employed to critique some current 
institutional practices that Sidney L. Dobrin claims are “haunted by academic 
prescription, economic and management thinking, and subject-driven approaches” 
(94), I want to my project to be perceived as congenial to the necessary procedures 
many academic programs have been forced to adopt in recent years under pressure by 
university administrations eager to satisfy accreditation criteria. In Postcomposition, 
Dobrin argues that the future of composition studies “demands disruption, 
epistemological and bureaucratic” (7) of student-focused, classroom-based, pedagogy-
oriented scholarship, practice, and program assessment. He attacks the CWPA (Council 
of Writing Program Administrators) – an organization I belong to – as a body that is 
“overtly about control and maintenance of power … over writing programs and writing 
pedagogies” (98) while only minimally acknowledging the influence exerted by wider 
ideological structures on the assessment processes and other “management” protocols 
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these programs have institutionalized, almost always through collaboration across 
disciplines and with periodic revision. 
While his posthumanist, postpedagogical, poststudent account of 
postcomposition compels philosophically, ultimately as professionals we need to work 
with and within existing structures. This dissertation will therefore advocate for a 
compositionism of the kind the philosopher Bruno Latour calls for in “An Attempt at a 
‘Compositionist Manifesto.” As he frames it, compositionism offers an alternative to 
critique, which “has all the limits of utopia: it relies on the certainty of the world 
beyond this world. By contrast, for compositionism, there is no world of beyond. It is 
all about immanence” (4). This view is, surprisingly for Latour, quite 
phenomenological.18 I would argue that it is also mimetic if we take immanent to 
mean expressive and enactive. But the larger point is that the things of the world 
which people like Dobrin perceive to be obstacles can reversibly be perceived as 
gateways. This is the view I take of the privileging of conceptual knowledge and the 
systems of instruction and assessment that help to maintain its dominance. It is not a 
boogeyman or even a necessary evil. It is simply the status quo, which every now and 
then needs to be balanced with an alternative in order to create a new way of 
thinking, doing, and living. I believe that my mimetic theory of multimodality and 
influencive rhetoric, by shedding light on the significant role experiential knowledge 
plays in everything we do both inside and outside of traditional classrooms, can help 
us and our students not only to think differently about learning and communicating, 
but to attune ourselves to the situations in which we learn and communicate, opening 
up a whole new horizon of knowledge work that is actually much more familiar to us 
than we may think.  
 
                                                            
1 By “curricular area” I have in mind primarily undergraduate courses offered through programs 
coordinated by a director. “Rhet Comp” is the popular shortened version of the field commonly called 
Composition and speaks to that field’s association with the rhetoric, a classical discipline that in recent 
scholarship has been going through marked transformation. Composition is sometimes called “writing 
studies,” a term I eschew in this project since it marginalizes modes of communication that I feel 
composition should attend to (this is discussed in the last chapter). Composition programs are variously 
called “freshman English,” “writing programs,” or simply “composition programs.” The Council of Writing 
Program Administrators uses the term “First Year Writing Program” (FYW) and calls directors of such 
programs “Writing Program Administrators” (WPAs). “Tech Com” is a shortened version of Technical 
Communication, a younger discipline and has not established itself as firmly as has composition in the 
general education curricula common to most higher education institutions in the United States. However, 
that may change given the technological sophistication of so many professional practices and the demand 
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for people to know how to communicate that sophistication across multiple professional fields. Technical 
Communication is the scholarly and professional field that developed around specialized curricula that 
was originally designed for students in the engineering and technical fields for professional 
communication. However, with the proliferation of so many different specializations both across and 
within professional fields and academic majors, undergraduate courses in technical communication must 
address the needs of students with a wide variety of majors. As a result, undergraduate programs in Tech 
Com are often a mix of traditional technical writing (writing about technology in genres such as training 
manuals or user guides), scientific writing (lab reports, research articles), and professional writing 
(business proposals, grants, career documents).  The term Tech Com refers to both the scholarly field and 
to the programs it encompasses. 
2 I will use the more general adjective “situated” for understanding cognition as embodied, extended, and 
distributed. Each one of these terms designates a specialized research area within a general framework 
that understands cognition as involving more elements that just the human brain and “mind.” The term 
that most generally applies to such a framework, situated, I will use primarily in this dissertation. 
3 In this dissertation I draw frequently from Hawhee’s 2004 book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in 
Ancient Greece. 
4 This comparison is made through a reference to a quote by Johann Peter Hebel (Heidegger’s citation: 
Works, ed. Altwegg III, 314): “We are plants which – whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not – must 
with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and bear fruit.” 
5 This is clear in the subtitle of their 1999 book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its 
Challenge to Western Thought. 
6 The title of Rickert’s 2013 book is Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being.  Although 
my own study only occasionally references Rickert’s major concepts, I do feel that there are strong 
parallels between his work with kairos and my work with mimesis, his drawing on Heidegger and mine on 
Merleau-Ponty, as well as his conception of rhetoric as ambient and my model – given at the end of 
Chapter 5 – of a rhetoric of influence. I very much like how he describes attunement as “given in its 
dynamic unfolding by an originary, world rhetoricity, an affectability inherent in how the world comes to 
be. Attunement conveys the countless modalities of responsiveness to this affectability . . . . [which 
means that we] are always already attuned; there are only changes in attunement” (8-9). In this 
dissertation, I offer mimesis as a force in how we structurally and materially attune ourselves with others, 
our situations, and environments. 
7 I base this statement on the compelling argument made by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 
Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought: conceptual thinking is 
rooted in the body’s experience of material space as evidenced by the spatial metaphoricity of language, 
even in its most abstract instantiations. A similar argument is made by Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese in their 
article “The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory Motor-System in Conceptual Knowledge.” 
8 See Chris Drew’s “Sophistic Training and Experiential Learning: A Methodology of Mind-Body Syncretism” 
(Pedagogy, 7:2, Spring 2007, pp. 303-8) 
9 Halliwell considers this definition of mimesis by Aristotle reductive, failing to capture the philosopher’s 
broad conception of both “imitate” and “nature.” I will discuss this in Chapter 3. 
10 Halliwell compares empathy with a slightly more congenial approach to identification achieved 
emotionally through sumpaschein, (“sympathy”) that, while bad in Plato’s eyes, at least allowed a 
subconscious degree of mental disassociation (80). 
11 In a similar mode, the playwright Bertolt Brecht sought to denaturalize theatrical productions that 
allowed for the sympathetic identification of audiences with characters and situations in order to create a 
“critical spectatorship” (Halliwell, 91). Such a perspective would, he hoped, shake awake mass audiences 
from the bourgeois spell cast over them, a perspective they would then bring to the everyday world 
where their lives were controlled by an aristocratic elite. Though they occupied opposite poles of the 
political spectrum, both Plato and Brecht believed that rationalist critique would have liberatory effects. 
12 Throughout his study, Halliwell uses the term mimeticism for a mostly artistic tradition that is informed 
by cultural understandings of the concept mimesis. In many cases, both terms are used interchangeable. 
13 As I will show in Chapter 1, not all human beings possess this capacity in full. Merleau-Ponty reveals 
how a brain-damaged WWI veteran is unable to mimic a salute that he once had performed many times. 
While at the level of basic perception his body is able to translate the world so that he can engage with it 
in meaningful ways – such as holding a job – his mimetic capacity is seriously diminished due to damage to 
his brain. As for the mimetic faculty of nonhuman species: there is a vast body of literature detailing how 
insects, frogs and toads, fish, and many mammals attune themselves to intimately to their environments 
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that their bodies, as Caillois noted, blend into it. The Mirror Neuron System that I discuss ahead was 
discovered by scientists working with monkeys. As a cognitive function, mimesis is shared among many 
living things.  
14 For Rickert, the “attunements of rhetorical being” inherent in our existence require a 
reconceptualization of rhetoric as ambient (the Latin ambientem attends to what is surrounding, 
encircling, environing; p. 5). Importantly for my purpose, ambient rhetoric is phenomenological, Rickert 
tells us, in its attention to the “ensemble of things, situations, and purposes that define the everyday” 
(171), and its participation in the “world” as thought through Martin Heidegger as a mutually achieved 
composite of meaning and matter. What is presented to us through our doing and making “is disclosed as 
already fitted into material environments and holistic forms of significance” and includes nonhuman 
elements (xii-xiii).  In line with similar proposals made recently by the rhetorical scholar Diane Davis, 
Rickert asks us to reconceive rhetoric as ontological – not just persuasive – since it engages with questions 
on how we interact with each other, generate and negotiate knowledge, and how the “human being” and 
the world simple are (xv, 162). Ambient rhetoric offers a framework that reveals the enactive dimension 
of praxis – practice, doing and making – that I will argue is not only fundamentally rhetorical but mimetic. 
15 The Merleau-Ponty scholar Scott Marratto, a member of my dissertation committee, has noted how 
neuroscientific discussions of the sensory-motor system tend to focus predominantly on the neurological 
processes of the brain at the exclusion of the body’s many other attributes and functions which altogether 
contribute to the body schema. While the mimetic theories of Vittorio Gallese  (such as intentional 
attunement and embodied simulation) extend outward to the social realm, they are very much rooted in 
the so-called Mirror Neuron System of the brain’s pre-frontal cortex – a theory discovered long after 
Merleau-Ponty had died – and of which Gallese was one of the discoverers. 
16 I will discuss Gibb’s theory of mimetic communication in Chapter 2. 
17 I prefer this spelling to “influential” and its connotation of persuasive appeal rooted in some kind of 
power structure.  
18 In Pandora’s Hope, Latour somewhat reductively writes: “Phenomenology deals only with a world-for-
the-human-consciousness” (10). Although Merleau-Ponty in later years recorded a similar criticism about 
his book Phenomenology of Perception, Marratto believes that this text along with other work from his 
early years was nonetheless “not inattentive to ontological concerns . . .” (6). 
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Chapter 1: Mimesis in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
 
Abbreviations of sources by Merleau-Ponty:1 
? PhP – Phenomenology of Perception 
? WP – World of Perception 
? PoW – Prose of the World 
? CAL – Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language 
? VI – Visible and Invisible 
? CRO – “The Child’s Relations with Others” 
? EO – “The Experience of Others” 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Tradition 
Before exploring Merleau-Ponty’s work in relation to imitation, I would like to situate 
him in the philosophical movement known as phenomenology. Founded around the 
turn of the twentieth century by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, 
phenomenology offered an alternative to the scientific realism that influenced 
European intellectual trends for some time. Scientific realism attempts to discover 
what is “real” by examining the properties of objects and things that can be measured 
and quantified. Properties that do not lend themselves to this kind of mathematical 
analysis were not deemed to have “reality.” The distinction that Plato made long ago 
between reality and appearance, wherein with appearance was associated with the 
physical world and matter, and hence with the body, became concretized. The couch 
that Socrates sat on was of the realm of appearance, a vague formulation of a 
metaphysical Couchness. But where Plato saw the material world as an inferior copy of 
ideal reality, the scientific tradition saw it instrumentally, as a means of obtaining 
insight into the “Nature” that was reality or what the Greeks called phusis. The 
seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes’ separation of “mind” from “body” 
contributed to this clear-cut distinction in an intellectual movement that culminated 
with the Scientific Revolution.  Neoclassicism represented the body not as we actually 
know it – from an experiential first-person perspective – but more as an object 
observed from a third-person, or “objective,” perspective. Phenomenology attempts 
to turn this entire tradition inside out. 
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 Although Husserl did not discount scientific accounts such as Galileo’s 
mathematically rendered representation of the world, he argued that objective 
interpretations did not represent the real so much as they were abstracted from it. He 
believed that, first and foremost, we inhabit a “lived world” (lebenswelt), the 
appearances of which do not exist as “objects” in a geometrically mappable space and 
behind which exist “the Real.” Instead, the “the Real” is generated in our perception 
of phenomena, in how the things of the world appear to us not through analysis and 
contemplation but by literally experiencing them. Simply put, we come to know the 
lived world through experience, by literally living in it. All theories about the things 
that we perceive, including scientific realism, are secondary to the primacy that is 
perception itself. This means that knowledge is, fundamentally, the ongoing product 
of experience. Our conceptual knowledge rests solely on the foundation of knowledge 
we acquire by interacting with the very material world in which we live. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy takes up Husserl’s idea of a lived world but shifts the 
focus from how it appeared to human consciousness to how it was registered by the 
human body’s sensory-motor perceptual system. He considers not only how we become 
conscious of the living world but how we come to inhabit it through direct experiential 
contact. In doing so, he offered a radically first-person perspective that called for a 
revamping of the received accounts of human behavior that in his time were accepted 
across a wide range of philosophies and scientific fields, including psychology. His 
phenomenology also offered a radical rethinking of the classical separation of ontology 
(being) from epistemology (knowing). To Merleau-Ponty, the meaning of things, their 
“significance,” is not the product of interpretation by the mind after it has processed 
data transmitted to it via the senses – a model famously proposed by John Locke and 
which later served as the theoretical basis for a “computational” paradigm that long 
informed theories of cognition; rather, significance is generated at every moment by 
the body’s interaction with its Umwelt, its surroundings, its world. Since action itself 
is meaning, there can be separation between “mind” and “body” or between “body” 
and “world.” 
This account departs radically not only from the empirical and intellectual 
traditions that Merleau-Ponty saw as constituting the framework of our received 
knowledge,2 but also from classical humanist accounts of subjectivity whereby the 
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“human being,” in addition to being the measure of all things and the highest of all 
living species, was a distinct entity whose individuality bespoke of an independent self 
with full agency. In ways that complemented and in some ways completed the 
phenomenological work of his contemporary Martin Heidegger,3 Merleau-Ponty 
advanced the idea that humans are beings-in-the-world, not separate from it, not over 
and above it, but simply in it and of it. By recasting the human “self” or “psyche” as a 
body-subject, Merleau-Ponty rooted human being in a body that was itself rooted in 
the world and whose “sense” of the world is generated through embodied experience 
with it – again, “sense” not being a product of consciousness but the interaction 
between one’s body and world that is itself significance. Life does not “have a 
meaning”; it is meaning. 
One gets the impression in reading Merleau-Ponty that he sees phenomenology as 
a kind of recovery effort. In a series of radio broadcasts in 1948, he repeatedly 
describes what he calls the “world of perception” – “the world which is revealed to us 
by our senses and in everyday life” – as something that modern art and philosophy is 
just to beginning to “rediscover” (WP 31-2).  He wants to bring this world hidden from 
us beneath the sediment of received knowledge and social life “back to life” (69).  
The slow-moving paradigm shift from the classical to the modern era was the initial 
spark of this “reawakening” (53) and things are still changing radically. In his 
Phenomenology of Perception he flatly states that the empiricist and intellectualist 
models upon which Western intellectual culture has been built are “collapsing before 
our eyes” – bringing down with it the “ideality of the objective, the objectification of 
the living body,” and the reduction of experiential phenomena “to third-person 
processes” (64-5).  Philosophy therefore needs to return to the “actual” world that is 
prior to the objective world and “rediscover phenomena” as the layer of experience 
through which other people and things are first given to us. Experiential existence he 
calls “the system of self-other-things” and its incessant coming into being at each 
moment of our lives we have lost sight of (65-6). 
Clearly, my aspirations for this dissertation resonate with those he held for 
phenomenology. I, too, wish to contribute to a “rediscovering” of experiential 
knowledge and the role it plays in learning and living. I want accomplish this by 
unearthing the buried phenomenological dimensions of mimesis. In this sense what I 
30 
 
have been calling a reconceptualization is primarily a rediscovery or, better (given the 
metaphor of burial I am using here), a recovery effort. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology will help me in this endeavor, and it is toward his theories about 
imitation that I now turn. 
 
The Function of Mimesis “in its Most Fundamental and Irreducible Form” 
In the pages ahead I will provide a general overview of the role played by “imitation” 
in Merleau-Ponty’s work. I put “imitation” in quotation marks because that is the word 
which appears most frequently in the English translations of his work I am working 
with. He also uses the term “mimic” and “mimicry,” sometimes in seemingly specific 
ways,4 when describing certain manners or styles of imitation, and at one point he 
employs mimesis itself to describe a fundamental “function” in the body’s sensory-
motor perception of things. While Merleau-Ponty does not offer an explicit theory of 
imitation, the human imitative capacity is clearly fundamental to, and significantly 
broadened by, four of his concepts that I will refer back to in the chapters ahead: the 
body schema, intercorporeity, style and expression,5 and our bodies’ ongoing 
reversible slippage between actual and virtual modes of existence. Threaded 
throughout all three categories are other concepts whose significance to imitation can 
be teased out with reference to the contexts in which he touches on them as well as 
to scholarship on his work. They include reversibility between subject and object, 
identification through habituation, intersubjectivity, the body as a form of media, and 
perceptual apprehension as the enaction of meaning or significance. These concepts 
are not distinct from each other but are interwoven with each other along with the 
three that I identify above. 
 I will embark on Merleau-Ponty’s theory of imitation by grabbing the proverbial 
bull by the horns and zeroing in on his direct use of mimesis. The term is used several 
times in his essay “The Child’s Relations with Others” when describing the renowned 
child psychologist Henri Wallon’s theories of infant development. Sympathy, he tells 
us, paraphrasing Wallon, appears in the child “on the foundation of mimesis” (154). 
Merleau-Ponty describes mimesis as “an ensnaring of me by the other,” an attitude by 
which we assume the gestures, conducts, words, and ways of doing things of those we 
confront. He elaborates: 
31 
 
Mimesis, or mimicry, is the power of assuming conducts or facial expressions as 
my own; this power is given to me with the power I have over my own body. It is 
the ‘postural function appropriate to the needs of expression’ (Wallon). The 
constant regulation of bodily equilibrium, without which no function (and in 
particular no perceptual function) would be possible in the child, is not merely 
the capacity to reunite the minimal conditions for balancing the body but is more 
generally the power I have to realize with my body gestures that are analogous to 
those I see. (154). 
He describes how Wallon shows “great insight” in relating mimesis to the postural 
function of what Wallon calls the “postural schema” and what Merleau-Ponty calls, 
following other researchers, the “corporeal schema” (schema corporel) or body 
schema.6 He notes in particular Wallon’s idea of “postural impregnation that is 
resolved in gestures of imitation” – that is, the bodily absorption of another’s conduct 
which is manifested in its imitation (for example, a yawn) – and cites Wallon’s 
description of a child who, after watching a chirping bird for some time, “sets himself 
to reproducing the bird’s sounds as well as something of the bird’s bearing” (145). 
Merleau-Ponty observes that “not only the perception of another child but even that 
of an animal quite different from the child himself shows up, thanks to the postural 
function, in attitudes that resemble those of the other and have their same expressive 
value” (145). 
 It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “expressive,” not 
representational, to describe “attitudes that resemble those of the other.” Mimesis 
here, grounded as it is in intersubjective identification through sympathy, is not 
rendered as copying which I feel bears a closer relationship to representation than 
does expression. The child’s mimicry speaks to a bodily association that may indeed be 
“mindless” in its replication, but that does not mean it lacks significance. What we 
see in this example, I contend, is an instance of experiential knowledge work. But as I 
asked in my introduction: what is the nature of that knowledge work? Merleau-Ponty 
here provides an answer. In fact, he uses this example to distinguish somewhat his 
own view of mimesis from Wallon’s. Whereas Wallon sees the postural function as an 
“inward formulation” of gestures, Merleau-Ponty sees “the unfolding of different 
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phases of this process” where the perception arouses in the perceiver “the 
preparation of a motor activity related to it” (146): 
It is this fundamental correspondence between perception and motility . . . that 
allows the perception . . . to translate itself into an original motor organization. 
This is what would be the function of mimesis or mimicry, in its most fundamental 
and irreducible form. (146) 
This fundamental correspondence between perception and motility that enables an 
original motor organization – mimesis in its most fundamental form – is apparently the 
operation which allows an infant of around three months old to imitate a smile even 
though it has no visual experience of her own body that would allow for a “point to 
point correspondence” between the smiling mouth of the adult and the her own 
mouth. Merleau-Ponty sees the “motor smile” that the child makes as generated not 
by her “mind” but by her body schema. Constituted kinesthetically, introceptively,  
cenesthesically, and tactilely, the body schema allows the young child to “globally 
identify” with the actions she observes performed toward her by others (116-117).  
Her body is able to “translate” the smiles and other facial expressions she observes 
because “they all have in common a certain style of action, a certain gestural 
meaning that makes of the collection an already organized totality” (118; emphasis 
his). Because global identification arises from a “coupling” – Merleau-Ponty cites 
Husserl here – between the body schema of the perceiver with the body schema of the 
perceived, there arises a kind of attunement, a sense of the familiar, a “certain 
style,” wherein “the other’s intentions somehow play across my body while my 
intentions play across his” (118-119). The culmination of significance engendered 
through an attunement through to a situation’s “style” Merleau-Ponty calls expression, 
which I will describe in the next section. 
The (intercorporeal) coupling between body schemas allows for (intersubjective) 
expression and, ultimately, communication. Merleau-Ponty observes how sympathy – 
“the system ‘me-and-other’” – would emerge from this complex “foundation of 
mimesis” since what is being “translated” from perception to motility in the 
observer’s body simulates what is being transferred, via perception, from the body of 
the other to the observer. Sympathy stems from a global bodily identification that in 
the stages of “precommunication” is characterized as the absence of a division 
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between the self and others. The phenomenon Wallon calls “syncretic sociability” is 
hence exemplary of sympathy: when a group of babies are together and one responds 
to something with a cry, they all start crying – a kind of “contagion” that Merleau-
Ponty believes disappears only as visual perception develops. (124, 125-6). While at 
one level syncretic sociability reveals how human infants are so attuned to each other 
that the cry of one becomes the cry of all, at another level we understand that their 
attunement is also situated.  To say simply that “the babies cry because they identify 
with each other” ignores the global parameters. The babies also identify with the 
situation. What does that mean? Merleau-Ponty gives the example of a child who is 
scolded by his father for having a glass in his hand. After putting the glass down, the 
child forgets about it and moves onto other things. But five minutes later, upon 
hearing the sound of breaking glass, the child becomes just as agitated as if he still 
were holding the forbidden item. “The child confuses himself with his situation,” 
Merleau-Ponty explains. “He is someone who has been holding a glass in his hand, 
someone who has had a relation with the glass, so that the subsequent breaking of the 
glass concerns him” (146-7). This, along with a few other examples, demonstrates how 
“[t]he child is, in fact, the situation and has no distance from it” (147). 
 Merleau-Ponty’s description of mimesis, based as it is on Wallon’s account, is 
by far more complex than the word’s conventional association with imitation 
conceived as rote copying and monotonous repetition. Before moving on, I would like 
to point out a few important details here. First, following Wollan, Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of mimesis as a fundamental function of our body’s sensory-motor system in 
that it governs the process by which a perception “translates itself” into a motor 
action while simultaneously transferring that action across an intersubjective field. 
Second, mimesis, while primarily introjective in psychoanalytic terms,7 seems central 
to the enactment of a global identification that is not limited to human others. The 
relations between the child and his world are evoked in his interaction with animals as 
well as things (the glass) and extend to include the situation in which these 
interactions occur. Hence “[w]e must link the notion of ipseity [selfhood] to that of 
the situation,” he tells us elsewhere, “the ego ought to be defined as identical with 
the act in which it projects itself” (CAL, 49). What might be said to be intersubjective 
relations – relations between human subjects – are not the only set of relations 
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mimesis functions to enact; relations are also intercorporeal if we see corporeality as 
including bodies that are not limited to human subjects. Third, imitation stems not 
from an act of copying but from “coupling” or attuning to others and situations; in 
imitating one identifies not so much with a specific action but with its larger context – 
its “style” – that arises through this coupling. No metaphysical or symbolic meaning is 
transmitted here; rather, “conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of gestural 
meaning” which is immanent in all our communication acts, including speech (PhP, 
208; italics in original). Finally, and in sum, complex mimetic operations occur at the 
level of affect and are embodied – that is, mimesis is a function of the sensory-motor 
body schema. 
 It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty in this essay conveys the idea that 
the child’s “ensnared” mimetic relation with others erases their distinction and 
eliminates difference. In the following pages, I will show that this is not quite the 
case. Because “The Child’s Relations with Others” was composed as a series of 
introductory lectures for a university course he was teaching, his primary concern 
seems to have been to represent the theories of Henri Wallon and other experts in 
childhood psychology and development. His own views on these theories seems to take 
a back seat to this exposition. Still, in addition to showing how Merleau-Ponty engaged 
with mimesis itself, this essay serves as a nice initial foray into his complex 
understanding of imitation, which I will now delve into in greater detail beginning with 
the concept of the body schema. 
 
The Body Schema and Our Capacity for Intercorporeal Embodied Simulation 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the idea of a corporeal schema (or “body schema” as it is 
more popularly rendered in English) was pioneered by the English neurologist Henry 
Head before being taken over and “enriched” by Henri Wallon, who preferred the 
term postural schema. (CRO, 145). Merleau-Ponty describes it as a system “whose 
different introceptive and extroceptive aspects express each other reciprocally, 
including even the roughest relations with surrounding space and its principal 
directions” including the vertical, horizontal, and other axes that coordinate our 
positions within an environment (CRO, 117) . The “consciousness” we have of our 
bodies is not of an “isolated mass”; rather, it is the body schema that is evoked 
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(however, as I will discuss below, some researchers distinguish between the body 
image that we are “conscious” of and the body’s proprioceptive awareness of itself, 
which would be the body schema). In actuality, we never perceive an integral “self” or 
“psyche” in the people we interact with; instead, we perceive “conduct” that is 
expressive of their intentions as coordinated by their body schemas (117). Following 
Wallon, Merleau-Ponty believed that experience, hence experiential knowledge, 
begins introceptively as a way to navigate the “chaos in which I am submerged” (118). 
It only begins to take on discernible shape between the third and sixth months as the 
interoceptive system collaborates with the exteroceptive system to create a “minimal 
body equilibrium” (122 ) that ultimately serves as the foundation of a sense of self. 
The child has a “tacit understanding” of his or her being-in-the-world but this kind of 
subconscious self-awareness is not, he stresses, a “positional consciousness, a 
representation, Vor-stellung” (PhP, 119). 
Empirical studies of neonate imitation in recent times provide support for the 
existence of a body schema and how Merleau-Ponty described its functions, but with 
an important exception. Contrary to Wallon’s and Merleau-Ponty’s belief that the body 
schema developed after birth through a child’s intersubjective perceptual relations 
with others, evidence suggests instead that a general structure consistent with a body 
schema is innate. Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff contend that all humans, at 
the time of birth, possess “a built-in neural framework or substrate; a schema from 
the very beginning, but one that is also open to modification by multimodal sensory 
experiences” throughout their lifetimes (214).  Whereas Merleau-Ponty believed that 
an infant’s neurological immaturity at the time of birth blocked an elaboration of the 
body schema, studies conducted by Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore8 have shown that 
infants are capable not only of external perception but of outright imitation of the 
gestures of others within the first hour of birth (one infant who “showed a strong 
imitation” effect was just 42 minutes old) (212, 221). The ability of the child to 
engage in invisible imitation – the “motor smile” that Merleau-Ponty calls the 
expression that appears on a child’s face in response to the “visible smile” perceived 
in another (CRO 116) – is not something that comes to her over time but something 
that can be enacted immediately after birth.  
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What does develop over time is what Gallagher and Meltzoff describe as the body 
image, which they distinguish from the body schema in ways that are not always clear 
in Merleau-Ponty.9 They describe the body image as “a complex set of mental 
representations of the body” that derives from a subject’s perceptual experience of 
his body, conceptual understanding of the body in general, and emotional attitude 
toward his body; though the latter two are not necessarily conscious, because they 
contribute to a set of beliefs or attitudes they form part of an “intentional system.”  
In contrast, the body schema is a system of motor functions operating below the level 
of self-referential intentionality and “involves a set of tacit performances, 
preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and 
movement” (216).  
What links the body image to the body schema is proprioception, which has a 
twofold function: (1) it consists of nonconscious, physiological information that 
updates the body with respect to posture and movement, and therefore plays a vital 
role in the body schema; and (2) this proprioceptive information can be the basis for 
proprioceptive awareness – allowing me to tell you where my legs are when my eyes 
are closed – which helps support the perceptual aspect of the body image (223). 
Because the child is born with a “primitive” framework for both of these systems – the 
body schema and body image – she possesses a proprioceptive awareness of her own 
(invisible) body that allows her to simulate novel facial expressions and gestures she 
observes in others as well even to “monitor, correct, and improve imitative 
performance” (225). Meltzoff and Moore have called this primitive framework a 
“supramodal perceptual system” in which proprioceptive and visual modalities of 
perception are already in communication with each other and “enables the infant to 
recognize a structural equivalence between itself and the other people” (225-6).  
Interpreting what Merleau-Ponty terms a “certain style of action” (CRO 118)10 as a 
“translation” between perception and motility in the “transfer” of gestural 
signification, Gallagher and Meltzoff offer as an alternative model this “supramodal 
code.”  Consequently, they argue, 
no “translation” or transfer is necessary because it is already accomplished, and 
already intersubjective. A supramodal code already reaches across the child’s 
relations with others. Infants already apprehend, with quickly-improving 
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precision, the equivalences between the visible body transformations of others 
and their own invisible body transformations which they experience 
proprioceptively. The concept of supramodal code means that the visual and 
motor systems speak the same “language” right from birth.  . . . The [body] 
schema, working systematically with proprioceptive awareness, operates as a 
proprioceptive self that is always already “coupled” with the other. (225-6) 
The “proprioceptive self” the authors describe here is what the body intuitively 
perceives as its distinction from others and situations, even in infants whose excess of 
sympathy Merleau-Ponty saw as “ensnaring” them with others. Frederique de 
Vignemont argues that this implicit sense of “self” – which she hypothesizes is 
grounded exclusively in the body schema 11 – is what keeps us from confusing self and 
other despite evidence that shows how observing pain and other bodily effects in 
others activates the same (“mirror”) neural network in the somatosensory cortex as in 
those directly experiencing it (431).  It is what gives us a first-personal sense of bodily 
“ownership” and has a permanency that lasts longer than a single bodily experience 
(445).  Vittorio Gallese, Morris N. Eagle, and Paolo Migone reach a similar conclusion. 
Although fMRI studies of people witnessing disgust exhibited in the facial expressions 
of others directly experiencing disgust activated the anterior insula in the same 
overlapping location – indicating how first- and third-person experiences of a specific 
emotion “are underpinned by the activity of a shared neural substrate” (141) – their 
embodied simulation of the phenomenon is not a “mere repetition” because of 
different “degrees of activation” in the same somatosensory areas that support the 
“disentanglement of who is who” (152,142).  In other words, we are born with an 
innate sense of difference. Identification with others or with a situation is never total 
despite nearly identical neural activations. Similarly, our bodily imitations are not 
“copies” of some external model (as Plato would argue) or emanations of some 
essential inner form (as Aristotle would suggest); rather, they are approximate, 
appropriate simulations that correspond to actions we perceive in others. We are 
“ensnared” only in the sense that we respond automatically to the other bodies we are 




At this point, we might need to update the term “imitation” as used by Merleau-
Ponty in the work he produced during the mid-20th century. In our situated 
interactions with other people and things, we all12 automatically engage in what 
Gallese, et al., call “intentional attunement,” a specific, shared, phenomenal state 
generated in part by the mirror neuron system. This system allows for embodied 
simulation that is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the observer of 
actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed” (131). 
They oppose embodied simulation to theories of “standard simulation” which posit 
that observers generate mental representations by imaginatively adopting the 
circumstances of the observed target (143). The authors make it clear that this 
mandatory, prereflexive mechanism “is not the result of a deliberate and conscious 
cognitive effort” and instead “generates a peculiar quality of familiarity with other 
individuals” (143-4). It is notable that Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror 
neurons, joins his colleagues in arguing that the term mirroring is “misleading” since 
“simulation does not necessarily imply overt imitative behavior.” If a baby cries, they 
write, the mother does not also cry, “a response that would reflect contagion rather 
than empathic attunement”; instead, her response is “in some way congruent with” 
the bodily state of her baby (151).  Similar observations made by the psychoanalytic 
theorist Daniel Stern about how this kind of cross-modal translation process enacted 
by a baby’s cries is productive of difference – “isomorphism without identity” – helps 
to facilitate the infant’s gradual recognition of its “self” (its body image) over time 
(Gibbs, 195). 
As we will see, this concept of embodied simulation nicely complements what 
Merleau-Ponty’s refers to as the “imitative way” through which we attune to, or 
couple with, the situations or people we come into contact with. It also helps to de-
totalize his example of syncretic sociability which implies that all babies cry 
automatically when one sets off the chain reaction; while there is a “degree of 
activation” in each one’s mirror neuron systems that allows for global identification, 
there are also degree of simulated response to the situation, including the fact that 
some babies in some groups may very well react in ways other than crying. 
There is another component to embodied simulation that we need to consider 
before moving on. Like Gallagher and Meltzoff, Gallese elsewhere (“The Two Sides of 
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Mimesis”) contends that at the moment of birth “humans are engaged in interpersonal 
mimetic relations” that occur in a shared “we-centric” space (11). This makes 
embodied simulation a crucial component to what recent theories in developmental 
psychology call a “shared mind” (12) that is intersubjectively constituted. But Gallese 
suggests the term intersubjectivity – that is, comprehension and communication 
between human subjects - does not adequately capture the bodily dimension of our 
behavioral simulations that subtends comprehension and communication. These bodily 
“instantiations of unconscious mimesis” (9) is best understood, he contends, through 
an account of “intersubjectivity viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity”(13), a 
term he apparently appropriates from Merleau-Ponty.13 Our neurologically responsive 
“situated motor systems” creates a pragmatic “openness to the world” before and 
below our theoretical takes on it which allow humans to “share the same intentional 
objects” (4). If we are “ensnared,” Gallese would argue, it is at the level or 
intercorporeity. Intersubjectivity simply stems from this. 
While Gallese’s emphasis on a primary intercorporeity has the potential to bring 
us to the brink of a nonhuman dimension to embodied simulation – the role of objects 
in our interactions – his focus remains centered on human interaction.14 In the 
chapters ahead, I will make the case that Merleau-Ponty’s account of intercorporeity 
allows for a coupling with bodies that include nonhumans, often through mimetic 
imitation and repetition is the foundation of our habits. Scott Marratto points 
generally in this direction when he attends to Merleau-Ponty’s description of a simple 
handshake: “he and I are like one single intercorporeity” (qtd, 144). Marratto 
interprets intercorporeity as a “field” in which the unity of one’s body is accomplished 
unconsciously through the “mutual involvement of bodies” in certain interactions. 
Whereas intersubjectivity concerns a relation between (conscious) subjects, the point 
to be made about intercorporeity is that “my body is already bound up with the 
other’s body before there can be any relation between conscious subjects” (144), a 
statement with which Gallese would agree. Taking a cue from Merleau-Ponty, I will 
similarly adopt the perspective of intercorporeity as binding relations between bodies 
– not subjects – but will include nonhumans in the former category since they are, with 
the exception of some animals perhaps, clearly excluded by the latter.  
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 In the Phenomenology of Perception, nonhuman bodies intersect with human 
ones in ways most of us (due to an ingrained anthropocentrism perhaps) are rarely 
cognizant of. Merleau-Ponty points out how our habits – which are acquired primarily 
through imitation15 – help to give us “our anchorage in the world” (167). It is, he says, 
“literally true” that a subject learning to type “incorporates” the keyboard space into 
his bodily space; similarly, the experienced organist “incorporates within himself” the 
dimensions and directions of an organ he has never played before, settling into it “as 
one settles into a house” (168). In these examples and in others, Merleau-Ponty clearly 
demonstrates Gail Weiss’s contention that to “describe embodiment as 
intercorporeality is to emphasize that the experience of being embodied is never a 
private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other 
human and nonhuman bodies” (5). These interactions are accomplished through our 
attunement to certain frequencies (this is my term here) that emerge from the 
situations in which we are immersed. These currents Merleau-Ponty calls “style” and it 
is one of two intimately related concepts that I will turn to now. 
 
Enacting Expression through Mimetic Attunement to Style 
Two key concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy – style and expression – are so closely 
entwined that it makes sense for me to discuss them together. “One cannot say that 
style stands apart from expression,” he tells us. “The expression of sadness, for 
example, is a means of being sad” (EO, 49). Merleau-Ponty describes style as a 
“certain manner of dealing with situations … by taking over that manner myself in an 
almost imitative way, even though I may not be able to define it” (PhP, 382). Our 
“existential mimicry” of a situation’s style enacts a “process of expression” that 
“brings the meaning into existence as the very thing at the heart” of situations (212). 
Style is a sort of frequency one attunes to when their actions help give rise to the 
significance of a situation or event. Expression is that significance. Both concepts help 
Merleau-Ponty to develop an ontology wherein our bodies, threaded through the global 
fabric of this process, enact the world through perception and motility; this 
enactment is simultaneously the world expressing itself through our bodily actions. 
Before continuing, I want to foreground a word I have been using all along: 
enactment. I use this term as a very general equivalent to expression, a sense 
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captured in Marratto’s statement that “expression is always the enactment of a 
decision about the sense of sensible being . . . (188). It is not a decision reached and 
acted upon by a single human agent. Like style, expression is a complex concept in 
Merleau-Ponty and probing its ontological layers is impossible within the scope of this 
dissertation. But in numerous descriptions – for instance, “[e]xpression is everywhere 
creative, and what is expressed is inseparable from it” (PhP, 455) – expression is 
clearly figured as an enactive process or event. This is important, the “expressive” 
powers of mimesis (Halliwell 14, 293) that so alarmed Plato and strongly inclined 
Aristotle toward an enactive conception of the term16 (168) resonate both with 
Gallese’s (2009) association of mimesis with enactive cognition through embodied 
simulation and with what Merleau-Ponty’s provocatively describes as the “magic” of 
expression in dramatic events. The actor’s enactment of another’s bodily gestures and 
expressions through the “nonlogical operation” of imitation – an operation whose roots 
sink into our body schemas – has the power to “animate” (his word: entraîne) our own 
bodies, stirring up “highly ambiguous feelings” between actor and audience (52-53). 
The basis of this “magic” enacted by the actor, he writes, “is in the intentionality 
which links our body to the world” (53). In this sense, the “actor’s art is therefore only 
an extension of the art we all possess. My body schema directs itself to the perceived 
world and to the imaginary as well.” For some people, there is a real danger in that 
“movement of transcendence that represents the expressive signification of the 
body.” It is precisely this expressive signification – the “sympathy” Plato saw 
generated from mimesis – that Merleau-Ponty says “explains the history of why actors 
have been so admired and nevertheless excluded from normal civil rights” (53).    
Clearly, Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of imitation in terms of style and expression 
provide a useful way to think about mimesis as expressive and enactive. But, like the 
body schema as well as style and expression, these are not ideas he came up with on 
his own. They worked their way into this vocabulary through his readings of the 
phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler as well as his research in early 
childhood development. A small hint of expression, in fact, occurs in the opening 
paragraph of Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language when Merleau-Ponty 
directs attention to something most people often conceive as insignificant: the 
babbling of babies: 
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During the first months of life, the child cries; he makes expressive movements; 
and then he begins to babble. One must consider babbling as the ancestor of 
language: it is, above all, extraordinarily rich and includes phonemes which do not 
exist in the language that is spoken around the child, and which he himself, once 
he becomes an adult, is incapable of reproducing. (11) 
He goes on to identify this babbling as “a polymorphic language, which is spontaneous 
with respect to its environment” and is constituted by a “large amount of imitation.” 
This imitation is “rudimentary” in that the child does not “grasp the meaning of that 
which he is imitating.” But still there is a lesson to be learned here: “This imitation 
concerns the melody of the sentence just as much as the words, because the child 
tries, as it were, to speak ‘in general’” (11). Babbling is to language, he tells us, as 
scribbling is to drawing. The baby’s babbling suggests a graduate attunement to the 
sounds – many of which are other human voices – that are themselves styles of spoken 
language: not words, not sentences, just rough phonemes and muscular gurgitations 
that have been refined into what we might call “tone,” “intonation,” “stress,” 
“accent,” and other features of adult linguistic behavior. The babbling is the 
“imitative way” the baby attunes herself to these styles. 
 As the child grows older the imitation becomes “immanent” in that the child 
seeks to replicate results rather than amorphous patterns. Merleau-Ponty here draws 
on the work of the child psychologist Paul Guillaume, who “goes beyond the classical 
conception” of imitation as actions that replicate cognitively registered 
representations (32). Guillaume provides an example of  a child who, upon seeing his 
father using a pencil to draw, seizes the pencil upside down and hits the table with its 
eraser; after a few times, he turns it right-side-up and puts the point on the paper; 
weeks later the child uses the pencil not for hitting but for tracing lines on paper. In 
all phases, Merleau-Ponty notes, following Guillaume, it “is not a question of the child 
reproducing the gesticulation of this father, but rather a question of obtaining the 
same result as he” (33-4). In other words, imitation cannot be reduced to a monkey-
see monkey-do model of representation. What we observe instead is the child’s 
attunement to an intentional dimension in the situation that includes but is not 
limited to his father. This, too, is an instantiation of a situation’s style, and it is 
clearly vital to the child’s motor and cognitive development. 
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 We need to be careful not to confuse this notion of style with conventional 
understandings of the term. It is not something that lends itself to identification, as 
does the spare “style” of Ernest Hemingway’s prose or the arpeggiated “style” of Elton 
John’s piano playing. Merleau-Ponty insists that style “is not a concept, an idea: it is a 
‘manner’ that I apprehend and then imitate, even if I am unable to define it” (43). 
Even when one partially imitates the behavior of others, one takes on the “total 
attitude” corresponding to that behavior. In other words, we are told, “true imitation 
permeates beyond conscious limits and becomes global: once it has become 
accommodated, imitation supersedes itself.” It is this superseding that allows for the 
appropriation of new structures, including the acquisition of language (40). It is in the 
perception of other people’s behavior that the phenomenologist Husserl and the child 
psychologist Guillame share a “completely parallel” analysis, one that touches on an 
intercorporeal aspect of imitation that Merleau-Ponty describes this way: 
When I witness the setting in of the behavior of others, my body becomes a means 
of understanding them, my corporeality becomes a comprehending power of their 
corporeality – I regain the final meaning … of other people’s behavior, because my 
body is capable of achieving the same goals. (42) 
This is precisely embodied simulation as described by Gallese, in which one becomes 
empathically attuned to another so that one’s bodily state “becomes in some way 
congruent with” that of another’s (Gallese et al, 151). But style is not enacted solely 
through our bodies’ relations with other human bodies. Merleau-Ponty describes how 
style arises in language use – his example is the word “sleet” – as a “meeting of the 
human and the nonhuman, as it were, a piece of the world’s behavior” (PhP, 469). 
When a book, for example, “takes possession of the reader,” an “expressive moment 
occurs” (PoW13). Significance is generated on the spot. It is not transmitted as data 
into the reader’s mind where it forms a representation, like a photograph captures 
and transmits an image. Instead, the language-knowledge the reader brings to the text 
– “the stock of accepted relations between signs and familiar significations without 
which he could not have begun to read” – “couples”17 with the “certain arrangement 
of already available signs and significations” embodied in the text, transfiguring each 
so that “in the end a new signification is secreted” (13). Here is described a meeting 
place of systems, not of subjects but of body schemas. 
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This coupling that occurs in global contexts has “real world” effects for human 
subjects. For example, before reading a book by Stendhal, Merleau-Ponty knew what a 
“rogue” was and this “sedimented” awareness of rogue allowed him to understand 
Stendhal’s description of the character Rossi the revenue man as a rogue. But as he 
continued reading, this sedimented meaning of rogue begins to break up, the term is 
given a new twist, “the cross-references multiply,” until the term rogue takes on a 
new significance. The meaning the reader brings to the text is not erased, for rogue 
still retains that general familiarity; but as “[m]ore and more arrows point in the 
direction of a thought I have never encountered before,” Merleau-Ponty’s “imitative 
way,” his manner of engaging with rogueness as expressed by the text, becomes 
productive of new dimensions of that word. We see at work in this enactive moment 
what Marratto identifies as the “dual manner” of style in Merleau-Ponty, one that 
individuates things as singular identities while simultaneously adhering to a typicality 
that cuts across things and situations (102). The expressive moment of “rogue” is 
enacted through the individuation between the familiar significations of rogueness 
that enables Merleau-Ponty to tap into the style of rogueness as expressed by the text. 
The new “rogueness” enacted is transformative of rogueness but without losing its 
sedimented typicality that links it always to the sense Merleau-Ponty had of it prior to 
reading Stendhal. 
What is important to note here is that our bodies do not remain idle as we read or 
look at things.  In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty tells us that when we 
run our eyes over a text our perceptions do not stir up representations but, rather, 
“patterns are formed” which are “endowed with a familiar physiognomy” (167). In 
other words, we respond to a text and other artifacts similarly to how we respond to 
the facial and bodily conduct of people we encounter. Gallese et al. refer to numerous 
studies conducted in the past thirty years which assumes an understanding of language 
as “embodied.” One showed that the mirror neuron system was activated in specific 
ways when people were read different kinds of sentences, with most activity 
registering to action-related sentences (139). Evoked Readiness Potential (ERP) studies 
of people reading silently noted that arm-, leg-, and face-related words showed 
different somatotopically arranged activation sources, with face-related words 
registering the strongest inferior frontal source and leg-related words showing a 
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maximal superior central source (140). The art historian and critic James Elkins notes 
that when people are first confronted with a unfamiliar object – a blot, a funny smear, 
a wild landscape, a building, a cloud – they seek a body in it: “[W]e try to see 
something like ourselves … or even just a part of ourselves – a face, a hand or foot, an 
eye, even a hair or a scrap of paper” (129). This automatic response stems from our 
proprioceptive “sense” which weaves our bodies “so deeply and tightly into our 
thought that we have to work to see how little we would understand without them” 
(159, 137).  Merleau-Ponty takes a similar stand when he tells us how “normal 
imitation”18 operates not in an objective or representative space conjured through 
thought; rather, that space “is already built into my bodily structure,” an “open 
system of equivalents” called the body schema19 (PhP,162-3). Clearly, the cognitive 
ground in which mimetic identification has its roots is bodily. 
 As I said above, I consider expression here as the enactment of meaning and 
significance that is sometimes brought to consciousness as a happening, an event. 
Attuning ourselves to the style emanating from our encounters with people, with 
situations, with things, is essentially what makes this happening happen. Figuring this 
process mimetically lends support to William Schweiker’s reclamation of mimesis as “a 
figure for the fundamental actus, the being-in-act, of understanding, action, and 
language” which he sees as a common thread in recent philosophical interpretations of 
it (specifically by Gadamer, Derrida, and Ricoeur) (34). Schweiker argues that the 
performative dimension of mimesis embodies a convergence of figure and practice, “a 
specific form of action that is not iconic ‘imitation’ or ‘mirroring’” (34) but something 
more fundamental: praxis. “There simply is no ‘world’ out there independent of our 
practice; the world comes to be through our enactment” (37). Schweiker calls this 
enactive, “performative” aspect of mimesis “figurative practice” and it clearly 
corresponds to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that thought (“figure”) and speech (“practice”) 
are not independent but interdependent: “The orator does not think before speaking, 
nor even while speaking; his speech is his thought” (PhP 180). 
In the next section, I will contextualize mimetic praxis as described by Schweiker 
by Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the reversible relationship between actual 
experiential knowledge and virtual conceptual knowledge. Before concluding this 
section, though, I would like to address one scholar’s interpretation of expression in 
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Merleau-Ponty that might be seen as posing a direct challenge to my mimetic approach 
to expression. In Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, Lawrence Hass tells us that expression 
offers an extremely promising new account of thought, language, and knowledge that 
Western culture has traditionally conceived as in representational terms (147): 
For at its core, expression is not about imitation (mimesis), correspondence, or 
isomorphism – these are the basic watchwords of representation theories of 
thought, language, and knowledge. Rather, expression is about the creative 
transformation of some previous data or experience so that it yields new 
knowledge or radiates a powerful, new sense about the original without the 
original data disappearing or being covered up (155). 
While I agree with Hass20 that expression is creative transformation, clearly I must 
respond to his statement regarding mimesis. He’s right that expression is not “about” 
mimesis (yes, he actually uses the term in parenthesis as cited) or these other 
watchwords of representation; but as I have shown, mimesis is about more than 
representation. We see here yet another example of how the term has been reduced 
to such a narrow scope that even a scholar of a philosopher who read and wrote 
extensively about imitation – and even about mimesis – loses sight of the breadth of 
imitation in the work he is expounding on. We must not follow suit. Just as the 
imitative babbling of babies is an expression of the melody of language, which is itself 
an expression of the world, so too are common everyday words expressive of 
dimensions that exceed the narrow definitions we confine them to. 
 
Contextualizing Practice: The Mimetic Interface of the Actual-Virtual  
In The Aesthetics of Mimesis, Stephen Halliwell identifies in Aristotle an “enactive” 
conception of mimesis – revealed most acutely in his discussion of music – which gives 
a “double sense” to the mimetic operation. Aristotle saw as desireable an aesthetic 
perspective he called suntheorein, which means “to contemplate or observe at the 
same time” (181). Mimetic representation included two complementary aspects: its 
status as an artifact, as a product of an artistic shaping of materials, and its capacity 
to signify and “enact” the patterns of supposed realities. His assumption that art 
forms maintained an “internally organized identity” – an idea I will depart from – made 
him accept the need for ways of talking about art that kept “the artifact and its 
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meanings, the ‘materials’ and the ‘object’ of mimesis, conjointly in focus” (172). 
Mimesis is at once “iconic,” or representational, and “expressive” of “the perceived 
affective content of the musical work and the corresponding pattern of the listener’s 
experience.” (153). This “dual aspect” of the concept not only aligns Aristotle’s theory 
“with a much broader current in ancient mimeticist thinking,” it also conceives of 
mimesis as “constituted partly be the experiences that it opens up for, and induces in, 
its audience” (161-2). Halliwell concludes that, in Aristotle, to call a work mimetic “is 
to situate it in a context of cultural practices that grow out of certain human 
instincts,” which means that the “intentionality” of mimetic works is not located only 
in the design plans of an artist but in shared conventions, traditions, and possibilities 
of a culture. (153). 
I will come back to Aristotle in the next chapter. I begin this section with him, 
though, because I hope to show that there is also a kind of “dual-aspect” mimesis at 
work in the domain perception as described by Merleau-Ponty. I have already 
described his account of mimesis, following Henry Wallon, as a “translation” between 
perception and motility. Now I will look at another level of operation: the interfacing 
of actual and virtual, or what might be called for the time being a transfer from 
“concrete” perception to “abstract” conception in the enactment of significance. 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this phenomenon by considering how an individual who 
suffered a permanent brain injury has lost, among other things, his capacity to imitate 
and, in a very real sense of the word, invent – perhaps the fundamental principle of 
praxis. I will understand this capacity as something similar to what Walter Benjamin 
described as “the mimetic faculty,” which I will come back to in Chapter 3 but here 
will approach through the lens of the cultural critic Brian Massumi, who conceives 
Benjamin’s notion of “nonsensuous similarities” that derive from sensuous (bodily) as 
the virtual. They are also heavily contextualized. At this point, I will depart somewhat 
from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of imitation, which is anchored primarily in the 
individual body schema, to consider mimesis as a current that cuts across the multiple 
modalities that constitute context, the situatedness of which our body is one 
constituent. Here I will draw on Herbert Spiegelberg’s application of Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology of constitution to construct a phenomenological theory of context. 
This will help me to connect the actual, sensuous, perceptual account of mimesis I 
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draw from Merleau-Ponty with the virtual, nonsensuous, conceptual accounts of it that 
we find in its aesthetic incarnations in Aristotle and many other thinkers. Most 
importantly, it will help me lay the foundation for a mimetic-multimodal praxis that I 
will elucidate in later chapters. 
 
Praktognosia and the Mimesis of the Phantom 
Merleau-Ponty tells us that “the perceived, by its nature, admits of the ambiguous, 
the shifting, and is shaped by context” (PhP, 13). He knew that it takes a special type 
of intelligence to make sense of ambiguous, shifting, highly contextualized 
phenomena. He uses the term praktognosia, a “practical intelligence” or “practical 
wisdom,” to describe knowledge obtained and retained experientially “as original and 
perhaps as primary” (PhP, 162). It is the innate, pre-reflective, tacit knowledge of the 
body schema on which all other knowledge is based. A disruption in the praktognostic 
functions of this “primary” level of knowing affects all other levels of thought. If that 
disruption incapacitates our imitative abilities, our conceptual skills necessary for 
invention and communication can be seriously impacted. 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates this quite vividly in Phenomenology of Perception in 
analyzing the condition of a 24 year-old WWI veteran who suffered two head wounds 
that had penetrated the occipital lobe of his brain. The patient, “Schneider,” was 
examined by two prominent neuropsychologists, Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein, 
whose meticulously described observations became the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
considerable study. Although Schneider was capable of performing a large number of 
actions, including working with scissors, thread, needles, and leather for his job 
making wallets, the injuries to a certain region of his brain caused lesions that 
impaired his ability to perform actions that cognitively-abled people do automatically 
“without thinking.”  
Following Gelb and Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty adopts the words “concrete” and 
“abstract” to designate two types of active movement that I contend reflect two types 
of knowledge work, the actual and the virtual or what I call the “experiential” and 
“conceptual.” According to Merleau-Ponty, concrete movement occurs “in the realm 
of the actual” and abstract movement “in that of the virtual,” a realm projected by 
the body which results in a “free space in which what does not necessarily exist may 
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take on a semblance of existence” (PhP, 128). He makes it clear that this virtual 
“semblance” should not be thought of as a representation (Vor-stellung), which 
“yields the object to us quite unambiguously” through a positional and objective 
consciousness outside of one’s “bodily space” (119). When Schneider is asked to mimic 
a salute he can no longer replicate what he did habitually in his past. Rather, he must 
consciously create a context in which to situate the salute by “pantomiming” a series 
of concrete actions: he repeats the command in a questioning tone of voice, then he 
makes his body assume the position required for the task; but the actual salute 
emerges only in conjunction with added actions such the combing of his hair with one 
hand while holding a mirror with the other (119).   
Merleau-Ponty contrasts Schneider’s process of enacting a salute with that of 
“normal”21 person who, like an actor, can restrict movement to its most important 
elements by “slip[ing] his body into the ‘great phantom’ of the character to be 
played” (120). Most people can easily extricate their bodies from the actual, concrete 
realm “to make them breathe, and if need be, weep in the realm of the imagination. 
This is what [Schneider] is no longer able to do” (120). His condition keeps him “tied 
to actuality” and hence he “lacks liberty” to create that semblance of free space 
before him that “comprises the general power of putting oneself into a situation” 
(157), in this case an imagined one. Because the “normal imitation” of which 
Schneider is incapable is built into his bodily structure and therefore cannot be 
located in an objective or representational space, he cannot do what cognitively-abled 
people do automatically: re-enact a virtual rendering of a concrete action by 
synthesizing time and space. Lacking the imaginary “liberty” to make the salute, he 
must arduously go about creating a context by pantomiming related motor actions that 
ultimately leads him to pull it off. 
William S. Hamrick observes that pathologies like Schneider’s play a “key role” in 
Phenomenology of Perception because of their ability “to illuminate what lies at the 
center of that phenomenology, the lived-body (le corps proper)” (181-2). Pathological 
behaviors allow for an understanding of the lived body “as a system of motor-
intentional powers of inhabiting situations spatially and temporally” by being 
“involved in a practical network of relationships with physical objects and other 
people” (182). Schneider’s impairment reveals how his involvement in this “practical 
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network” is seriously curtailed by disruption to his powers of motor-intentionality. He 
is confined to a hylomorphic “mode of consciousness” to which, as Hamrick observes, 
“the classical form/matter analysis of experience” would apply. The meaning of 
actions like performing a salute must be “expressly, thematically constituted” in such 
a way that the sign becomes a representation of the signified (183). His actions must 
arise from what Merleau-Ponty referred to repeatedly as an “I think” mode of 
consciousness – in which the mind is a thing separate from the body – rather than from 
an “I can” mode of being-in-the-world  through which mind and body are unified.  As a 
result, oddly enough, Schneider is the ultimate Cartesian: he must deductively 
conceive its form by classifying it in relation to other forms before shaping it into a 
product. This is, ironically, his pathology. Consequently, he cannot engage in the 
“imaginative process” that the philosopher Gilbert Simondon, a student of Merleau-
Ponty’s, described as integral to invention: 
[A] more profound analysis of the imaginative process would undoubtedly reveal 
that the determining factor playing an energising role is not forms but that which 
supports form, that is, their background. . . . The participational relationship 
connecting forms to their backgrounds is a relationship which straddles the 
present and brings the future to bear upon the present, that which brings the 
virtual to bear upon the actual. This is so because the base is a system of 
virtualities, of potentials, and of moving forces, whereas forms are a system of 
the actual. Invention is a taking into account of the system of actuality by a 
system of virtualities; it is the creation of a new system from these two (On the 
Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 51) 
Imprisoned as he is in the system of actualities, Schneider cannot inhabit that middle 
ground – or even oscillate between the two systems – in order to invent or enact. He 
cannot perform externalized acts that the cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald 
contends are enabled by a mimetic capacity that has been fine-tuned through our 
evolutionary process (he calls this capacity “mimetic culture”). Such acts are 
predicated on “a brain capacity that allows us to map our elementary event 
perceptions to action, thus creating, at a single stroke, the possibility of action, 
metaphor, gesture, pantomime, re-enactive play, self-reminding, imitating diffusion 
of skills, and proto-pedagogy, among other things” (33).  This is precisely what we see 
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in Schneider. Because he is incapable of “play-acting” (of “play” and “playing”),22 
Merleau-Ponty observes, he cannot “enter into a fictitious situation without converting 
it into a real one . . .” (156).  He cannot even for a moment slip into the “great 
phantom” (120) and play the role of the solder he once was.23  
The “great phantom,” a term Merleau-Ponty appropriates from the playwright 
Denis Diderot, emerges again in his essay “The Experience of Others.” On his reading, 
Diderot’s ideal actor develops his character through a “special operation of a 
prelogical character” rather than through “conventional imitation” (EO, 50). When the 
actor “turns into a phantom,” he essentially “performs an expressive operation by 
which the body lends itself to the expression of a role other than the one with which it 
is ordinarily associated” (50). This “existential operation” is something which we all do 
– minus people like Schneider – on a regular basis, most obviously though habits that 
Merleau-Ponty argues are “plastic” and not “fixed once and for all.24  “These analyses 
of imitation” drawn from his reading of Diderot Merleau-Ponty opposes to imitation 
“posed in classical terms”25 (52) which does not adequately account for its 
fundamentally embodied dimension. Because the body schema of each one of us 
“directs itself to the perceived world and to the imaginary as well,” he tells us, “the 
actor’s art is therefore only an extension of the art which we all possess,” the only 
difference being that for the actor it is “a much more complex case of such an 
operation” (53, 52).   
While Merleau-Ponty associates Diderot’s great phantom in this essay with a kind 
of dramaturgical “magic,” the basis of which “is in the intentionality which links our 
body to the world” (53), in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty offers it as an 
analogue of the virtual – the metaphoric or conceptual “reality” that we produce by 
drawing on the actual concrete knowledge structurally inscribed in our body schemas 
through experience. In an enactment, the virtual significance emerges through 
concrete action. While that significance has representational characteristics, it is in 
itself an emanation of embodied experience and as such cannot be reduced solely to 
“a” representation.26 As I pointed out earlier, Gallagher and Meltzoff eschew 
“transfer” along with “translate” in describing the infant’s ability to imitate others 
immediately after birth since an intercorporeal “supramodel” coding has already 
coupled its body schema with others. For this reason, I will use the verb interface 
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instead of “transfer.” Interface, in fact, articulates nicely with Merleau-Ponty’s 
description of the body as our our general medium for having a world (169) as well as 
in Anna Gibbs’ slightly different take on the body’s being “not so much a medium as a 
series of media” that connects it to media we see as external: writing, technology 
(201). It also fits Gibb’s description of space as enacted through mimesis: “Mimesis 
produces the virtual by enabling the reassembling of these disparate media, giving rise 
to what is ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract,’ as Proust writes of 
dreams” (201). Schneider’s inability to produce a “normal” imitation can easily be 
conceived as an inability to interface the actual medium that is his body with the 
virtual media that constitute the larger contexts in which he is situated. It is to these 
contexts that I now turn. 
 
How the Body’s “Mimetic Faculty” Infolds Contexts 
In her study of virtuality, the late visual scholar Anne Friedberg compares the function 
of virtual to that of metaphor.  Metaphor does not involve transcending or detaching 
from the actual. “This room is an oven” is a virtual rendering in language of an actual 
event in time and space experienced bodily. Language is a form of media, but as 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson convincingly argue, because language is steeped in 
metaphor, which is itself steeped in the body’s sensory-motor capabilities, what is 
virtual about language is always-already embodied and, hence, always-already 
mediated.27 In his short but densely complex essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Walter 
Benjamin argues that all beings possess a “mimetic faculty” that, like nature, 
produces similarities. This faculty has a history “in both the phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic sense” and, he claims, its “highest capacity” belongs to human beings 
(333). What he calls the “phylogenetic significance of the mimetic faculty,” however, 
can no longer be understood by the concept of similarity because our evolution has 
occurred simultaneously with the development of language. Because it is an 
abstraction of the concrete, the sensuous similarities from which it derives – captured 
in the phenomenon of onomatopoeia – gives way to the “nonsensuous similarity” of 
which symbolic systems like language and all written scripts are archives (335). But 
what else is nonsensuous similarity, Brian Massumi asks, 
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if not a lived analogy that brings relational differences together in the similarity 
of an event to its own repetition? Virtual form is the direct, analogical, 
differential, eventful experience of a ‘semblance which does not appear’ but is 
really felt. Being of the nature of an event, it cannot be coded. It can only be 
activated through codings . . . [i]ts expression takes the form of a directly felt 
perceptual event that is relational in and of itself, whether it is explicitly 
‘interactive’ or not.28 
We must completely rework how we think about the body, Massumi continues, and in 
doing so come to understand it “as immediately virtual as it is actual” and to see the 
virtual “as a lived paradox where what are normally opposites coexist, coalesce, and 
connect” (91). The body, Massumi continues, “infolds contexts, it infolds volitions and 
cognitions that are nothing if not situated” (91). 
But in order to do this productively, we must also rework how we think about the 
contexts it infolds, the situatedness that shapes the body’s perceptions and actions. 
This is, in effect, the mimetic method Diderot reflects on in his Paradox of the Actor 
whereby the actor infolds the personal and situational contexts of the character (see 
Gebauer and Wulf, Chapter 14). It is also, I might add, not unlike the kairotic current 
in Thomas Rickert’s reconceptualization of rhetoric as ambient, and the conclusions 
numerous studies in cognitive neuroscience have reached in the past few decades 
about human behavior. But Merleau-Ponty’s use of Diderot’s phantom to emphasize 
the body’s role in the production of the virtual does not quite capture the multiple 
contexts this phantom haunts. It is in the conjunction of body and its situational 
contexts that a phenomenology of mimetic practice can be prosperously articulated. 
The American phenomenologist Herbert Spiegelberg believed phenomenology was 
particularly helpful in bringing to our awareness the contextual nature of experience, 
one that was not restricted to sense-experience but included relations, meanings, 
values, other minds, social and cultural phenomena; within these contexts people 
entered into “cognitive contact” with each other’s individual as well as global bodies, 
personalities, thoughts and feelings (327). Writing in 1964, Spiegelberg noted that the 
term “context” did not appear often in phenomenological accounts of experience; 
rather, the terms “horizon,” “field,” “Umwelt,” and in the most comprehensive sense 
“world” had the most popular currency (330). Although he does not say so explicitly, 
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his interest in context has a heuristic – not just philosophical or ontological – value. 
Whereas Merleau-Ponty increasingly sought to move beyond intentional human 
consciousness that so much of Husserl’s phenomenology was anchored in, Spiegelberg 
worked squarely within that framework. 
Spiegelberg was interested in how Husserl’s phenomenology of constitution can 
“tell us how the phenomenon of the context presents itself” (330). In doing so, he 
wishes to bring to awareness, if only temporarily, the “configuration” that emerges 
around a “thematic text” (330), which can be any object, a magazine, a table, a play, 
a work of art. “It is in this manner that the context, first presented only vaguely and 
peripherally, constitutes itself into a firmer framework on an equal level with the first 
thematic text” (330). At this point, what was in one moment the “text” in the next 
moment becomes “context.” Becoming aware of their reversible relationship can 
vastly enrich the perspective one has of engaging with and producing “texts,” 
certainly a vital dimension of praxis in composition and communication, and one I will 
emphasize in the chapters ahead. 
Classical analyses of perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, reduce experience to a 
single level whereby what is seen is judged to be true. This objectification of 
perceived things decontextualizes them and they become identifiable concepts. It is 
because of this objectification that I must endeavor mightily in developing an 
argument that broadens the concept of “mimesis” – and, hence, the concepts of 
“imitation,” “representation,” “repetition,” “practice,” and other words – in ways 
similar to how Merleau-Ponty increasingly sought to broaden the terms “style,” 
“expression,” and even “perception.” We can do this, however, by backing up and 
considering “the whole setting” – the wider context or ‘l’entourage – through which 
“another modality” is revealed (“Primacy,” 14). Because phenomenology asks us to 
see how the things we perceive are embedded in larger contexts – an all-encompassing 
and dynamic phenomenal field that is in a constant state of regeneration as we 
perceptively move through the world  – it is, before anything else, the “study of the 
advent of being to consciousness, instead of presuming its possibility as given in 
advance” (PhP, 71). In the chapters ahead, I will apply what is fundamentally an 
ontological study to a number of concepts that come together under the broad aegis of 
mimesis – as a theory of “imitation” – with the hope of bringing to light a dimension of 
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thinking, learning, making, teaching, influencing, and communicating that has for long 
been buried under the weight of misunderstandings. 
 
                                                            
1 I will use these abbreviations throughout this dissertation. 
2 Historically, these traditions have been loosely aligned with the classical Platonism (idealism and metaphysics) and 
Aristotelianism (empiricism and science).  
3 I say “completed” in that Merleau-Ponty inserted into phenomenology something Heidegger tended to ignore: the 
body. I’m sure, however, that some Heideggerians would object to this assertion. 
4 For example, Leonard Lawlor suggests that Merleau-Ponty uses the word “mimique” to describe an expressive 
operation in which one who mimes evokes “the power to stylize,” to generate something that can be put into words 
but which, while recognizable as a repetition, does “not merely resemble the object.” Rather the mime generates 
what is virtual, not real, in the object” (26). 
5 I suppose that, technically, style and expression are separate concepts. But as I state ahead, Merleau-Ponty himself 
has noted that the two are intimately linked and so I conflate them here into a single idea. 
6 There are two points I should make here. First, because the term “body schema” is used in translations of Merleau-
Ponty’s most well-known work, The Phenomenology of Perception, English-language researchers have adopted that 
term (for example, Shaun Gallagher) in their discussions. To avoid confusion, I will use “body schema” instead of 
“corporeal schema,” although I prefer the latter since it resonates with the term intercorporeity, a term I will discuss 
later in this chapter. Second, as I point out in the next section, the body schema that Merleau-Ponty writes about has 
been revised as a result of recent empirical studies on neonate imitation. Shaun Gallagher and Andrew N. Meltzoff, 
drawing on empirical studies, make the case for distinguishing between a body schema and a body image, something 
Merleau-Ponty does not do. In this description of postural impregnation, the latter category—body image, and not 
body schema or what Wallon called “postural schema” – would most likely be the one Gallagher and Meltzoff would 
see evoked here. 
7 In psychoanalytic terms, Merleau-Ponty describes mimesis as “the equivalent of introjection” whereas the 
phenomenon that gives rise to syncrethic sociability, transitivism, is the equivalent to projection. (CRO, 148) 
8 See Gallagher and Meltzoff, p. 232, for direct references. 
9 Scott Marratto, a member of my dissertation committee, made this note about my statement here: “Merleau-Ponty 
does, I think, actually distinguish the ideas involved here, but he just doesn’t employ this kind of terminological 
distinction. For body schema he uses the term schéma corporel, and for what Gallagher et. al. call body image he uses 
a number of terms suggesting something like ‘objective’ body.”    
10 This term may be read a bit out of context. Style (which I discuss in the next section) is a complex concept in 
Merleau-Ponty and no doubt Merleau-Ponty had this larger dimension in mind when he used it. But he does not 
contextualize the term in this essay, leaving it open to interpretation. 
11 Unlike the body image, the body schema is not shared between the self and other and applies only to the subject’s 
own body. It is first-personal not because “it represents the body as one’s own, but because it represents exclusively 
what counts as one’s own body” (443). 
12 I am generalizing here. In fact, studies suggest that some people with autism or disorders that affect brain function 
– something Merleau-Ponty explores as well – do not interactively engage in the same way people without those 
conditions do. See Gallagher’s How the Body Shapes the Mind, Chapter 9, 235-6. 
13 Gallese is well aware of phenomenology, Husserl’s lebenswelt, and Merleau-Ponty’s work generally. In his 2009 
article “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification,” he discusses 
intercorporeity at some length, later citing Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the “comprehension of gestures come about 
through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others. . . . as if the other person’s intention inhabited 
my body and mind his” – a comprehension that is communicated, according to Gallese, “first and foremost” (523) 
intercorporally, between bodies, subtending the intersubjective level, between subjects. Of Merleau-Ponty’s passage, 
which I only quotes a part of here, Gallese writes: “These words fully maintain their illuminating power in the present 
century, even more so as they can now be grounded on solid empirical evidence” (526). 
14 I attribute this focus to two things. First, this article was written for collection of essays about Rene Girard’s theory 
of mimesis, which I will discuss in Chapter 3. Briefly, Girard understands mimesis in terms of a triangulation between 
an object and at least two people who desire it; this triangulation, he claims, is the root of violence in human 
civilization. Gallese strikes me as at pain in attending to Girard’s theory of mimesis to which his own essay offers an 
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alternative interpretation. Second, as an expert in physiology and neuroscience, Gallese grounds his theories in 
empirical studies that almost exclusively focus on human-to-human interaction.  
15 Jack Reynolds makes this statement more than once in his discussion of habituality in Merleau-Ponty’s work for the 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (accessed August 2013; www.iep.utm.edu) 
16 I will discuss this at length in Chapter 2. 
17 This “coupling” is Husserl’s “lively phrase referring to the perception of others” (13). Because style for Merleau-
Ponty is a mode of perceptive experience in general, it is not limited only to acts of direct communicaton between 
subjects. Here it signifies Stendhal’s success “in converting us to his system of harmony, [so that] we adopt it 
henceforth as our own,” resulting in what he describes as “the pure relations of spirit to spirit” between the reader 
and the book’s author (12).  
18 He uses “normal” here to describe the kind of imitation a brain-damaged war veteran is incapable of executing. 
19 It is important to recall that Merleau-Ponty did not distinguish, as do Gallagher and Meltzoff, between body schema 
and body image. What they describe as body image is entwined with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of body schema. 
20 I do wonder, however, if his rendering of expression as a process that yields new information without covering up 
existing information tends to absorb too easily the role of style. It sounds like Hass is describing style in the last 
sentence of this passage; however, since style seems to have a somewhat reversible relationship with expression then 
I suppose what goes for the former goes for the latter as well. 
21 Advocates of people with disabilities would use the term “abled.” Merleau-Ponty is simply employing the 
terminology used at that time. 
22 The term “play-act” comes from the Colin Smith’s translation of the book. In Donald A. Landes’s translation (2012), 
however, the words given are “play” and “playing” (136). Since “play” is a pedagogical concept I will come back to in 
another chapter, I wanted to cite this alternative translation here. 
23 It is vital to note that his “great phantom” is not Merleau-Ponty’s phrase. His footnote indicates that the term is 
from Denis Diderot’s Paradox sur le comedien (Paradox of the Actor), in which Diderot reflects on imitative mimesis as 
an acting method (see Gebauer and Wulf, 175). Paradox is the driving force of this method, according to which the 
performer simultaneously is and is not the character being performed. The philosopher  and literary critic Phillippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe sees in this work a “modern” conception of mimesis that – because it is an imitation of phusis, of 
natura naturans, and hence a form of poiesis – is not so much about imitation but about making something new. (For 
more on Lacoue-Labarthe’s interpretation of mimesis in the context of Diderot, see Gebauer and Wulf, 182-3). 
Indeed, the mimetic arts were counted on by Aristotle as belonging to the class of techne, but, more specifically, as 
forming a subdivision of poiesis or productive craft” (Halliwell, 153). In this sense, we should add enactment to the 
English words Halliwell offers – expression, emulation, representation – as a way of rounding out the oftentimes 
“narrowed and impoverished” translation of mimesis as copy-producing imitation (14). 
24 “A habit it an aptitude for responding to a particular type of situation with a particular form of solution. Thus habit 
as an operation is both bodily and spiritual” (52). 
25 He describes this classical model as an “unsolvable problem”: “In order to imitate what I have seen, I would need 
what I do not have: a double knowledge which includes both the muscular contractions of the model and the means 
to realize this series of movements” (52). 
26 The late visual studies scholar Anne Friedberg describes the Latin etymology and definition of virtual as referring 
“to the register of representation itself – but representation that can be either simulacral [with no referent in the 
real] or directly mimetic” (8); in her own work, her use of the term does not imply “direct mimesis”26 but a “transfer – 
more like a metaphor – from one plane of meaning and appearance to another” (11). 
27 “Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because 
the vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence 
theory of truth is false” (6).  
28 This reference comes from Massumi’s essay “The Archive of Experience” that appeared in Information is Alive: Art 
and Theory on Archiving and Retrieving Data, eds. Joke Brouwer and Arjen Mulder (Rotterdam: V2 Organisatie/EU 
European Culture 2000 Program, 2003, 142-151). The citation here, however, comes from a copy of this essay (p. 13) 
posted on his website, brianmassumi.com. (http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/Archive%20of%20Experience.pdf) 
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Chapter 2: The Complex History of Mimesis – An Overview 
 
Recovering the Expressive Side of Mimesis 
I will open this chapter with an example of the kind of popular representations of 
mimesis that this dissertation seeks to move beyond. In a 2006 article published in 
Comparative Literature Studies, Cecile Chu-chin Sun, a professor of East Asian 
Language and Literatures at the University of Pittsburgh, describes a “radical 
distinction” between Western and Chinese poetic traditions that, in her view, comes 
down to the “dominance of mimesis in one tradition and that of xing in the other” 
(326). She translates xing as “evocation,” an “affective-responsive interplay between 
the ‘mind’ and the ‘object’” (object being wu, or “scene”) which evokes an intimate 
and organic relationship between human beings and the material world (335), “a 
memorable resonance between poet and environment with its particular locale and 
moment of time” (351). Opposed to xing is “the whole notion of mimesis,” which 
according to Sun is not only rooted in a “hierarchically-oriented view of reality, but is 
itself the very product of it” (339). She defines mimesis as a mode for conceptualizing 
reality with a “distinct anthropocentric privileging of human beings over external 
nature” (326), making it “diametrically different” from the resonance that is evoked 
through xing (338-9). Her view of mimesis is shaped, she tells us, entirely by her 
readings of Plato and Aristotle, “the chief architects of the conceptual construct of 
the mimetic tradition” (328). The mimetic concept of reality the West has inherited 
from these thinkers is, following Plato, hierarchical in that a superior plane (ideas or 
forms) is privileged over an inferior one (sense or matter) and, following Aristotle, 
anthropocentric in its celebration of human aesthetics and artifice over engagement 
with the sensory world of experience (330). Western poetry hence cannot take 
account of the “penchant for natural spontaneity implicit in the xing mode of 
creativity” that is the driving force of the Chinese poetic tradition (329).  
 As noted above, Sun’s version of mimesis here exemplifies the kind of 
conventional understanding I will be building an argument against in this dissertation.1 
I will bring to light significant dimensions of mimesis that are nearly identical to Sun’s 
description of xing, but in doing so I will not ignore other dimensions that may be 
palatable to her negative rendering of mimesis. In this chapter, I will attend to what I 
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call the dual aspect of mimesis.2 I will flesh this meaning out more fully in the pages 
ahead, but by way of introduction it is worth noting how Gunter Gebauer and 
Christoph Wulf attribute to human mimetic capacities two sides: an expressive side 
that serves as an entrée to the world and to others by allowing for a partial 
overcoming of the subject-object split, and a more instrumental side that can lead to 
an assimilation to an ossified environment that results in a subordination or even 
dissolution of the self (265). The gradual historical suppression of the former 
“expressive” side, according to the authors, has helped create conditions that 
contribute to a loss of immediacy in our encounters with others and the world at 
large, a loss that impacts our ability to communicate since such conditions result in a 
“reduction in the expressive side of language in favor of its semantic content and 
instrumental function” (267). Recovering this suppressed “expressive” side to mimesis 
is the primary aim of their 1992 book Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society and one I adopt as 
well more than two decades after its publication. 
 Recovering this suppressed “expressive” side to mimesis requires us first to 
acknowledge that the concept’s complexity has been greatly hindered by its 
translation – an observation made by many thinkers and scholars. The rhetorician and 
philosopher Kenneth Burke complains that the translation of mimesis as “imitation” 
cannot possibly sum up the “full range of meanings” – including its puns and 
soundscape (Attitudes, 243). The classical scholar Vivienne Gray tells us that this 
standard translation of mimesis is “often unhelpful” for a term that has “a wide range 
of technical meanings” in ancient Greek literary criticism, including what a historian 
does in creating history (467). The anthropologist Michael Taussig believes that 
because of its association with imitating and representing reality, mimesis has been 
lambasted in the recent times “as a naïve form or symptom of Realism,” a straw man 
“against whose feeble pretensions post-structuralists prance and strut” (44). Stephen 
Halliwell complains that Jacques Derrida’s fixation on Plato and Platonism results in a 
“restrictive construal of mimesis” that assumes a dependence on a metaphysics of 
truth in reality underlying virtually all versions of mimesis in Western art and 
philosophy (376). These complaints by scholars of mimesis speak to an abiding 
frustration that arises from attempts to work with an idea whose narrow conventions 
have been so thoroughly naturalized. To conceive mimesis simply as the reproduction 
59 
 
of sameness privileges its representational characteristics over its expressive ones, 
marginalizing its role in the production of difference and its capacity to enact 
multiplicity while paradoxically sustaining a general unity. As I hope I showed in the 
previous chapter, I believe that key concepts in the phenomenology of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty provide us with a theoretical method for teasing out this other side of 
human mimetic capacities Gebauer and Wulf call expressive and claim has been 
historically suppressed by the Western philosophical tradition. 
In Chapter 1, for example, I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s example of how the 
muscular gurgitations and rough phonemes of babies’ babbling are slowly refined into 
language as the infants attune themselves to the intentional dimensions of situations. 
This capacity to engage meaningfully with the world is powered by their body 
schemas’ mimetic ability to “translate” perception into motility and generate an 
original motor action – perhaps the primary block upon which all subsequent 
knowledge work is built. I refer as well to his example of a young boy who gradually 
learns how to use a pencil not by reproducing the gestures of his father while writing 
but by seeking to obtain the same results of his father. In both cases, the young 
humans initially identify with situations. In Merleau-Ponty, the “almost imitative way” 
in which we actively engage and ultimately incorporate the multiple dimensions of a 
situation is through a mostly unconscious operation he calls style. Scott Marratto 
describes Merleau-Ponty’s concept of style as having a “dual manner”: it individuates 
things as singular identities while adhering to a typicality that cuts across them (102). 
What is expressed in the process, then, conforms to the typical and familiar while 
simultaneously enacting something new. Hence, expression in Merleau-Ponty in many 
ways comes close to what Sun associates with xing’s evocation of resonance: as the 
body attunes itself to the style of a situation or world that situation or world 
reciprocally expresses itself through the medium of the body.3 More importantly for 
later chapters, the “dual manner” of style that individuates a form while conforming 
to its prior instantiations is characteristic of the most basic methods that guides nearly 
all forms of building, making, and composing. It also resonates with the guiding 
principle of imitatio, a major movement in rhetoric and other arts whose key concept 
was mimesis and to which, I will argue in the chapters ahead, current multimodal 
pedagogies of repurposing, remix, and remediation are historically beholden. 
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In the following sections I hope to develop this picture to an even greater 
resolution by showing how there is and, in fact, has always been a dual aspect to 
mimesis that renders the term much more dynamic, nuanced, paradoxical, and 
ultimately enactive than its conventional stereotypes allow. In the section below I will 
introduce what one mimetic scholar identifies as Aristotle’s “enactive” conception of 
mimesis which attends equally to both its representational and expressive sides. After 
briefly considering the etymology and early history of the term, which I feel supports a 
dual-aspect account, I will show how even in the hands of three of mimesis’s harshest 
critics – Plato, Rene Girard, and Theodor Adorno – the concept’s underlying dual 
nature resists its assignation to a singular (and in these cases largely negative) 
definition. I will then, in the following section, draw on the mimetic theories of 
Aristotle, the cultural theorists Walter Benjamin, Mark Hansen, Morris Berman, and 
Anna Gibbs in shaping a view of mimesis that provides an innovative framework for its 
application to rhetorical theory (Chapter 3), multimodality (Chapter 4), and 
pedagogical approaches to the teaching of composition and technical communication 
(Chapter 5). 
   
The Dual-Aspects of Enactive Mimesis 
Aristotle plays an important role in the history of mimesis, and I will return to discuss 
that role at some length later in this chapter. For now, though, I want to set up as a 
framework for the rest of this chapter a particular understanding Stephen Halliwell 
argues Aristotle held of mimesis, one he describes as “dual-aspect” and which strongly 
inclined the philosopher, in Halliwell’s view, toward an enactive view of the concept. 
Although Aristotle recognized several varieties of nonartistic mimesis,4 his most 
significant treatment of it is in relation to music, poetry, drama, and visual art, 
thereby reifying an orientation that no doubt resulted in a curtailing of its 
anthropological and philosophical dimensions. However, I believe that Aristotle’s 
enactive conception of mimesis as described by Halliwell, even though it occurs within 
the context of art and particularly music, can serve as an entrée to a dimension that 
in many ways complements Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression that is not confined 
solely to the aesthetic realm. 
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 I cannot in this space fully represent Halliwell’s extensive study of Aristotelian 
mimeticism with justice. I will instead focus on an important observation he makes of 
that thinker’s description of the reception of art by observers. Mimesis for Aristotle 
operates on the principle of simultaneity: it is at once “iconic” (representational and 
conceptual) and “expressive” (emotional, affective), and the aesthetic experience 
depends to a great extent on being able to perceive both at the same time. This 
“dual-aspect mimeticism” (172) encouraged an audience experience that involved a 
“combined and balanced consideration of the media as well as the ‘objects’ of media” 
so that when we encounter art we need to “keep the artifact and its meaning, the 
‘materials’ and the ‘object’ of mimesis, conjointly in focus”5 (172; italics in original). 
Aristotle believed that in aesthetic contemplation pleasure is derived from the 
interplay of two different manners of apprehension that occur simultaneously: a 
consideration of an artifact’s demonstration of its maker’s techne (technical and 
artistic skill) and a response to its “sensuous properties” such as color, texture, or 
other material properties that evoke its representational significance (181). Dual 
aspect mimesis, according to Halliwell, involves an “appreciation of both medium and 
‘object,’ of the material artifact and the imagined world that it represents, [both of 
which] coalesce in a complex state of awareness”6 (181-2; italics in original). 
 I will suggest in the pages ahead that this complex state of awareness is not 
limited simply to two views or perspectives. Rather, the dual nature of mimetic 
experience creates conditions for the emergence of multiplicity while sustaining an 
underlying cohesiveness or unity. In his essay “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty describes 
the nature of perception in seemingly dual terms as an integration of sensory ability 
with movement. When we see, he claims, we also see ourselves seeing. But this kind 
of double-vision does not confine us to dichotomous thinking, as demonstrated in by a 
painter whose work Merleau-Ponty greatly admired, Paul Cezanne: 
Cezanne did not think he had to choose between feeling and thought, as if he 
were deciding between chaos and order. He did not want to separate the 
stable things which we see and the shifting way in which they appear. He 
wanted to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through 
spontaneous organization. (EM 73) 
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In a sense, Cezanne serves as a nexus between “dualing” modalities, the integration 
of which powers his ability to express the world’s “insurpassable plentitude” through 
an arrangement of colors that also capture the “imperious unity” of the “indivisible 
whole” (75). Clearly the dual nature of perceptual and sensory engagement with the 
world in which we are situated, as demonstrated by Cezanne, is simultaneously 
enactive and expressive – not just of two things but of “plentitude,” of 
“insurpassable” multiplicity. Like style and expression, these two terms are so 
interrelated that separating them potentially impoverishes the significance of the 
multitude of perceptual and sensory experiences to which they apply. 
In the chapters ahead, I will attempt to construct of scenario in which all of us, 
as perceivers of the world and observers of that its various multidimensional 
representations, need to experientially inhabit the nexus between the things that 
cultural convention often requires us to “choose”: modes and media, idea and 
artifact, style and expression. We need always to try and keep the dual perspectives 
that arise through our experiences conjointly in focus in the manner in which Aristotle 
apparently conceived our mimetic experience with art. In the section to which I turn 
now, I will show how the “dual aspect” conception of mimesis that Halliwell identifies 
in Aristotle has avatars in other realms where mimesis matters, including areas outside 
of aesthetics. I will begin by going back to the earliest pre-philosophical instantiations 
of the concept before moving on to more recent ones. 
 
Mimos: Who Can Distinguish the Mime from the Mime? 
When we piece together its fragmented and complex etymology, the picture that 
emerges of ancient conceptions of mimesis is one of bodily representational practices 
that endowed not only human performers with expressive force but also larger 
contextual elements. Although the origin of mimesis is a matter of dispute  – Halliwell 
tells us that the etymology is irrecoverable, rendering the best efforts of several 
scholars speculative at best (17) –  most scholars agree that the mimeisthai family to 
which it belongs derives from the root word mimos. By the fifth century B.C. mimos 
was used often within the context of sound effects or musical accompaniment. 
Aeschylus’s lost play Edonians, for example, associates mimos with the booming 
sounds of primitive instruments known as “bull-roarers” that sounded like, or 
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imitated, the voices of bulls (17). A member of the mim- family turns up as well in 
another text dating to around the same time, the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, in which 
the poet describes how a group of Delian maidens bewitched audiences by vocally 
mimicking (mimesthai) the voices of men as well as the “literal” sounds of castanets 
(19). Pindar’s use of the same word to describe the choreographic simulation of animal 
movements leads Halliwell to conclude that by the fifth century B.C. the mim- root 
“had already come to be associated with the musicopoetic arts in general” (poetry, 
music, and dance, or mousikē collectively). Gebauer and Wulf come to a similar 
conclusion, interpreting the references by Pindar and Aeschylus as evidence for an 
interpretation of mimesis as meaning “to represent through dance” and as “expression 
by means of sound and gesture” (27).7  
We can see how later translations of mimesis as imitation and its association 
with representation, aesthetics, repetition, and realism has its logical origins in this 
ancient history. But there are dimensions that have been lost in translation. Lexically 
mimos balances dual significations, denoting both the person who represented, 
imitated, or portrayed something and the context of the dramatic action (Gebauer and 
Wulf, 27). This dual aspect is retained in the word mime, which as a noun signifies 
both actor and art of miming, and as a verb signifies the action of miming. Mimos, 
then, suggests a fundamental correspondence between doer and the doing. One is 
reminded here of the paradoxical conundrum underlying Yeat’s famous query: “How 
can we know the dancer / from the dance?”  Similarly, what differentiates the mimos 
of actor from the mimos of act? Both are intertwined in such a way that there does not 
seem to be a distinct form/matter hierarchy of the kind introduced into philosophy by 
Plato. The seat of this conundrum resides in its affordance of the opportunity to 
perceive difference while simultaneously resisting any clear demarcation in which to 
classify it.  
Such a conundrum was undoubtedly at play in the “bewitching” of audiences 
who could not distinguish the sounds of nonhumans (bulls and castanets) simulated 
vocally by humans. In this moment, two distinct realms – human and nonhuman - 
commonly thought as separate become intimately entwined. The astonishment could 
not have been generated in the absence of difference. Because they knew the human 
and the castanet were not “the same,” the vocal mimicry of the sounds culminated in 
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an expression of paradox that briefly dissolved difference while simultaneously 
insisting on it. It is a moment that Merleau-Ponty might label “reversible”: humans 
touch castanets and are touched back, blurring the corporeal distinctions between 
human subject and nonhuman object. Or, as Anna Gibbs puts it, “mimesis is like an 
image in which figure and ground can always be reversed, so that sometimes 
subjectivity is in focus, while at other times it recedes into the background, leaving 
something new to appear in its place” (187). The mimetic task of the audience, then, 
is to “know through which optic it is most productive to look at any given moment” 
(187). As in deconstruction, when a stabilized meaning is destabilized by disrupting a 
conceptual binary (human/nonhuman, dancer/dance), categorical distinctions dissolve 
and resolve in an ongoing play of dynamic reversibility. This is not just a conceptual 
theory but an actual practice that we all engage in when confronting the paradox of 
sameness being difference. When people are confronted with identical twins, for 
example, they almost instinctively look for something that differentiates them.  
We also see in this ancient account of mimos how mimesis is not as 
anthropocentric as Sun claims in her attempt to distinguish it from the Chinese xing. 
The vocal mimicry suggests an intense level of identification between the human 
performers and the nonhumans whose sounds are being represented through vocal 
mimicry. Indeed, mimesis in its most ancient accounts suggests productive intercourse 
between human beings and nonhuman beings. Its first occurrence as a noun comes 
from a tract by Democritus suggesting that the origin of music was in human imitation 
of birdsong (Halliwell, 19). In addition, Pindar’s use of mimeisthai to describe a 
choreography in which dancers are instructed to match their steps to the movement of 
certain animals suggests that performers were more than just “aware” of them in an 
identifiable sense but actually identified with them at the bodily level. Perhaps the 
mimoses’ attunement to animals and their uncomfortably accurate representation of 
them – along with their affiliation with an oral genre Halliwell describes as 
“subliterary, low-life dramatic sketches” that represented life as experienced by 
common people8 – was what made the practice so unpalatable to the aristocratic 
Plato, whose high-minded metaphysics insisted on the separation of humans from 
animals and other lower forms of life.9 However, as Derrida so famously demonstrated 
in his deconstruction of Phaedrus, the dichotomous logic of Platonic metaphysics 
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collapses under the weight of its own dualism, generating difference and multiplicity 
as it stubbornly insists on a stable, coherent, unified, absolute Truth. In the next 
section, I will show how Plato’s seemingly clear-cut denigration of mimesis is actually 
undercut by the dual-aspect dimension to his own rendering of the concept. 
 
Plato’s Dual-Aspect Mimesis: A Mimetic Master in Denial? 
In my introduction, I aligned Plato’s treatment of mimesis with the denigration and 
disparagement of experiential knowledge. My representation of Plato’s treatment of 
mimesis, though in keeping with the vast majority of scholarship on this matter, did 
not attend to dimensions of a concept that, according to Halliwell, in Plato “is much 
more complex and much less easily condensed into a unified point of view than is 
normally supposed” (24). While Halliwell, like many others, concede that Plato is the 
first to give to mimesis its perjorative connotation, his contention of its complexity is 
something I would like to attend to in this section. First, however, I want to look more 
closely at those aspects of mimesis that so troubled Plato and resulted in his 
denigration of it – even while he arguably embodied many of those aspects. 
One thing that seemed to have troubled Plato was what the Greek 
mathematician Theaetetus observes about the word in his Sophist: that “the mimetic” 
(to mimetikon) is “a multifarious and extremely diverse category” (qtd in Halliwell, 
64). In the latter part of this dialogue, we learn that it is a form of techne, a 
productive activity (poiesis), but one whose products – like those produced by the 
rhetors known as Sophists – were categorized as secondary, illusory, or false (64). As 
an imitation of something else, mimesis was thrice removed from the true forms it 
sought to represent. In The Republic, for example, Plato’s Socrates describes three 
types of couches. The first, the highest, is that which is “in nature”: the one true form 
(eidos) of couch. The second, the actual couch that Socrates sits on, is a material 
artifact produced by a craftsman, a necessary but inferior copy of the original. The 
third is a painting of the couch – a copy of a copy of an original, thrice removed from 
the “real” and hence impoverished of “reality.”10 Like Rene Magritte’s famous 
Treachery of Images painting (“This is not a pipe”), the painting is a representation of 
a material object that is itself a mere representation of “the Real,” the eidos of 
couchness. It is like the shadows that appear on Plato’s cave wall: vague adumbrations 
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of a material world projected by the light of Truth that itself dissolves into the 
background, leaving people duped by the images dancing before them. As a mode of 
representation, mimesis in Plato becomes associated with practices that cluster 
around the motif of “deception,” a motif that resurfaces throughout the history of 
that concept (20). 
Halliwell contends that fear of the imagination was the “psychological core” of 
Plato’s critique of the mimetic arts and most certainly of the rhapsodes and 
performers – including Sophists – who practiced them. Plato believed that within each 
person existed many potential selves into which the soul can be diffracted. Because 
the imagination was stirred not only by dramatic performances but also, as Halliwell 
puts it, by a “disordered or constantly changing multiplicity [which] is given by the 
very nature of the human mind,” one risked losing “self-control” (sophrosune) under 
its influence. In a dramatic performance, mimesis enabled sympathetic identification 
(sumpatheia) between poet and audience, between self and other, thereby 
threatening to release a plethora of potential selves that are locked up within us all. 
What alarmed Plato, if Halliwell’s interpretation stands, seems to be an 
intersubjective dimension to mimesis that threatened to dissolve the distinct and 
coherent selfhood of the subject. In other words, he could tolerate difference only as 
it served to demarcate self from other and, in so doing, stabilize the self; if and when 
difference encroached on the subject, as would be the case with intersubjective 
relations, absolute distinctions would blur and render the subject relative and 
mutable. The many selves Plato saw lurking in the human mind could only be 
“integrated into a single, stable self under the rule of reason” (95), and in the absence 
of cunning, deceptive, outright fraudulent mimesis. He therefore banned poets, 
rhapsodes, and Sophists from his ideal republic. 
 And yet, despite this seemingly clear-cut portrayal of Plato’s attitudes toward 
mimesis, he nonetheless occupies a complex position in its theory and history. As the 
first thinker to discuss the concept at length, he may be thought of as the “founding 
father” of mimetic theory (Halliwell, 24) despite having also “invented the pejorative 
sense” of the term (Haskins, 11).11 Just as we cannot reduce mimesis to any one 
definition, we must be careful not to reduce Plato to a monolithic stereotype that he 
held an unchanging and consistently negative attitude toward mimesis. Such a 
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stereotype is presented by Eric Havelock’s profoundly influential Preface to Plato 
(1963),12 which reproduced Plato’s representative poet as an automaton whose 
rhythmical repetition, melody, and dance produced nonrational “memorization” in 
audiences, placing the audience “under the minstrel’s control” (qtd in Haskins, 11) 
and hence denying oral poetic mimesis the reflective capacity he assigns to literate 
cultures of reading and writing (13). While this stereotype represents an anti-mimetic 
position that perhaps was dominant in Plato’s thought, we need also to attend to 
Hallowell’s contention that Plato discusses mimesis with a “remarkably large range of 
contexts” and warns against assuming that there is a “unitary, monolithic conception 
of mimesis at work in the dialogues” (24, 38). Mimesis, Halliwell argues, “receives 
fluctuating and constantly revised treatment from Plato” and is “approached from 
various angles in different works” (38). Indeed, Per Bjornar Grande identifies in Plato 
a “mimetic inconsistency” that has him, on the one hand, dismissing poets from his 
Republic while, on the other, allowing for a select few to participate in artistic 
education. Indeed, Plato’s Socrates tells Adeimantus in Book III of the Republic: 
It is not only to the poets therefore that we must issue orders requiring them to 
portray good character in their poems or not write at all; we must issue similar 
orders to all artists and craftsmen, and prevent them from portraying bad 
character, ill-discipline, meanness, or ugliness in pictures of living things, in 
sculpture, architecture, or any other work of art . . . . [A]nd then our young 
men, living as it were in a healthy climate, will benefit because all the works 
of art they see and hear influence them for good, like the breezes from some 
healthy country, insensibly leading them from earliest childhood into close 
sympathy and conformity with beauty and reason. (401 b-d).13 
As this passage shows, mimetic identification in the form of sympathy is not inherently 
bad providing it is oriented toward the Good. In his Sophist, Plato’s visitor from Elea, 
the hometown of Parmenides, divides mimetic imitation into “belief mimicry” and 
“informed mimicry,” the former of which is insincere, manipulative, and characteristic 
of Sophists. Mimicry that is informed, however, is accompanied by knowledge and 
associated with sincerity. Bjornar Grande says that the informed, hence sincere, 
imitator “is fearful of his knowledge. He has the Socratic attitude of not knowing 
anything a priori” (9), a reading that is suggested by the text as well (268a) and 
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figures informed mimesis as potentially adaptable to what the West has come to know 
as the Socratic method.  
Plato’s visitor does not elucidate informed mimicry to the extent that he 
dissects the “foolish” belief mimicry of Sophists. It is intriguing to entertain the 
proposition that Plato didn’t delve into the informed mimicry because that designates 
the actual role he plays as creator of the dialogues. After all, is not every single line 
composed by Plato a manifestation of mimesis? The philosopher Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe thinks so. The “height of the paradox” he sees in Plato’s critique of mimesis 
is that “Plato does not respect the laws he decrees” – “he,” of course, being primarily 
Socrates, “his” mimos, the mimetic part of “himself,” who speaks philosophically 
while the actual author, Plato, “does not speak one word of the philosophical 
discourse itself” (134-4; italics in original). In a footnote, Lacoue-Labarthe goes so far 
as to compare Plato’s “manipulation” of the character Socrates to the 
thaumatopoiikos, the puppet master that Plato frequently alludes to when the 
question of mimesis is brought up (135). This irony was apparently not lost on Plato’s 
wayward student Aristotle, who “bluntly” called the dialogues a form of mimos, 
opening a reading whereby, as Johan Huizinga puts it, “even Socrates and Plato [are] 
reckoned among the jugglers and thaumaturges just like the sophists” (149-50). 
Decades later, the Athenian rhetor Demetrius of Phaleron would label as mimetic the 
dialogue style of writing that Plato perfected since dialogue, a public discourse of 
contest, “imitates a man speaking off the cuff” (qtd in Haskins, 479). Vivienne Gray 
observes that Plato in his dialogues, with just a bit of a stretch, “can be said to mime 
Socrates in the same way rhapsodes were imitating a Homer or an Achilles” (11). If 
this sense, Plato would need to give himself a one-way ticket out of his own republic 
had such a place come into existence during his lifetime.  
We can see that even in Plato mimesis has a kind of dual aspect: even as his 
representation of it (a mimetic act) says one thing, he ends up simultaneously 
expressing another. It is also noteworthy that Plato’s extraordinary impact on Western 
philosophy might itself be conceived as a kind of bewitching not unlike that of Helen 
by Paris, son of the King of Troy, as represented in the Sophist Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen. Gorgias argues that the infamous Helen should be absolved of her reputation as 
an adulterous traitor to her husband and kingdom since blame should be located in the 
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language her suitor Paris used – one which constructed a persuasive logos, or Truth – 
that provoked her to follow the path he laid out for her. Similarly, Plato’s dialogues 
simulate speech in the construction of an epistemology of Truth that has been 
undeniably persuasive in its influence on the intellectual, aesthetic, pedagogical, and 
theological traditions of the West. We seldom consider the impact of philosophers as a 
contagious bewitching of our faculties and intellects. Maybe it’s time that we did. 
 
The Slippery Slope of Rene Girard’s “Mimetic Desire” 
Although in this dissertation I attempt to create a generally positive account of 
mimesis, I do not want to ignore its negative accounts. Partly this is because attention 
to its negative or stereotypical renditions allows me to highlight contradictions or gaps 
in support of helpful and usable reconceptualization of this important concept. First, 
though, it is important to represent the alternative versions as accurately as possible. 
As a segue into Rene Girard’s largely negative account of mimesis, I want to briefly 
consider research conducted on infant imitation by Andrew M. Meltzoff, the current 
Co-Director of the University of Washington’s Institute for Learning & Brain Sciences. 
In one experiment, Meltzoff tested how 18-month-old babies responded to a 
mechanical device that mimicked the movement of a human in picking up a dumbbell. 
The inanimate device did not look human – it had pincers rather than hands – but it did 
move very similarly to how humans move when performing this action. The babies’ 
reactions to the device convinced Metlzoff that they did not attribute any kind of 
intention or goal to the device, and hence they did not seek to imitate the action. This 
observation led Meltzoff to conclude that infant imitation occurs within an 
intersubjective framework where what is experienced visually is differentiated from a 
deeper level of felt experience involving human intention. A human hand slipping off 
the ends of the dumbbells suggests what an adult was “striving” or “trying” to do, but 
a mechanical pincer slipping from it conveys no intentionality and does not inspire 
imitation of the action (66, “Out of the Mouths”). Mimicry of an action therefore is 
motivated by the child’s perception of intention. Such a perception, he concludes, is 
the basis of cooperative learning and sociality, but it also serves as grounds for 
competitive desire for inanimate things or, in the case of siblings, rivalry (70). When a 
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child perceives the desire for something in another child, he or she adopts that 
perspective, creating a rivalry that pits the intentions of one with those of the other. 
 This final observation can be employed to support the mimetic theory of Rene 
Girard, a literary and cultural critic who argues that mimesis – specifically mimetic 
desire – is not only the source of violence in humans and many animals, but that 
“mimesis and violence are essential to account for human origins” and together 
constitute the source of civilizations (Garrels, “Mimesis and Science: Interview,” 245). 
As Gallese and Lakoff have argued, and as Meltzoff’s experiment suggests, humans are 
intersubjectively attuned to one another’s intentions through their mutual 
interactions. For Girard, such intentions are expressive of desire for certain people or 
things. When one perceives the desire of another for something, he or she adopts that 
desire, thereby endowing the object with value. This object-based desire then spreads 
mimetically, through imitation and replication (or “appropriative mimicry”), among a 
larger body of people. Unfortunately, because humans are, as Girard puts it, “an 
animal of crisis” (244), we develop conflictual relationships such as jealousy with 
respect to the desired object (which could be land, food, animals, humans, artifacts, 
etc). Our mimetic desire often results in violence. To mitigate conflicts, humans 
participate in sharing, as in the democratic model where everyone gets a piece of the 
pie. But sharing seems to be just one form of “unconscious avoidance of the problem 
of human conflict”; we do not so much share objects as we do desires, Girard argues, 
and our “ability to share desires conceals conflict at every turn.” There is clearly a 
dual-aspect at play in his theory of mimetic desire: “We desire the same thing and we 
are friends; we desire the same thing and we are enemies” (236-7).  Not only has 
mimetic desire played “an important role” in leading us to the global environmental 
problems we all face (251), but it is the underlying motivation for scapegoating 
violence,14 particularly the kind that involves whole communities turning against a 
minority of people scapegoated as other – a phenomenon that Girard believes is 
“creative of human culture” (245).  Girard does not hold back in his condemnation of 
mimesis. Even Plato may hesitate before considering Girard’s claim that mimesis is 
“obviously the greatest source of conflict in human life” (243).  
 While Girard’s mimetic theory has managed to thread its way across a number 
of fields currently involved in studies of mimicry and imitation, his intensely negative 
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construction of mimesis has been critiqued by several mimetic scholars, including 
Gebauer and Wulf. Acknowledging that Girard has developed a powerful instrument of 
interpretation, they are quick to point out the problematic nature of his “truth 
claims,” namely the reduction of every society to an essential origin, the definition of 
society as a mechanism for channeling violence, and the consistency of a chain of 
events leading to the establishment of a monolithic cultural order: “[M]ust we assume 
that there ever was an identifiable origin of the social?” (264-5).  The authors also 
note that Girard’s theory is based on texts (mostly literary and theological) that are 
“characterized by a number of family resemblances . . . in that they represent their 
characters’ problems in their relationships with Others and emphasize mimetic action, 
desire, and violence” (265). In addition, Girard’s argument tends to occur at the 
metalevel of narratives about social origins and crises, drawing conclusions from the 
big picture while ignoring the many “empirical events” that constitute that picture but 
which are “left in the dark” (264). This is especially the case with his work on anti-
romantic novels in which his depiction of mimesis “as a fundamental anthropological 
mechanism is an oversimplification, the result of a reductionist procedure that leads 
to the postulation of mimetic processes as independent of context and historical 
situation” (238).  
 The deepest hole in Girard’s negative theory of mimesis, however, was dug by 
Girard himself. In a 1992 interview with Rebecca Adams, Girard acknowledges that 
“mimetic desire, even when bad, is intrinsically good, in the sense that being merely 
imitative in a small sense, it’s the opening out of oneself” (Adams, 24). Because 
mimetic desire affords people such an “extreme openness,” it cannot be isolated 
solely to conflict but seen as the basis for devotion to others, even love. “Nothing is 
more mimetic,” he says, “than the desire of a child, and yet it is good. Jesus himself 
said it is good. Mimetic desire is also the desire for God” (24-5). Vittorio Gallese seizes 
on this acknowledgement by Girard to argue for a view of mimesis as having two sides: 
the “bad” or conflictual side that stems from mimetic desire and the “good” side that 
can lead to ethics of empathy once we accept the fact that through cognitively 
enacted intentional attunement we all inhabit an intercorporeal we-centric space 
(“The Two Side of Mimesis,” 16). Girard, however, eschews as “meaningless” the 
division of mimesis into good or bad and accuses the empirical sciences of downplaying 
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the conflictual dimension of imitation and desire (Garrels, “Mimesis and Science: An 
Interview,” 238, 236).  He believes that his mimetic theory needs to be better 
inscribed in evolutionary theory (“I am a Darwinist,” he tells Scott Garrells, “I believe 
in natural selection” [ 243].) and complains that Richard Dawkin’s memetic theory 
(which sees memes as units of culture that self-reproduce and operate similarly to 
“selfish” genes) fails to account for the conflictual element in cultural evolution that 
is mimesis (243). 
 We can see that even in Girard mimesis has a dual aspect: it gives rise to 
conflict and hate as well as companionship and love. This dual-aspect emerges also 
from Meltzoff’s experiment described above: mimetic identification with another’s 
intentions can result in desire and rivalry as well as sociality and cooperation. While 
he remains insistent that we must attend to the conflictual manifestation of mimesis 
in human relations, he does occasionally acknowledge that mimesis seems to have a 
positive side. In his 2008 book Evolution and Conversation, for instance, Girard writes 
that the “deeper meaning” to an understanding of mimesis is that 
[w]e will always be mimetic, but we don’t have to be so in a satanic15 fashion. 
That is, we don’t have to engage perpetually in mimetic rivalries. We don’t 
have to accuse our neighbor; instead, we can learn to love him (225).  
His claim that “we will always be mimetic” conveys his belief that beneath conscious 
and representational forms of imitation there is an unconscious inclination to imitate 
the desires and intentions of others. In other words, as Garrells puts it, “imitation 
operates at a level that precedes representational thought” and serves as an “ongoing 
function of our affective experience of desire” (14). We are reminded once again of 
Merleau-Ponty’s assignation of mimesis to signify a structuring mechanism of the body 
schema, one that is activated in response to intentions of desire – to learn how to use 
a pencil, to imitate a mother’s smile – but which are not necessarily conflictual. Girard 
is clearly cognizant of this dimension of human mimetic capacity, and it seems as if he 
evokes this obliquely in the passage cited above. But his apparent reluctance to 
explore this dimension at length should be acknowledged. There is, in fact, a 
precedent for such an exploration that would not necessarily undermine his view of 
mimetic desire. Theodor Adorno, along with his colleague Max Horkheimer, also offers 
a compelling critique of the role played by mimesis in generating human conflicts, 
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including those that evolve to the point of genocidal scapegoating. But in doing so, he 
does not lose sight of the mimesis’s dual aspects; in fact, as I show in the next section, 
that dimension of mimesis is what may save us from ourselves. 
 
Adorno’s Mimesis as the Way In and Out of Rationalist Instrumentality 
Of all the research I conducted for this dissertation, it is Adorno’s theory of mimesis 
that I have found the most challenging to understand. Thankfully, I am not alone. 
Miriam Bratu Hansen describes mimesis not only as “a central category in Adorno’s 
thought [but] a notoriously difficult one at that” (90). In the anthropological-
philosophical context of Dialectic of Enlightenment, mimesis derives from primordial 
forms of mimicry and involves assimilation to an environment, a relation of reciprocal, 
adaptive, and nonobjectifying interchange with the Other, and a fluid, pre-individual 
form of subjectivity. As such, according to Hansen, it assumes “a critical and 
corrective function” vis-à-vis instrumental rationality and the identifying logic of 
conceptual language that distances subject from object. But because the historical 
subjugation of nature “has sundered its relations with society,” mimesis is more or less 
conceived as a utopian category prefiguring a reconciliation with nature, “which 
includes the inner nature of human beings, the body and the unconscious” (90). Tom 
Huhn observes how Adorno characterizes mimesis as “archaic,” an “impulse,” whose 
origin precedes history – indeed, to trace its history would deposit us in the realm of 
biology (9). Adorno’s claim in Aesthetic Theory that the first cave paintings “must 
have been preceded by a mimetic component,” a comportment that is “the 
assimilation of the self to the other” as well as “an immediate practice . . . [that] is 
not knowledge” (qtd, 9), leads Huhn to conclude that, for Adorno, “[m]imesis 
precedes image making, by extension all thing making (production), and is thereby 
initially a praxis rather than a poiesis, a doing rather than a making” (9). 
According to Adorno himself, the assimilation between self and other derives 
from “an indelible mimetic element in all cognition and human practice”; 
unfortunately, this innate proclivity to identification has been shaped by dialectical 
rationality to serve the “false conclusion” of identity thinking, which “believes that it 
knows the unlike by likening it to itself, while in so doing it really knows itself only” 
(qtd in Whitebook, 64). In other words, the difference that distinguishes the other as 
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other is erased. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and his collaborator Max 
Horkheimer present mimesis as a natural or anthropological phenomenon that was 
colonized early on and shaped to serve the purposes of the colonizing enterprise: 
Civilization replaced the organic adaptation to otherness, mimetic behavior 
proper, firstly, in the magical phase, with the organized manipulation of 
mimesis, and finally, in the historical phase, with rational praxis, work. 
Uncontrolled mimesis is proscribed. . . . The severity with which, over the 
centuries, the rulers have prevented both their own successors and the 
subjugated masses from relapsing into mimetic behavior . . . is the condition of 
civilization. (146) 
An unmolested, uncolonized mimesis – “mimetic behavior proper” – manifests itself as 
a natural phenomenon (“organic adaptation to others”) that does not suit the purposes 
and functions of a civilization that increasingly has sundered its relations with the 
organic world from which it emerged but over which it seeks ultimate dominion. One 
cannot be, after all, organically adapted to something that must be converted into a 
standing reserve of usable resources. At the same time, one must be able to identify 
those resources by name in order to ascertain their value and significance, which 
requires a kind of identification. Therefore, mimesis must be controlled in order to 
serve the colonizing force of civilization. 
The historical roots of this control began in what the authors call the “magical 
phase” of early Western culture. “Mimetic magic” prefigures the split between subject 
and object by “taboo[ing] the knowledge which really apprehends the object” (11). A 
language that no longer addresses a tree as simply a tree but as something else, a 
location of significance that is more than the tree, like mana,16 “expresses the 
contradiction that it is at the same time itself and something other than itself, 
identical and not identical” (11). The kernel of dialectical logic opens and grows into 
totemism in which the religious authority, the shaman for whom “equivalence is his 
instrument,” wards off danger with its likeness (12). Mimetic magic is the first 
instance of the “organized control of mimesis” or, more complexly, a “mimesis of 
mimesis” that develops in late modernity to reproduce the ritualized discipline, the 
uniforms, the barbaric drumming, the monotonous repetition of words and gestures, 
and the elaborate symbols that fashion “the fascist cult of formulae” (152). This 
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compulsion toward cruelty and destruction stems from “the organic repression of 
proximity to the body” (193) that intensified with the development of civilization. The 
witch trials confirmed “the victory of male domination over primeval matriarchal and 
mimetic stages of development” (207), they tell us, and the European anti-Semitism 
that even the holocaust failed to fully eradicate “is the reverse of genuine mimesis 
and has deep affinities with the repressed” (155). And yet, “the reason that represses 
mimesis is not merely its opposite,” Horkheimer and Adorno contend, 
 [i]t is mimesis itself: of death. The subjective mind which disintegrates the 
spiritualization of nature masters spiritless nature only by imitating its rigidity, 
disintegrating itself as animistic. (45) 
Unfortunately, the dialectical logic inherent in the organized control of mimesis 
remains a driving force of contemporary capitalism that manifests itself forthrightly in 
the culture industry that is a hallmark of the whole enterprise. “Bourgeois society is 
ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to 
abstract qualities” (6). Those who have been “blinded by civilization” are rent by 
mimesis’s dual aspect which bourgeois ideology has rendered wholly dialectical. 
“[T]abooed mimetic traits” such as gestures of touching, nestling, soothing, and 
coaxing act as shameful residues of primacy that has no place rationalized 
environments: “What repels them as alien is all too familiar” (149).  
 In many ways, mimesis in Adorno bears resemblance Enframement (Gestell) in 
Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology,” another concept that has a 
dual function. The structural or “enframing” mechanism of our perceptual abilities is 
colonized by an instrumentalizing technology, causing us to collectively order 
experience in such a way that the essences of things are concealed by their ideological 
transformation into a reserve of useable resources (bestand). And yet, paradoxically, 
the Enframement that conceals the essential nature of the things we experience is 
also the way out of this ordering mindset. Perhaps by virtue of the fact that enframing 
is ultimately an embodied perceptual capacity that orders experience by connecting 
and dividing also renders it the source of revealing. Mimesis operates similarly in 
Adorno: it is the way into the mess it simultaneously offers a way out of. It is, in a 
sense, the ultimate balancing act. It is therefore troubling that some Adorno scholars 
do not themselves strike a balance between his account of “uncontrolled” mimesis as 
76 
 
adaptive, pre-reflective, nonobjectifying, and intersubjective and his account of its 
organized control that perverts these affective qualities in the service of civilization. 
Part of the problem is that Adorno himself often uses the term “mimesis” and 
“mimetic” (in passages such as the one indented above) as shorthand for the concept 
he less frequently describes as a “mimesis of mimesis” and which he sees as a 
perversion of an originary “mimesis proper.” 
Still, as Michael Taussig points out, throughout the considerable body of his 
work, Adorno gave greater emphasis to the notion that mimesis “provided the 
immersion in the concrete necessary to break definitively from the fetishes and myths 
of commodified practices and freedom” (254). Such an immersion may be experienced 
in the “mimetic language” of art – a language that precedes the split between subject 
and object that is implied in the signifying use of discursive language (Hohendahl, 81). 
Gebauer and Wulf argue that when mimesis is considered across the bulk of Adorno’s 
work, it is associated with “a decentering of the subject and a dissolution of 
anthropocentrism,” providing the opportunity for a “vital experience,” “an intensive 
mimetic relation to the world, to the Other, and to inner nature” (293).  So vital is 
this experience brought on by mimesis that D. Bruce Martin offers Adorno’s theory of 
mimesis (prior to its controlled organization, of course) as a “more fertile ground for 
developing radical ecological thought than do existing philosophies of deep ecology” 
(130-1).  
 In this section, I have shown how the largely negative portrayals and critiques 
of mimesis by Plato, Rene Girard, and Theodor Adorno never quite break free from the 
concept’s dual aspect, its capacity to enact sameness along with difference, freedom 
along with slavery, hate along with love. I have also shown how mimesis is more than 
just an aesthetic category; in Girard and Adorno especially, mimesis is a key 
characteristics of what is commonly referred to as “human nature,” a phrase that 
semantically conjoins the human with larger ecological structures while creating a 
distinction between them. It is from this conjunction that I will construct a model of 
mimesis that will inform the following chapters of this book. I will begin this effort 
now by reconsidering the classical definition of mimesis, provided by Aristotle, that 




Aristotlean Mimesis: Beyond Representing Naturata to Expressing Naturans 
Aristotle’s complex account of mimesis has suffered serious reduction by way of the 
popular translation of one short phrase he employs to describe what artists do when 
they create a work of art: mimeitai ten phusin. Halliwell takes great exception to the 
rendering of this phrase as “imitate nature,” which he describes as an inadequate 
translation that became a “neoclassical slogan” (15). For Aristotle’s aesthetics, he 
argues, the mimetic arts belong to the class of craft (techne) as a whole, but even 
more specifically to a subdivision of making (poiesis) or “productive craft,” which in 
principle should be analogous to processes perceived in nature. Hallowell argues that 
mimeitai ten phusin and similar Greek locutions should be translated as follows the 
process of nature rather than “imitates nature” (153) and spends considerable time 
showing how there can be no straightforward equation between mimesis and “the 
imitation of nature” as conceived by neoclassical and romantic thinkers, among many 
others (351). Gebauer and Wulf interpret Aristotle’s mimeitai ten phusin as a call on 
artists to “produce by means of the same force as nature” – a force that “nature and 
human beings possess in common” (54, 56). The medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas 
may have held a similar view when he described the act of imitation not as the 
conscious copying of an object or thing, of natura naturata, but as a manifestation of 
the formative force of natura naturans (Gebauer and Wulf, 71) – a view that puts his 
take on mimesis in line with Merleau-Ponty’s take of phenomenology, which he tells us 
“can be seen as a move from naturata to naturans, from constituted to constituting” 
(PhP, 70). 
Halliwell’s objection to this reductive translation stems in part from his 
discomfort with the largely pejorative sense of the term imitation, the semantics of 
which have been greatly narrowed and impoverished in modern usage (14). Rethinking 
the significance of imitation will be a prominent project in my next chapter. For now, 
I want to focus on the significance of the second term in this translation, nature, 
which has received much less attention in mimetic history than the verb modifying it 
despite its equally precarious translation. In The Social Creation of Nature, Neil 
Evernden argues that when most people think of nature (with a small n) they do not 
think of the “great amorphous mass of otherness that encloaks the planet” but, 
rather, they think of Nature (with a capital N): “the system or model of nature that 
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arose in the West several centuries ago” (xi) that conceives nature more as an object 
or thing. The etymologically complex word phusis, Evernden claims, interestingly 
enough, “originally referred to what a thing is like,” but in the hands of the pre-
Socratics began to refer to what everything is like and eventually came to stand for 
“everything” (19-20).  
Martin Heidegger believed that employment of the Latin term natura to 
translate phusis destroyed the authentic and original meaning of the term. In “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” he tells us that phusis “is indeed poiesis in the 
highest sense” (10) and that techne “belongs to the bringing-forth that is poiesis” 
(13). He interprets Aristotle’s four causes as “co-responsible” operative modes in the 
production of an artifact. The production process is enactive in that an artifact 
(Heidegger’s example is a chalice) “emerges” from the interaction of different forces, 
all of which share responsibility for the making – and only one of which is the human 
silvermaker (6-8). Phusis as described by Heidegger goes way beyond the conventional 
wilderness image evoked by “nature” and seems more in line with how the 
composition theorist Byron Hawk describes life: “a complex combination of material, 
biological, historical, social, linguistic, and ultimately technological processes that 
produce emergence” (5). It is important to consider that Aristotle’s understanding of 
phusis may have been closer to Hawk’s description of life than to the convention 
images that arise when we use the term “nature.” 
Interpreters of Aristotelean mimesis rarely take into consideration the vastly 
different signification of the Greek phusis from the Latin-derived word nature. Hence 
mimesis in Aristotle cannot be restricted to the iconic representation of “nature” that 
is responsible for our visions of, say, painters copying what they see around them such 
as rainbows or sunsets. Instead, Aristotelian mimesis seems expressive of a 
conjunction between painter, painting, and the painted, more generally between the 
world and the body that interacts with it while painting. Like the 20th century thinker 
Walter Benjamin, Aristotle believed that the most formidable mimetic powers were 
possessed by humans. Benjamin gave a name to this unique form of cognition: “the 
mimetic faculty,” a concept that segues nicely to a consideration of the recent 





The Role of Mimesis in Cognition 
As I noted in Chapter 1, the German thinker Walter Benjamin believed, as did 
Aristotle, that all creatures possess mimetic capabilities that are most fully developed 
in humans. His famous term “mimetic faculty” signified how similarities between the 
things we encounter in the world create familiar patterns which allow us to situate our 
experiences in an intelligible way. Benjamin believed that language evolved along with 
human culture. As human civilization became more complex, so too did language, 
becoming more conceptual and hence divorced from the material world with which 
human interaction helped produce language in the first place. Hence the “sensuous 
similarities” from which language derives – captured in the phenomenon of 
onomatopoeia – gives way to the “nonsensuous similarities” of which symbolic systems 
like language and all written scripts are archives (“Mimetic Faculty,” 335). Our 
formidable mimetic faculty described by Benjamin, Michael Taussig tells us, should be 
thought of as a “sixth sense, the basis for judging similitude” that enables the “nature 
that culture uses to create second nature” (213). 
Translated into the language I am using in this dissertation, what Benjamin 
calls “nonsensuous similarities” speaks to the operation of the mimetic faculty in the 
virtual realm of the conceptual and “sensuous similarities” speaks to its operation in 
the actual world of the experiential. In ordinary operations, our sensory-motor body 
schemas, as Merleau-Ponty showed in his discussion of the brain-damaged WWI veteran 
Schneider, automatically translates between these areas when we think and act. My 
contention is that we have lost sight of this interplay because of our educational 
emphasis on conceptual thinking, on symbolic significations and meanings shaped 
primarily by culture. Benjamin would likely agree. Gebauer and Wulf see as one of his 
central ambitions the reconstruction of mimetic sensuous experience that was nearly 
destroyed by Descartes’ dualism and scientific order (271). Susan Buck-Morss similarly 
identifies Benjamin’s project as trying to retrieve and revitalize “what was lost along 
the way” in the sequential development of stages of abstract formal reason - 
specifically an “active, creative form of mimesis” that stemmed from our “unsensed 
connection between perception and action” and which, once reconstituted, could 
possible incite revolutionary consciousness in people (263). Benjamin seemed to 
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believe that the expressive opportunities afforded by a more fully developed mimetic 
faculty should not be divorced from the (sensuous) material world in which our bodies 
and minds are ultimately rooted. Such a development might instead strike a balance 
between the two; nonsensuous similarities would not replace sensuous ones so much 
as complement them. Cultivating our mimetic faculty would hence not be a movement 
away from something old but a movement toward something new based on the old. 
For Benjamin, the epistemological shift to the nonsensuous similarities of the of what 
he called the signworld (Merkwelt) does not necessarily lead to a dead end, Buck-
Morss tells us, since it creates the conditions for a “future of development of mimetic 
expression, the potentialities for which are far from exhausted” (267). 
Benjamin’s mimetic theory has in recent years been resuscitated and given 
renewed vigor by the cultural theorist Mark Hansen. In his 2000 book Embodying 
Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, Hansen identifies “two divergent concepts of 
embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or simply collapsed 
from the beginning” (27). The first and most privileged view, epistemological 
embodiment, is an “artifactual” exteriorization of some process of inscription which 
is, in his opinion, ultimately concerned with stabilizing something that is “by nature 
amorphous or highly tenuous – for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention (for 
Latour)” (26). The second and marginalized view, phenomenological embodiment, 
insists on the corporeality of the body as a site of experiential excess and attends to 
the nondiscursive, nonrepresentational, affective dimensions of lived experience. 
Phenomenological embodiment, he contends, “asserts the impossibility of ever 
completely clarifying - bringing to discursive articulation - the embodied background 
underlying human practices” (27). Seeing in philosophy an end to what he terms the 
“semiotic-systemic perspective” of the epistemological account of embodiment, 
Hansen offers in its place a model he calls “corporeal mimesis” – a concept based on 
Walter Benjamin’s “mimetic faculty.”  According to Hansen, a cultivated corporeal 
mimetic faculty would allow humans to better negotiate radical changes (specifically 
industrial and technological changes) to “the material domain” of our material 
environments. Refining our mimetic faculty in these times of technologically mediated 
change, claims Hansen, “leaves room for the introduction of a distinct postlinguistic 
81 
 
form of mimesis that would restore a crucial dimension of sensuosity—a practical, 
embodied basis—to our contact with the material world” (232, emphasis in original). 
Hansen’s reconceptualization of Benjamin’s mimetic faculty as corporeal 
parallels Merleau-Ponty’s recovery of the bodily experience through phenomenology, 
which similarly seeks to return philosophy to the world of actual experience by 
“rediscovering phenomena” as the “layer of living experience through which other 
people and things are first given to us, the system of ‘self-other-things’ as it comes 
into being” that is prior to objective reflection (PhP, 65). In his 1981 book The 
Reenchantment of the World, the cultural historian Morris Berman strives for a similar 
rediscovery to a way of being in the world that has been buried under layers of 
cultural conventions. He promotes the development of “self-conscious mimesis” as the 
vital next phase in the cultivation of a “participating consciousness” through which 
people become attuned to the web of relations that threads its way across all beings 
and things but from which human “ego-consciousness” has disentangled us (72, 296). 
Berman argues that mimesis is a form of knowledge (173) and that identification of the 
sensuous with the intellectual is the “crux of the mimetic tradition” in Western 
culture (157). He claims that the beginning of wisdom is not in analytic dissection but 
through mimetic immersion in the world and compares mimetic knowledge to Henri 
Bergson’s ecological view of mind/body as a “field” in which our leaning – as 
demonstrated in the work of Michael Polanyi – is achieved mimetically through bodily 
engagement with our situations (147-8).   
Here we should recall Scott Marratto’s description of intercorporeity in 
Merleau-Ponty as a “field” in which “my body is already bound up with the other’s 
body before there can be any relation between conscious subjects” (144). I have 
touched on the relationship between intercorporeity and mimesis and here will return 
to that subject. I believe that the empirical studies that have informed the thinking of 
the neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese (who has written about mimesis within the context 
of intercorporeity, a term he apparently borrowed from Merleau-Ponty)17 is key to the 
mimetic approach I take toward rhetoric and  multimodal pedagogy in the chapters 
ahead. As I noted earlier, Gallese – one of the discoverers of the mirror neuron 
systems in humans and other primates – argues that there are “two sides of mimesis” 
and promotes the “good” side that Rene Girard has played down in his advancing of 
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mimetic desire as the source of conflict. By putting into conversation key aspects of 
work by Alexandre Kojeve, Martin Heidegger, and Halmuth Plessner with empirical 
neuroscientific research conducted internationally over the past two decades, Gallese 
offers a “different, complementary, not mutually exclusive account of mimesis as one 
of the driving forces leading to social identification, hence to human sociality and 
intersubjectivity” – but intersubjectivity viewed “first and foremost” as 
intercorporeity, “the mutual resonance of intentionally meaningful sensory-motor 
behaviours” (“Two Sides of Mimesis,” 3). Intercorporeity, as Gallese explains it, 
describes a crucial aspect of intersubjectivity because humans share the same 
intentional objects and their situated motor systems are similarly wired to 
accomplish similar basic goals. Before and below our theoretical take on the 
world is the pragmatic character of our openness to the world. (4) 
In our situated interactions with other people and things, we automatically engage in 
what he and his colleagues call “intentional attunement,” a specific, shared, 
phenomenal state generated in part by the mirror neuron system.  This system allows 
for embodied simulation that is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the 
observer of actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the 
observed” (131). This mandatory, prereflexive mechanism “is not the result of a 
deliberate and conscious cognitive effort” but instead “generates a peculiar quality of 
familiarity with other individuals” (143-4).  From the moment of birth “humans are 
engaged in interpersonal mimetic relations” that occur in a shared “we-centric” space 
(“Two Sides”11). He suggests that these bodily “instantiations of unconscious mimesis” 
(9) emerge simultaneously with intersubjective relations from the ground of 
intercorporeity (13). Therefore, he argues, humans have an innate capacity for 
empathy that does not solely manifest itself as rivalry but also, as Girard himself has 
noted, as compassion and love – an observation that Meltzoff’s experiment referenced 
above also supports. An ethics that takes serious account of this “good” side of a 
clearly dual-aspect mimesis should look to neuroscientific studies of cognition in 
promoting empathy, cooperation, and cohabitation as correctives to the violence, 
scapegoating, and war that results from its “bad” side. 
As I noted earlier, intercorporeal mimetic relations in Gallese are based 
primarily in human-to-human interactions. In an attempt to move beyond human 
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sociality, I show in the previous chapter how Merleau-Ponty describes typists and 
organists as “incorporating” the space of keyboards into their own body schemas 
through habitation, a process he discusses within the broad framework of imitation. 
The affect theorist Anna Gibbs, however, provides an even better nonanthropocentric 
account of intercorporeal mimetic relations that I would like to look at here. In her 
2010 essay “After Affect: Sympathy, Synchrony, and Mimetic Communication,” Gibbs 
argues that mimesis, like affect, is not necessarily best thought of as occurring at the 
level of the individual or the organism; rather it might be seen as a “trajectory” that 
both organism and environment are mutually caught up in (195). Interpreting mimesis 
not as direct imitation or “copying” but as reciprocity, entrainment, and synchrony, 
she aligns it with an emerging “nonhumanist” movement of thought “for whom 
thinking is a practice that should extend us beyond the known forms of the subject” 
(187). She herself cuts a path in this direction by offering a mimetic reading of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s discussion of asymmetrical coevolution that they call 
“becoming.” While the orchid and the wasp may exist separately in different “worlds” 
or Umwelts, a form of symmetrical reciprocity nonetheless emerges in the structural 
coupling of these two worlds.18 Gibbs adds empirical weight to this theory by 
referencing observations made by the behavioral ecologist Anne C. Gaskett on how 
orchids evolved complex mimicry patterns to deceive, if only temporarily, pollinating 
wasps (194). Gibbs describes as “communication” the structural alignment between 
the wasp’s alimentary system and the orchid’s reproductive system (195). Mimesis, 
hence, is not just a human function but a complex process of what Aristotle said the 
work of artists, painters, rhetors, and musicians ought to “imitate”:  phusis, nature. 
Indeed, there seems to be a strong mimetic dimension to Aristotle’s notion of 
“function,” which, according to Gilbert Simondon, aligns parallels between beings 
whose modes of existence and structure are different but who are linked through a 
chain of functioning that gives continuity and permanence of life from one species to 
another (Two Lessons, 50-2). In imitating phusis, human artists and performers are 
basically linking themselves to this chain of functioning that, like Gibbs’ mimetic 
communication, cuts across all living things. 
At the level of human interaction, Gibbs argues that mimesis reveals itself 
through our “capacity for synchrony” as a form of “affective attunement,” as revealed 
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in how a baby’s squeal of delight is “translated” into a mother’s dancing shimmy as a 
form of response – a “correspondence” between perception and motility that operates 
“cross-modally,” enacting a space “where two subjective worlds come into momentary 
contact” (195). The mother responds to her baby’s needs, Gibbs says, because “she is 
attuned to the level of the baby’s distress”; she and the child are synchronized (196). 
This synchronic attunement is what Gibbs calls mimetic communication and, like the 
other examples provided above, works against the conventional understanding of 
mimesis as the reproduction of sameness since the mother’s shimmy is an appropriate 
response to her baby’s squeal and not a replication of it. This “cross-modal” process 
that operates “both intra- and inter-corporeally” (196), Gibbs asserts, is productive of 
difference, organizing experience so that one’s identification with others reversibly 
becomes one’s distinction from them. This is not just a phenomenon of infants. Adults 
similarly become “entrained” with the gestural manners and speech rhythms of others 
they observe or interact with, almost always at an unconscious level (196). But never 
do we entirely “lose ourselves,” as Plato believed, in the process. Mimetic 
communication is not about sacrifice but attunement; difference is not eliminated or 
marginalized but enacted simultaneously with similarity. One cannot determine what 
constitutes difference without attending to similarity; they are co-constitutive of each 
other. The wasp and the orchid exist in different phylums, different “worlds,” but the 
agon of their encounters enacts just enough similarity to allow for symbiotic relations. 
As noted previously, Merleau-Ponty believes that we share with our situations a 
style, “a ‘manner’ that I apprehend and then imitate, even if I am unable to define it” 
(CAL, 43; italics in original). Even when one partially imitates the behavior of others, 
one takes on the “total attitude” corresponding to that behavior. The acquisition of a 
total attitude reveals that cognition is not the product of some mental apparatus but 
rather emerges from the intercorporeal nexus between the body of the imitator with 
the body of the one being imitated: 
When I witness the setting in of the behavior of others, my body becomes a 
means of understanding them, my corporeality becomes a comprehending 
power of their corporeality – I regain the final meaning … of other people’s 
behavior, because my body is capable of achieving the same goals. (CAL, 42) 
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This is precisely the process of mimesis as described by Gallese through which one 
becomes intentionally attuned to another so that one’s bodily state “becomes in some 
way congruent with” that of another (Gallese et al, 151). But style is not enacted 
solely through our bodies’ relations with other human bodies. Merleau-Ponty describes 
how style arises in language use – his example is the word “sleet” – as a “meeting of 
the human and the nonhuman, as it were, a piece of the world’s behavior” (PhP, 469). 
Here we have a meeting place of systems, not of subjects, reminiscent of Gibbs’ 
description of the coupling that occurs not so much between the wasp and the orchid 
but between the wasp’s alimentary system and the orchid’s reproductive system. To 
engage mimetically with the people and things of this world, then, is to engage with 
the style of all styles that the Greeks called phusis. Our engagement is expressive – 
not just representative – of many things that constitute “life,” including how we learn 
and communicate by intentionally attuning to others. In the next chapter, I will look 
more closely at what Merleau-Ponty calls the “almost imitative way” we attune 
ourselves to the style of situations, a dimension central to ancient rhetorical pedagogy 
that was retained through certain skill sets associated with imitatio. But before 
proceeding I want to contend briefly with the anti-mimetic, anti-phenomenological, 
anti-ambient ideology of Timothy Morton’s so-called “dark ecology,” to which I now 
turn. 
 
A Brief Deconstruction of Timothy Morton’s “Dark Ecology” 
In his 2007 Ecology Without Nature, Timothy Morton argues that contemporary “nature 
writing” like that of David Abram – who draws heavily on Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology in offering an ecological philosophy that attends to the more-than-
human dimensions  of perception – suffers from a romantic ideality he calls 
“ecomimesis,” a “device” that “wants to go beyond the aesthetic dimension” of 
mimesis and “involves a poetics of ambience . . . [that] denotes a sense of a 
circumambient, or surrounding, world” (31-3, 132). By trying to erase the trace of 
writing in his text and in other texts, Abram and other writers he perceives as given to 
romanticism indulge in “ecomimetic ekphrasis,” an ambient rhetorical device that 
seeks to absorb readers into the reading itself, evoking thereby a “fantasy 
environment” that stands in for the world in which we are supposedly immersed or 
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embedded (129). He categorically attacks the ideas of complex systems as “holism 
without the sticky wetness, a cybernetic version of the ecological imaginary” (103); 
intersubjective fields of perception  as a manifestation of the “rich, spatial quality of 
field in phenomenology [that] is simply the holographic hallucination,” one that wants 
to conjure a surrounding world that “jumps off the page” (105); and the body as “a 
phenomenological product of intersubjectivity, which seek[s] to do away with the 
dilemma of specifying the boundary between inside and outside” (105).  Ecomimesis 
draws on these and other concepts to “carve out a radical embeddedness in the 
landscape” by conjuring “an ambient dimension incarnated like Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘Flesh,’ surrounding and sustaining the narrator and the reader” (132-3). Because 
ecomimesis aims for immediacy, “it wants us to forget or lay aside the subject-object 
dualism” (151) and draws on ambient rhetoric to create a sense of in-between: “The 
brilliance of ambient rhetoric is to make it appear as if, for a fleeting second, there is 
something in between” (50). According to Morton, the  notion of there being an in-
between is “sheer nihilism” (54) perpetuated by the “trope” of Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasm, which intertwines “what is sensed with the one who is sensing” (69) and hence 
contributes to what Morton calls the “beautiful soul syndrome,” a “subjective form of 
ambience” that results from “the collapse of aesthetic distance” (164).  
  Morton’s forthright attack on “ecomimesis” is not without significant 
shortcomings. It should be noted that Morton’s criticism of nature writing is part of a 
larger commitment to an ideological dis-ease with contemporary theories of 
relationality. His suggestion that the term intersubjectivity, popularized by 
“phenomenological rhetoric,” should be replaced by the word “interobjectivity” (106) 
resulted in comparisons between his book the then emerging philosophy of Object 
Oriented Ontology, which Morton has since associated himself with. “OOO” has 
adopted a critical – and sometimes openly hostile – theoretical position with respect to 
the relational theories that inform much contemporary critical theory,19 including 
those I draw heavily from in this dissertation. Morton’s provocative, often humorous, 
and sardonic treatise barely disguises his visceral animosity toward major tenets of 
phenomenology, complex systems theories, autopoiesis, and other philosophies that do 
not draw clear distinctions between subjects and objects. Morton piles these together 
into a single monolithic ecophilosophy that, in the later chapters, turns out to be deep 
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ecology. But what does he offer in its place? This is where Morton’s entire project 
deconstructs itself – with much help from the author himself. 
 In contrast to deep ecology, Morton proffers what he calls “dark ecology,” “a 
perverse, melancholy ethics that refuses to digest the object into an ideal form” 
(195). In his words: 
We should be finding ways to stick around with the sticky mess that we’re in 
and that we are, making thinking dirtier, identifying with ugliness, practicing 
“hauntology” (Derrida’s phrase) rather than ontology. So out with the black 
clothes, eyeliner, and white makeup, on with the spangly music: dark ecology. 
(188) 
In the pages that conclude his book, Morton hardly develops his theory of dark 
ecology. Instead, he simply opposes the term to the “new organicism” of relational 
philosophy (191). Dark ecology is trumpeted as a “halting” of the ambient sounds of 
ecomimesis by “the screeching of the emergency brake” (196).  It also helps us all get 
“over the dilemma of the beautiful soul, not by turning the other into the self, but 
perversely, by leaving things the way they are” (196).  Most remarkably, in the very 
last two paragraphs of Ecology Without Nature, Morton suddenly admits that “I long to 
characterize what I am aiming for as ‘really deep ecology’,” which, simply put, means 
“hang[ing] out in what feels like dualism” since taking “a more nondual approach” to 
questions about our ecological relationship with the world would be metaphorically 
equivalent to jumping down into the mud rather than trying to pull the world out of it 
(204-5). 
How do we do this exactly? “In a truly deep green world, the idea of Nature 
will have disappeared in a puff of smoke, as nonhuman beings swim into view” (204). 
The problem with this conclusion, of course, is Morton’s assumption that all the 
theoretical perspectives he attacks buy into the same monolithic view of Nature. I 
contend that they do not. Even constructed views of Nature differ widely, with self-
identified deep ecologists conceiving of it in ways very different from wildlife 
management experts or evolutionary biologists. As I discussed earlier, Aristotle’s term 
phusis is inadequately translated as “Nature” just as mimesis is inadequately 
translated as “copying” or “imitation.” Morton ignores how theories of relationality 
like those of Merleau-Ponty enabled “nonhuman beings to swim into view,” that 
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objects were perceived as having an ontology long before OOO entered the 
philosophical agon.20 Morton way too quickly seizes upon the conventional definitions 
and stereotypes of the concepts he rails against in his book while mimicking popular 
styles (dark eyeliner, spangly music) seen as “dark” or provocatively punk. His desire 
to provoke in this book, I submit, exceeds his commitment to critical analysis and 
consideration. As I hope I have shown, there is much more to the concept of mimesis 
than the reductive definitions that come together to inform Morton’s straw man 
“ecomimesis.” In the next chapter, I will delve more deeply into the widespread 
cultural prejudice against one of these definitions – mimesis as imitation – in an 
attempt to reveal how the denigration of what is an essential manner of learning 
about ourselves and the world we inhabit has done much more harm than good. 
 
                                                            
1 I would also like to add that I don’t believe her interpretation of Plato and Aristotle delves much at all 
into their actual dealings with mimesis. What Sun seems to be doing here is taking a very reduced version 
of mimesis and using it to reflect their general philosophies. This is especially true in the case of Plato, 
where mimesis reflects his privileging of eidos over matter. What she doesn’t attend to, surprisingly, is 
that he actually used that hierarchy to diminish mimesis. In the case of Aristotle: I suppose by securing 
mimesis so steadfastly in the realm of human aesthetics did in a sense anthropocentrize it in ways that, as 
I will show, much earlier understandings of the concept did not. However, reducing Aristotle’s extensive 
treatment of mimesis solely to anthropocentrism, in my view, is an example of extremely selective 
reductionism. It’s not that I disagree with Sun’s very generalized reading of a conventionalized version of 
mimesis here. It’s just that her reading does not directly attend to Plato and Aristotle’s actual discussions 
of the concept. 
2 Stephen Halliwell uses this term to describe the enactive conception of mimesis he believes Aristotle 
was strongly inclined to, and which I will discuss in the following section. My use of the term dual aspect, 
however, will not be confined solely to the aesthetic context of Aristotles’ discussion. 
3 We should recall here that Merleau-Ponty describes the “fundamental and irreducible form” of mimesis 
as a “correspondence” between dual modalities – perception and motility – which translates itself into 
“an original” motor organization (CRO 146). As a function of the body schema “appropriate to the needs 
of expression,” mimesis is what allows us to automatically regulate our bodily equilibrium in part by 
realizing that our body gestures are “analogous” to those of the people and other living beings around us 
(154). The motor organization enacted through this correspondence is, however, original – not a direct 
copy of an act, but more like a simulation of an act’s intention. In other words, what is imitated here is 
not so much the action itself but the expression of that action, its total significance. The picture 
emerging here suggests that mimesis is the cognitive operation that enables our attunement to style 
through an “affective interplay between the ‘mind’ and the ‘object’” that Sun ascribes to the allegedly 
anti-mimetic concept of xing (335). It is also clearly an intercorporeal operation in that it cannot occur in 
the absence of material bodies, both human and nonhuman. 
4 For example, causal dependence, visual similarity, analogy, and behaviorial imitation or mimicry. See 
Halliwell, 153. 
5 The term cited by Halliwell is suntheorein, whose two other uses in Aristotle confirm the force of the 
prefix for him: “to contemplate or observe at the same time.” (181) 
6 The current artistic trend of bioart similarly tries to evoke a more complex state of awareness by 
encouraging viewers to embody dual aspects of bioartistic exhibits. In some pieces, they become 
simultaneously viewers and participants, in others they experience an experiment by being both subject-
as-experimenter and the object-as-experimented-on. This dual aspect evolves, according to Robert 
Mitchell, from bioart’s ability to bring two media together: media-as-communication and media-as-
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transformation. (See Introduction for Mitchell’s Bioart and the Vitality of Media, U of Washington Press, 
2010.) 
7 They speculate that the original mimoses participated in Dionysian cult dramas and later became 
performers at banquets thrown by wealthy aristocrats at which they depicted scenes of life “as it is” – 
that is, from the allegedly more realistic point of view of commoners (28-9). 
8 See Halliwell, 17. Gebauer and Wulf tell us that mimos were actors who represented lift “as it was” – 
that is, the everyday life of commoners – and the banquets of rich men (29) 
9 In their book Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Harvester Press, 1978), Marcel Detienne 
and Jean-Pierre Vernant argue that stochastic knowledges like metis, a concept that parallels mimesis in 
many ways, were ignored for centuries by ancient Greek historians and scholars due to the combined 
influence of Christianity and Platonic metaphysics, both of which promoted a view in which “human 
reason should appear even more clearly separated from animal behaviour than it was for the ancient 
Greeks” (317-18). 
10 I draw here on Matthew Potolsky’s description of this section of Plato’s Sophist (22-26).  
11 As we will see in the next chapter, prior to Plato mimesis was a term used in relation to a performative 
practice and pedagogy. Plato basically philosophized it. Halliwell therefore refers to him (seemingly 
following others) as the founding father of mimeticism – of the theoretical and aesthetic tradition. But 
this tradition clearly has roots in history long predating Plato’s dialogues. As a coarse analogue, it would 
be possible to call Plato the founding father of rhetoric in that he was the first to record the word 
(rhetorike). But, of course, rhetoric as a practice in ancient Greece pre-dated Plato by many centuries. 
12Havlock argues that Plato’s rejection of mimesis and banning of the poets in the Republic stemmed from 
the philosopher’s understanding of a shift in Greek literacy from oral to written traditions. 
13 Quoted in Bjornar Grande, 8 
14 Scapegoating violence is a central tenet to Girard’s mimetic theory. He believes that proto-humans 
established culture and religion through ritual sacrifice, which deflected escalating in-community 
violence to a surrogate. For a good overview of Girard’s theory see Garrells (1-2, 11-19). For an account 
of the literary, mythic, and religious framework that informs Girard’s theory, see Gebauer and Wulf 
(Chapt 20, 255-266). 
15 Girard tells us that “satanic” means “the power of accusation. ‘Satan,’ in the Bible, means first and 
foremost the accuser…” (Adams, 33).  
16 Mana is a proto-Oceanic term that worked its way into multiple languages associated with the 
Austronesian language family. It originally was associated with the forces of nature – thunder, wind, 
storms – but in time came to represent a great supra-natural force. Horkheimer and Adorno use it as an 
equivalent for magic. When the magician claims that the tree is a site of magical mana, the tree becomes 
something more than itself, even other than itself. In this way do humans gain control of “nature”: they 
who understand magic can control that in which it is invested. 
17 As I noted in Chapter 1, in his 2009 article “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis 
of Social Identification,” Gallese cites Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the “comprehension of gestures come 
about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others. . . . as if the other person’s 
intention inhabited my body and mind his” – a comprehension that is communicated, according to 
Gallese, “first and foremost” (523) through intercorporeity, the intentional attunement between bodies, 
which he argues subtends intersubjectivity. Of Merleau-Ponty’s passage, which I only quote a part of 
here, Gallese writes: “These words fully maintain their illuminating power in the present century, even 
more so as they can now be grounded on solid empirical evidence” (526). 
18 This example is drawn and elaborated on by Deleuze and Guattari from the German Baltic biologist 
Jacob Von Uexkull. 
19 In his 2012 Alien Phenomenology, or, What it’s Like to Be A Thing (U of Minnesota Press), the OOO 
rhetorician Ian Bogost adopts a similar tone in his attack of correlationism and other features of relational 
philosophies he conceives as obliterating objects. 
20 For one of many examples, Bernard Stiegler argues for an ontology of “technical beings” in his three 
volume work Technics and Time, the first book of which was published in 1994. 
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Chapter 3: Cultivating Experiential Knowledge: The Mimetic 
Dimension in Rhetoric 
 
The Dual Denigration of Mimesis and Rhetoric 
In the last chapter I explored the complex meaning of the term mimesis. In this 
chapter I look more closely at how mimesis - as both conventional representation and 
enactive expression – impacted the Western rhetorical tradition and still does. To do 
this requires us to consider in much greater depth a central significance of mimesis, 
namely the interrelated activities of repetition, simulation, and repurposing that are 
lumped altogether in its translation as “imitation.” This term is one that must be 
carefully contextualized when used; otherwise, one risks conjuring the historical 
anathema against the allegedly lazy, rote, mindless monkey-see-monkey-do 
reproduction of facsimiles in a culture that has been tutored to prize originality and 
uniqueness and persecute plagiarism. The deeply entrenched prejudice against what is 
an essential learning behavior in humans and many other species has in recent times 
given way to more serious considerations of its biological and anthropological 
dimensions. In his introduction to the 2011 Mimesis and Science: Empirical Theories on 
Imitation and the Mimetic Theory of Culture and Religion, a collection of essays by 
scholars in multiple disciplines who respond in various ways to Rene Girard’s theories 
of appropriative mimetic desire, Scott R. Garrels observes how the work of mimetic 
scholars in the humanities and social sciences have for long addressed “broad 
concerns” that empirical imitation scholars are just now beginning to catch up with 
(29). Fortunately, these scholars are now beginning to contribute to a “renewed view 
of imitation as one of the most compelling and overlooked capacities of the human 
species” (1). Increasingly, imitation is understood as a “complex, generative, and 
multidimensional phenomena” that may very well be the basis for how we understand 
ourselves and others, but for how we learn as well (1). 
 These complex and multidimensional phenomena have been ignored, Garrels 
tells us, because of “many enduring and deeply ingrained philosophical and conceptual 
biases concerning imitation, some dating back thousands of years (2). These biases 
have been well documented and often accepted as innovative steps in the forward-
moving direction of progress. “All forms of imitation are to be despised!” proclaimed 
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one of the many futurist manifestos1 published in the early 20th century as iconoclastic 
movements in art began to spread across the Europe and America, promoting an 
ideology lionized by the modernist poet Ezra Pound’s statement “Make It New.”2 
Pound may not have realized it, but he was in fact simply reproducing an old ideology. 
The Renaissance figure Leonardo da Vinci’s forthright disapproval of all forms of 
imitation contributed to a burgeoning disregard for formal aesthetic practices 
associated with what the Romans called, in both art and rhetoric, imitatio (Garrels, 
7). Conditions were created long ago for a tradition in which, as Stephen Halliwell 
complains, “the semantics of ‘imitation’ have been considerably narrowed and 
impoverished” so that its modern significance “tends almost inevitably to imply, often 
with pejorative force, a limited exercise in copying, superficial replication, or 
counterfeiting of an externally ‘given’ model” (14; emphasis in original).  
 While in other cultures overt imitation is considered a sign of respect, rigor, 
and even flattery, Western intellectual traditions have followed in the footsteps of 
Plato, whose attack on mimesis Garrels targets as “a primary source of our modern 
tendency to devalue imitation” (5). As mentioned earlier, Plato associated imitation 
with the making of images that were thrice removed from the epistemic eidos of 
which they were unreliable representations – shadows cast on the wall of the cave that 
passed themselves of as reality and confined people to mental slavery. His anti-
mimetic position therefore went hand in hand with an anti-imagistic one. Eric A. 
Havelock, in fact, describes the general thrust of Platonism as “an appeal to substitute 
a conceptual discourse for an imagistic one.”3 This conceptual orientation would have 
serious consequences for what Plato himself called rhetorike, specifically the 
“imitative kind … of image-making art” practiced by the Sophists (qtd in Covino 34). In 
Plato’s eyes, according to Gebauer and Wulf, “Sophistic thinking aims to produce 
images that the listener will regard as real, all of which takes place in the world of 
phenomena” and, like mimesis, belongs to a an increasingly obsolete oral culture 
(Gebauer and Wulf, 43, 45). In his Sophist, Plato labels the “production of images” by 
Sophists as acquisitive and compares it to hunting (265a-c), a metaphor which Per 
Bjonar Grande reads as a “manipulative way of learning and taking possession of other 
people” (12). Plato then immediately extends the metaphor to include commerce and 
contest (265b), that realm of persuasive communication practices that in Gorgias he 
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labeled “rhetoric.” Tainted as it was by the execrable influence of Sophists, rhetoric 
would join mimesis and all other “imitative arts” as a cultural force against which 
philosophy must pit itself.  
Aristotle, fortunately, did not follow suit. However, his reconceptualization of 
mimesis and rhetoric narrowed the scope of practice with which both were associated. 
Susan Jarratt argues that Aristotle mapped out “quite a different epistemic field” 
from the Sophists, placing rhetoric along with ethics and politics “against the 
background of his fixed vision of episteme” and thereby created a system that 
suppressed the positions the Sophists advocated, namely the primacy of human 
knowledge, possibilities of non-rational and emotional responses to the whole range of 
discourse types, and the integral relationship between theory and practice (xviii-xix). 
Ekaterina V. Haskins comes to a similar conclusion with respect to mimesis, seeing 
Aristotle’s privileging of representational mimesis over the performative kind that so 
vexed Plato as a “disciplining” of rhetoric which curtailed the influence of 
“performance culture” upon public institutions, including civic education (31). 
The experientially performative Sophistic dimensions that were excised in 
Aristotle’s revamping of rhetoric along more conceptual lines did not, however, 
disappear from the rhetorical tradition.4 They lived on through imitatio,5 a practice 
developed in Roman rhetoric and historiography whose roots stem from ancient 
Sophistic training that did not encourage a separation of mind from body or rhetor 
from situation. In the last chapter, I showed how mimesis – even in the hands of its 
harshest critics – persists in revealing a dual-aspect dimension that opens it to 
multiplicity rather than narrows it to the singularity as expressed by the words 
“imitation,” “copying,” and “rote learning.” In this chapter, I will ally this broadened 
understanding of mimesis with an equally broadened account of key aspects of 
imitation – repetition, simulation, and repurposing – and reveal how these basic 
behavioral capacities help situate rhetors and composers in the material contexts of 
their situations. By continuing to draw on key components of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
perceptual phenomenology, I will show how imitative mimesis fits with propositions 
made recently by some materialist rhetoricians who conceive an originary rhetoricity 
subtending the symbolic orders upon which so much of the traditional canon draws. I 
will then offer an account of imitatio that shows how from the start it has subscribed 
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to experiential modes of learning and communicating overlooked by scholars and 
critics alike. In this sense, imitatio – which is the formal rhetorical and aesthetic 
rendering of the Greek word mimesis in Latin – has its philosophical roots in perhaps 
the first formalized account of experiential learning in Western Culture.6 This will be 
followed by an elaboration of embodied repetitio – a concept I construct that aligns 
repetition in rhetoric and general language use with mimesis conceived 
phenomenologically – that is, as expressive of enaction. I will then turn toward 
contemporary rhetorical pedagogy by drawing on the work of Robert Terrill, a 
communication scholar who revived imitatio for a 2011 article published in Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly. Terrill’s article will help me to sum up this chapter’s focus on 
mimesis in rhetorical pedagogy and segue to the next chapter in which I explore that 
pedagogy in the context of multimodality. 
 
Imitating Phusis: Mimesis and Material Rhetorics 
The rhetorical scholar Jay Dolmage claims that Western rhetoric has for long 
participated in a tradition that “lifts discourse from its corporeal hinges” by 
overlooking its embodied and thoroughly “phenomenological importance” (“Metis,” 1). 
Where Dolmage draws on the Greek concept of metis to restore to rhetoric its 
phenomenological importance, I draw on mimesis as read through the phenomenology 
of Merleau-Ponty.7 I am not the first, though, to use phenomenology as a way to re-
envision rhetoric. In her 1998 Toward A Phenomenological Rhetoric, Barbara Couture 
ambitiously promotes what she terms as phenomenological rhetoric as a “sea change” 
to the “valued rhetorical practices” of argumentation (6, 182)  that have, in her view, 
incorporated narcissistic and fetishistic behavior that stem from the belief in a 
separate, coherent, unified self (58). Arguing that “we need to return to the 
possibility of universal meaning,” Couture offers phenomenology as a way to transcend 
the “dichotomous thinking” and “polar tensions” brought on by deconstruction, 
poststructuralism, and other relativisitic philosophies that she, along with Ann E. 
Berthoff and others, claim have worked its way into rhetoric (28). She argues that the 
idea of shared universal truth is manifested in how “phenomenology accounts for 
consciousness as it is constitutive of both meaning and the implicit object of meaning” 
(64). Since all of humanity is concerned with making meaning, truth exists 
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phenomenologically – that is, not in ourselves or in the world but “in the dynamic of 
our engagement with the world,” which is itself, as Merleau-Ponty has said, “meaning” 
(62, 65). 
 Although Couture draws heavily on Merleau-Ponty, her overriding commitment 
to rescuing truth from relativizing poststructuralists tends to prevent her from 
attending to the material role of the body in his phenomenology. This dissertation 
therefore seeks to fill the gaps I see in Couture’s phenomenological rhetoric. While I 
am not concerned with resuscitating universal truth, I do believe that we need to 
attend to materially enacted meaning in our composing and communication practices.  
My phenomenological approach to rhetoric actually has less in common with Couture’s 
than it does with what has become known in recent times as material rhetoric. There 
are echoes of Merleau-Ponty, I feel, in Nathan Stormer’s description of rhetoric as 
“express[ing] materiality: it is a way of incarnating ourselves in the world . . . 
(“Recursivity, 29).8 Similarly, Thomas Rickert argues for “a richer, more dynamic, and 
materialist understanding of rhetoric that declines to zone rhetoric within 
symbolicity,” one whose persuasive aim is not to conduct “a shift in the mental states 
of subjects but something world-transforming for individuals and groups immersed in 
vibrant, ecologically attuned environments” (xv). “The big story,” though, as Rickert 
puts it, “is that rhetoric is not solely human doing, that it is worldly, and that world is 
simultaneously one of meaning and of meaning’s withdrawal” (163). While Rickert 
conceives meaning primarily through a Heideggerian lens (as seen here with the 
reference to its withdrawal), I approach it through one crafted by my reading of 
Merleau-Ponty: meaning arises through our bodily interactions with situations,9 one 
important dimension of which is, for humans at least, fundamentally mimetic and 
hence rhetorical. 
In Chapter 1, I looked at how certain aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of adult 
imitation were demonstrated in his study of the brain-damaged World War I veteran 
Schneider. In what he calls “normal imitation,” human beings are so attuned to the 
situations they are enmeshed in that they automatically shift from actual (perceptual; 
affective) experience to the virtual (conceptual; symbolic) manifestation of that 
experience, over and over – a capacity lost to Schneider. I see this capacity as being 
akin to what Rickert calls ambient attunement: a recognition that “even if symbolicity 
95 
 
remains ascendant, it stays receptive to its material dimension, and not just receptive 
but engaged, and not just engaged but enmeshed” (165). I believe that, in practice, 
ambient attunement is enabled by what Merleau-Ponty describes as “mimesis in its 
most fundamental form”: the correspondence between perception and motility that 
enables action. Gebauer and Wulf offer a similar (materialist) account of mimetic 
representation not as an “act of an autonomous mind but a product of practice in the 
formation of materials, painting or writing” (21) which Aristotle and others believe are 
impelled by the productive “force” of phusis that, though mimesis, speaks to an 
underlying “similarity in the processes of creation” (55). As I noted in the previous 
chapter, what is being “imitated” is not an object or thing (natura naturata) but the 
poietic process which enacts it (natura naturnas) (Gebauer and Wulf, 71). 
When we put mimesis and rhetoric back into contact with their material base, 
we discover that both are intimately linked as processes of natura naturans, the 
“naturing”10 of phusis. The hermeneutical philosopher Hans Gadamer, writing in 1969, 
described rhetoric as a dimension of “the universal phenomenon of human 
linguisticality” that builds “on a natural power that everyone possesses to some 
degree” (20). Far from being a “theory of forms or speech and persuasion,” rhetoric 
according to Gadamer develops from “a native talent for practical mastery, without 
any theoretical reflection about ways and means.” Theory, hence, is “subsequent to 
that out of which it is abstracted; that is, to practice” (20-1). In 1980, the classical 
rhetorician George Kennedy argued that rhetoric did not “begin” with Plato’s Gorgias 
and or even with Aristotle’s Rhetoric; rather, it extends back further than even its 
earliest instantiations (observed by Aristotle) in Homeric poems, Greek drama, and 
other prose writing (3). Kennedy, in fact, goes even further than Gadamer in pushing 
the definition of rhetoric beyond the concept of skill, technique, and the “art of 
persuasion” by describing it as “a natural phenomenon: the potential for it exists in all 
life forms that can give signals” (4). As a “phenomenon of nature, rhetoric is prior 
logically and historically to human speech,” which Kennedy argues developed from 
animal communication, specifically that of primates (216).11  
Gadamer’s and Kennedy’s postulations that rhetoric is a phenomenon of 
“nature” were novel at their time. Recent developments in material rhetoric12 
basically pick up where they left off. In her 2010 book Inessential Solidarity, Diane 
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Davis seeks “to expose an originary (or preoriginary) rhetoricity – an affectability or 
persuadability – that is the condition for symbolic action” and is irreducible to 
“epistemological frame-ups” (2; emphasis hers). What is interesting for our purposes is 
that Davis compares the “constitutive persuadability and responsivity” of this originary 
rhetoricity to “constitutive mimesis” as described by the philosopher Phillippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, an engaged entrainment with others – a “mimetic rapport” achieved through 
“mimetic identification” – which, in humans, “precedes understanding” and manifests 
itself (as Merleau-Ponty noted) in infant imitation of their mothers and other adults 
(24-5). In describing the “suggestive influence” of an orginary persuadability, Davis 
draws on parts of Sigmund Freud’s work which seems to offer a “new version of ‘the 
pathic’ part of ancient rhetoric,” one that does not involve an emotional appeal but 
rather – and here she borrows a term by Borche-Jacobsen – a kind of “mimetico-
affective contagion” indicative of the absence of any proper subject – including the 
subject of representation (33). 
I want to explore Davis’s comparison of an originary rhetoric to what seems to 
be a closely related originary mimesis. To begin, it is important to note Aristotle’s 
belief that imitation is not just a skill but an actual “instinct of our nature”: “The 
instinct of imitation [dia mimesos] is implanted in man from childhood” he tells us in 
his Poetics. “He is the most imitative of all living creatures, and through imitation 
learns his earliest lessons” (IV, 2-6). It is important to note how Aristotle in this 
passage equates imitation with an incipient pedagogy (“learns his earliest lessons”). I 
will return to this equation in the next section. For now, though, I want to suggest, 
following Halliwell, that for Aristotle mimesis is not necessarily confined to or 
determined by human intention. Mimetic likeness, rather, “entails an intentionality 
that is ultimately natural in origin but becomes embodied in culturally evolved and 
institutionalized forms” (156). It seems that for Aristotle the creative impulses that 
give rise to art and other forms of creativity are – like the body is for Merleau-Ponty – 
very much rooted in worldly processes (phusis) which we intentionally attune ourselves 
to through imitation. I believe that Merleau-Ponty provides a framework through which 
this “instinct” might be better understood. As the fundamental correspondence 
between perception and motility that enables a motor organization (CRO 145), the 
ability to imitate “is built into my bodily structure and is its inseparable correlative” 
97 
 
(PP 164). Even when imitation becomes free of motility and allows us to experience 
objects “in themselves,” as in the conscious production of art, the “primary sphere in 
which meaning is engendered . . . is motility itself” (PhP 164). Merleau-Ponty’s 
observation that because the body schema is an “open system” whereby different 
motor tasks are instantly transferable in the act of imitating, a subject can lose “his 
separate reality in the other” with whom he becomes identified (164).  
Merleau-Ponty’s carefully considered theories of imitation – informed as they 
were by studies of neonate imitation and childhood development – are bolstered by 
recent studies in cognitive neuroscience. These studies, I believe, also lend support to 
Gadamer’s, Kennedy’s, Rickert’s, Davis’s, and most recently Marilyn Cooper’s 
proposition that, as she puts it, “persuasion is the fundamental mode of our 
interactions with all kinds of others and thus that being is inescapably rhetorical” 
(“Rhetorical Being,” 1). The discovery of the Mirror Neuron System in the 1990s sheds 
light on how identification is enabled by this “open system” that Merleau-Ponty calls 
the body schema. The same neurons in the pre-motor cortex are activated when a 
subject both observes a goal-directed motor act and performs a similar act, meaning 
that the observed behavior is pre-reflexively understood (Gallese, “Two Sides,” 8). 
This claim is substantiated by studies conducted on infants, many of whom can imitate 
adults within an hour of being born (57) and replicate their mother’s gazes in a 
mother-baby-object triangle (Meltzoff, 60). These studies tell us that “imitation 
operates prior to language and is a primary precondition for the genesis of language 
and symbolic skills” (69). To imitate a facial gesture that she sees, an infant does not 
simulate the gesture internally as if there existed an internal model or blueprint of 
“smile” that is then rendered on the surface of the infant’s face. Rather, “[t]he 
required model is the action of the other”; thanks to the activation mirror neurons and 
other structures of the body schema, the infant’s body “is already in communication 
with the other’s body at prenoetic and perceptual levels that are sufficient for 
intersubjective interaction” (Gallagher, 223). Neonate imitation is perhaps the first 
instance of experiential learning in our lives by virtue of its being the first social 
action we engage in. Indeed, as the biological neuroscientist Francisco Varela asserts, 
at this stage “the mind” is fundamentally intersubjective and infants’ actions are not 
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intended to strengthen individual personality but to build relationships with other 
people (Poerkson, 47).  
It is in the process of building these relationships intersubjectively that we see 
how imitative behavior reflects an underlying rhetoricity or persuadability to 
intentional actions. The “mimetico-affective contagion” to which Davis compares 
originary rhetoricity seems to be the basis of what cognitive psychologists call 
entrainment or what is known more popularly as the “chameleon effect.” Often 
referred to as “unconscious mimicry,” entrainment might be thought of as our 
intentional attunement to others and to situations. In the last chapter, I referenced 
Anna Gibbs’s example of a how a baby’s squeal of delight is “translated” into her 
mother’s dancing shimmy (195). Although the neuronal mirror systems of both subjects 
are activated in similar ways, the mother’s reaction does not “mirror” the baby’s 
action – since she does not herself squeal – but instead is in some way congruent with 
the action, including complementary or modulating responses that Vittorio Gallese 
argues are better thought of as empathic attunement instead of “contagion” 
(“Intentional Attunement,” 151). There is clearly a rhetorical dimension to this 
interaction in that the infant increasingly “knows how to solicit the mother’s 
attention” while the mother’s expressive, patterned, repetitive way of speaking (or 
“motherese”) “seems to be designed to capture the babies’ attention and to meet and 
match [the baby’s] preferred sounds and movements” (Gibbs, 197). This imitative 
correspondence reveals an underlying, very reflexive persuadability: both subjects 
seek to influence while simultaneously being influenced by the other. 
What Gibbs calls “mimetic communication,” Gallese calls “embodied 
simulation” that results from “intentional attunement,” what Merleau-Ponty calls 
“they system ‘me-and-other’” that is emerges from the “foundation of mimesis” in our 
sensory-motor apparatus (CRO, 124)  - these are all correlates to mimetico-affectivity 
that Davis draws on in describing originary rhetoricity. This phenomenon is at play in 
all of our social – that is, rhetorical – situations. It is what is operative in Thomas 
Rickert’s example of how symbolicity remains always receptive to its material 
dimensions when he asks readers to imagine a group of people joining in a circle. The 
act of doing this “works on two levels”: the level of conceptual symbolicity and at the 
level of the “material movement of bodies that invites the people to share [entrain, 
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“imitate”] a rhythm and complete the form” that has emerged in this particular social 
situation. There is in this formation an “affective pressure [that] is not solely 
symbolic” and for which people who “fall out” with the group dynamic “can pay high 
prices.” In entraining with others, there is a “fittingness” that operates congruently 
with symbolicity that “is of itself persuasive here” (165).  
This fittingness is akin to what Merleau-Ponty calls the style that we tap into 
“in an almost imitative way” when attuning ourselves to the intentional dynamics of 
certain situations. This is accomplished affectively and intercorporeally. “When I 
witness the setting in of the behavior of others,” he tells us, “my corporeality 
becomes a comprehending power of their corporeality . . .  because my body is 
capable of achieving the same goals” of those sharing the same space (CAL 42). When 
we integrate ourselves into a social situation, our bodies in a sense persuade others to 
accept us as we attempt to assimilate to the group dynamic. We automatically tap 
into what is familiar in the situation – its style – and in doing so the group dynamic is 
transformed. This transformation is what Merleau-Ponty calls expression. What is 
expressed is the group transforming and transformed through our integration with it. It 
is fundamentally mimetic in that we “mimic” its style and rhetorical in that our 
mimicry influences others to conform or not to the transformation we bring to the 
collectivity. 
 
Rethinking Imitation in Rhetorical Pedagogy 
Although nearly every composition and technical communication textbook currently on 
the market provide sample academic essays with the hope that students will model 
them in their own writing, the term “imitation” – still associated with rote repetition 
and mindless regurgitation in the service of acquiring skills – is generally avoided. 
When it does appear in scholarship, it is treated with no small degree or skepticism. 
One example would be Richard Boyd’s 1991 critique of David Bartholomae’s suggestion 
that students should “mimic” the distinctive registers (the styles and conventions) of 
academic discourse communities to which they acclimatizing themselves. In his essay 
“Imitate me; Don’t Imitate Me: Mimeticism in David Bartholomae’s ‘Inventing the 
University,” Boyd identifies Bartholomae as a pioneer of a group he calls “advocates of 
mimeticism” who outwardly promote empowering students by immersing them in “a 
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privileged discourse” (336) while invisibly denying students entry into this so-called 
privileged academic community. Boyd perceives a double-bind in this approach 
because the teacher “does not ultimately wish for a perfect act of emulation” by 
students since it would introduce “interchangeability” between model and subject 
that would undermine the teacher’s “oposition of superiority” (341). Hence there is a 
double-bind in this mimetic pedagogy which manifests itself in the instructor who 
“demands and forbids imitation since he or she can never allow the student to become 
a perfect mirror image and thus the perfect equal of the teacher” (341). Boyd also 
includes among the advocates of imitation one of Bartholomae’s most adamant critics, 
the expressivist theorist Peter Elbow, for his defense of an “emulation or participation 
model of teaching and learning” in which students’ identification with the teacher can 
result in a “love” by what is being taught (qtd page 338). In order to counter the 
double-bind of this imitate me/don’t imitate me pedagogy that ultimately seeks to 
preserve the teacher’s position of privilege, Boyd argues for – but does not develop – 
“an instructional context that facilitates [students’] understanding of the working of 
mimeticism in the educational process” and therefore preserves “the social and 
political pasts that they bring to the university” which mimeticism seeks to replace 
(343). 
 While Boyd touches on some problematic dimensions of Bartholomae’s own 
discourse – certainly the former’s use of the word “privileged” might be contested – 
his critique is not immune to interrogation. His belief that all instructors of 
composition do not want students to share the “power” that endows them with 
privilege (I suppose this applies as well to the legions of contingent faculty teaching 
without entitlements) is a sweeping generalization and overblown assumption. It also 
should be noted that his critique is informed entirely by Rene Girard’s theory of 
mimetic desire in which a neophyte subject is ensnared with such force that he or she 
“sees through the eyes of a mesmerizing other who directs all the desires and opinions 
of the subject” (339). In the process, the subject “is also learning to disdain his or her 
old self” by surrendering and replacing it with those believed to be possessed by the 
model (339). It should be noted, however, that Boyd himself is imitating a model here 
– Girard’s – and is certainly reading Bartholomae’s alleged advocacy of imitation 
through the lens provided of that largely anti-mimetic theorist. In doing so, he 
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subscribes to assumptions built into Girard’s theory – including positing of a self-aware 
and self-preserving subject or “self”13 which, when asserted with force, will almost 
certainly marginalize and brand as negative the intersubjective/intercorporeal 
dimensions of communication that I associate with mimesis.  
 Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will offer an alternative pedagogy of 
imitation, one which is not constrained by an abiding investment in the nebulous 
concept of power. I do not wish to suggest that Boyd (or Girard for that matter) is 
missing the mark in his critique of imitation; indeed, as I pointed out in the last 
chapter, there is indeed “bad” side to mimesis that we need to acknowledge and 
contend with. But we also must attend to what is lost in the wholescale dismissal of 
mimetic behavior since that, too, can be “bad.” I will begin by looking at educational 
practices popular in Athens prior to Plato, focusing especially on ancient Sophistic 
rhetorical training described by Debra Hawhee in her 2004 book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric 
and Athletics in Ancient Greece. As Hawhee and others note, Sophistic pedagogy was 
highly mimetic in its emphasis on exercises based on imitation and repetition, which 
derived from athletic training regimens with which it shared pedagogical space. 
Mimetic education in these ancient gynmasia did not stem from a desire to reproduce 
models; rather, it shaped the process by which young learners bodily absorbed 
knowledge which would help them develop skills necessary for active citizenship in 
Greek society. As we will see, such knowledge was acquired through multiple 
perceptual modalities in ambient, multimodal environments. 
 In the previous section, I made a case for conceiving a relationship between 
mimesis and rhetoric at the mostly unconscious “mimetico-affective” level of 
communication. I now want to show how that relationship manifested itself in ancient 
Greek pedagogy, a significant dimension of which was invested in the intersections 
between athletics, rhetoric, and musico-poetic practices known as mousike. Although 
the word “rhetoric” first appeared in Plato’s Gorgias, Aristotle traces the beginning of 
the study of rhetoric back a century earlier, and frequently cites examples of 
rhetorical usages in orally performed Homeric poems and in Greek drama (Kennedy, 
3). Gebauer and Wulf argue that a key characteristic of the oral poetry of ancient 
Greece was a two-sided mimetic process – psychological and physical – which 
combined “indicative behavior” (physical representation) with “emotional imitation” 
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(emotional expression). This intense form of identification, being both emotional and 
physical, was not the result of one-way transmission but, rather, emerged through 
“the mutual interaction of the singer with the public” (51). Rhetoric conceived in this 
mimetic manner is reflexive or – as Merleau-Ponty would say – reversible in that the 
poet/rhetor simultaneously touches the audience and is touched back by the 
audience, and the performance/rhetorical situation is enacted through this mutual 
reflexivity.14 They note that this identificatory “contagion” that “grips and involves 
those present” involved a (clearly multimodal) smorgasbord of  “[s]poken and heard 
sounds, rhythm, schema, melody, bodily movements, and shared participation” that 
was not unlike the choreographed gymnastic exercises whose origins “presumably lie 
in the teaching of rhythms designed to support speech” (47). 
 Hawhee reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the “decidedly corporeal 
style” of ancient Sophistic rhetorical training “derived from athletics and early 
education a style of training grounded in imitation and based on . . . the three Rs of 
sophistic pedagogy – rhythm, repetition, and response” (135). Because it was a 
“primary mode of learning” for the ancient Greeks, mimesis, which Hawhee 
understands as imitation, was an “element critical to sophistic pedagogy” (148) that 
took place largely in the gymnasia where young men and boys were simultaneously 
instructed in both rhetoric and athletics – specifically wrestling and grappling, with 
which rhetoric was closely identified.15 Students learned in an environment that might 
be described as multimodal – a “network of objects, people, and practices and their 
attendant sounds and smells [that] comprised a distinctive material setting for a highly 
textured, bodily pedagogy” (128) – through three mimetic “modes of learning . . . . 
that comprise[d] the sophistic method of rhetorical training” (141). The first, rhythm 
(rhythmos), Hawhee interprets as a specific type of movement, one that “combines 
fixity with variability” by producing “distinctive movements within a generalizable 
direction” (142). The second, repetition, allowed the body to acquire rhythms so that 
“knowledge of fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious, and habituation 
ensues” (142). Third, responsiveness, shaped exercises that took on a sort of 
competitive collaboration since learning did not occur in a vacuum but required 
another, an opponent, with whom one’s engagement demanded that new moves – 
variations on the rhythmic themes to which one’s body is attuned – be generated in 
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relation to those of the other (143).16 This mimetic pedagogy applied to rhetorical 
debates just as much as to grappling, wrestling, and other artistic and athletic 
practices that took place within the walls of these gymnasia. As Hawhee describes it: 
From this spatial intermingling of practices there emerged a specific syncretism 
between athletics and rhetoric, a particular crossover in pedagogical practices 
and learning styles, a crossover that contributed to the development of 
rhetoric as a bodily art: an art learned, practiced, and performed by and with 
the body as well as the mind. (111) 
I see mimesis as a foundational force in this “crossover.” Hawhee discusses a passage 
by the pedagogue Isocrates in which a teacher is expected to “provide such an 
example of oratory that the students who have taken shape under his instruction and 
are able to imitate (mimesasthai dunanemenous) him will, at once, show in their 
speaking an unsurpassed degree of grace and charm” (150). She points out that the 
passive form of “taken shape” (ektupothentas) in this sentence – a Greek verb 
associated with sculpting – “thwarts the notion of a ‘sculptor’” by insinuating that the 
shape “emerges under the teacher’s instruction, or in a particular milieu – that is, out 
of a relational, associative dynamic” (151).17 
Where Boyd turns to Girard in offering a stinging critique of “mimeticism” in 
composition pedagogy, I turn toward the ancient Sophists to find one that I find of 
great potential benefit and which I will continue to develop by turning now to the 
second historical instantiation of this pedagogical praxis: the rhetorical theories and 
methods associated with imitatio. I will begin by showing how conventional 
stereotypes of imitatio not only fails to capture but actually conceals the well-
documented history of clearly embodied practices. After reviewing this history, I will 
consider imitatio in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, specifically his 
concepts of style and expression. I will then, in the last section, take a cue from the 
rhetorical scholar Robert Terrill in describing how a revamped version of this tradition 
can be of benefit to current composition and rhetorical pedagogy. 
 
Undoing the Stereotype of Imitatio 
Imitatio, broadly defined, may be thought of as the Latin formalization of the Greek 
mimesis into a specific practice associated with the arts – painting, literature, drama – 
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but also with rhetoric. Although imitatio and mimesis are frequently used 
interchangeably, in this dissertation the former will be denote a formal praxis that 
involved the emulation of rhetors and the repurposing of rhetorical forms, especially 
those that were held to be of great effect. From the height of the Roman Empire 
(where this Latin translation of mimesis first took hold) up through the High 
Renaissance, imitatio stood for a tradition that advocated the imitation of role models 
and the ability to make something new out of them (Potolsky, 50). Although Aristotle’s 
dictum that artists should follow the processes of “nature” were adhered to in a 
general way, there was a sense that “raw nature is too wild and unruly for proper 
imitation” (50). In his 1711 “An Essay on Criticism,” for example, Alexander Pope 
suggested that the way to nature was through established artistic traditions and 
conventions: “Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem; / To copy nature is to copy 
them” (qtd p. 51). 
The established “ancient rules,” of course, were those of Classical Greece and 
Rome. The Romans began the tradition by imitating Greek art. Virgil imitated the 
pastoral poetry of Theocritus; Horace imitated the odes of Pindar; Ovid rewrote the 
Greek myths; Seneca retold the tragedies of Sophocles (52). In the Middle Ages, 
imitatio seems to have been played a central role in what Mary Carruthers identifies 
as the cognitive craft of “monastic rhetoric.” Although she associates this craft with 
mneme, the art of “memory,” which she distinguishes from an aspect of mimesis 
narrowly interpreted in terms of “realism,” her description of creative thinking 
“learned by a method of apprenticeship based upon imitating examples, [with mastery 
coming] only to a few and only after long discipline and continual practice” (2-3), 
clearly corresponds to the practice long associated with imitatio. It is wrong though, 
as Michael Potolsky argues, to adopt the stereotype that emerged from this tradition 
of imitatio as a “mere defense of rigid conformity or deference to the past” (53). In 
fact, as many of us know from exposure to political satire and parody, imitation can 
be used to subvert rules and mock established role models. Indeed, there emerged in 
Roman dramaturgy a behavioral aspect of imitatio that was reflected in Cicero’s 
association of mimesis with comedy, a representation of “life” that may in some ways 
be accurate but not necessarily in a realistic manner (Hallowell, 287). 
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 The most explicit discussions of imitatio in Roman discourse can be found in 
rhetorical manuals. Nearly all the major orators of this period discuss imitation, but 
rarely in the narrow sense of repetition; rather they adopt a position advocated 
explicitly by Horace, that imitatio is a critical practice that demands the refinement 
of skill and careful judgment (Potolsky, 56). The 5th century Greek orator Dionysius of 
Halicarnarssus argued for a practice of imitation that was closer to emulation than to 
copying since copying ran the risk of having something seem “labored or unnatural” 
(qtd, 56). A century later the rhetorician Quintilian argued that rhetors need to be 
aware of the “things that are not imitable” in speeches deemed worthy of imitation, 
namely “talent, facility of discovery, force, fluency, everything that art cannot 
supply,” and therefore should think of themselves not as followers but as rivals of 
those emulated (qtd, 57).18 One of the most important discussions of Roman imitatio is 
to be found in Seneca. In Epistle 84, he tells aspiring orators that good imitation both 
resembles and differs from its sources, as a child does a parent: “I would have you 
resemble [the orator being emulated] as a child resembles his father, and not as a 
picture resembles its original; for a picture is a lifeless thing” (qtd 58). 
The picture emerging of imitatio here is hardly reflects the intention to 
reincarnate that which is being emulated. A boy can physically resemble his father 
because of genetic similarity, but he can resemble his father in attitude, accent, 
disposition, and other ways cultivated by their having shared similar experiences. In 
Chapter 1 I referred to an example recounted by Merleau-Ponty in which a boy learns 
how to use a pencil not by copying his father’s actions but by attuning himself to a 
certain intentional style that emerged from an ensemble of the father’s skilled hand, 
the pencil, paper, table top, gripping, holding, moving, making, and so on. The boy’s 
process of accomplishing the same result of his father is in a sense a fundamental form 
of imitatio as described by Seneca: he “resembles” the father by learning how the 
action he perceives expresses an intention, and it is that which is imitated in this 
situation as in all situations. This example also aligns with Vitorio Gallese’s description 
of mimesis as intentional attunement enacted through the embodied simulation of 
another’s actions and mimetico-affective entrainment that Diane Davis likens to 
originary rhetoricity.  
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The ancient rhetoricians were well aware of the affective dimensions of 
rhetorical situations and the practice of imitatio was guided by formal techniques 
designed to exploit affectivity. We see these at play in the so-called “rule of 
propriety,” the imperative to make a speech “fit the occasion” (what the Greeks 
called to prepon), advocated by the tradition’s pioneering figures including Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus. An important rhetorical convention at these times was a speaker’s 
ability to “appropriately” recount an historical event in such a way that it moved 
audiences toward adopting the speaker’s viewpoint. Vivienne Gray tells us that in 
Dionysius’s hands, mimesis becomes a “technical term” in historical theory and is 
achieved by observing the “rule of propriety of argument in composing speeches” of a 
historical nature (469). It is vital to understand the very different approach to his 
history Dionysius and other ancients took to history than we do. The law of propriety 
required public speakers to recreate historical events based not on the collection of 
facts or empirical data – on accuracy - but through the expression of their physical and 
emotional tenor as imagined by the rhetor/historian (469). Skillful adherence to this 
rule required speakers to carefully cultivate “observation of what men do in real life” 
(470). Dionysius believed that rhetors should “imitate” the speech of men as shaped 
by the historical experience by recounted. For example, since men in real life, 
according to Dionysius, do not employ “the same order of words” for different kinds of 
emotional events – tragic, celebratory, sedate, and so on – it is expected that the 
rhetor “not employ the same order of words for all events” (qtd p 470). The rule of 
propriety ensures that the rhetor/historian adapts the argument and style to the 
occasion being described. The style of the composed speech enacts the style of the 
experience. 
 What emerges in imitatio is a rhetoric that situates itself in the experience the 
rhetor seeks to recreate on the spot, blending the re-enacted occasion with the actual 
one at which he is speaking. One Greek rhetorician associated with imitatio, 
Longinus,19 praised the speeches of Lysias because they captured (again, “imitated”) 
the natural way of speaking employed by the ordinary man. Lysias in one speech 
produces “the original type of young, ordinary, retiring citizen, differing in no way 
from the well known reality” (qtd in Gray, 472). The key phrase here is “well known 
reality.” What is significant is not so much the “type” of character being represented 
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but the situation being expressed, for it is the shared experience of this reality that 
allows for identification. After all, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, people identify with 
situations just as much as they do with other people. Hence “the good poet and 
orator,” according to Longinus, “must be an imitator of the events he describes” (qtd 
472; emphasis mine) and points to the technical use of mimesis in a speech by Meidias 
Demosthenes, which relies on stylistic features like asyndeta and repetition to mimic 
the repeated, abrupt, and sharp violence of the blows by an aggressor. This mimicry is 
captured even in the English translation: 
. . . by his gesture, his looks, his voice, when he strikes to insult, when he 
strikes like an enemy, when he strikes with his fists, when he strikes you like a 
slave. (qtd. 474) 
The rhetorical style here does not just represent the tumultuous person “he” is but 
how he is in this violent situation. The tumult of the moment, the event, is expressed 
through the language used to describe the actions of the person. What is virtually 
rendered is made materially palpable, an embodied simulation of an event felt by 
rhetor and audience alike. A similar use of mimesis is noted by Duris of Samos in the 
writing of Homer. Writing several centuries before Dionysius, Duris describes as 
mimetic Homer’s use of long syllables, one or two syllable words, and other rhythmical 
devices to “imitate” the laborious efforts of Sisyphus. While these devices contribute 
to a representation of the character’s presumed emotional state, they also express the 
material context – including the weight of the ponderous boulder – in which Sisyphus is 
situated. The role played by the nonhuman components of these events were 
preserved by the dictum that rhetors “appropriately” recount events. Dionysius used 
the word mimesis to describe how Homer’s language simulated an act of releasing 
water from a clog. Not only is the swinging of the hammer “imitated” (by balanced 
phrases and near rhymes), but so are the large rocks blocking the water’s path, the 
running-over flow, and finally – thanks to a series of dactyls and short words – the 
release and gradual acceleration of the flow once the obstruction has been cleared 
(Gray, 475-6).  
Like Aristotle, Dionysius believed that human beings were mimetic by nature 
and that language was rooted in a mimetic instinct. He observed how eyewitnesses 
literally “become mimetic of the things being narrated” (mimetikoi ginontai ton 
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apangellomenon), and that good speakers naturally shape discourse to express the 
qualities of the event (Halliwell, 294). Recent empirical studies indeed suggest that 
people “become mimetic” of the situations they encounter through both spoken and 
written discourse. These studies reveal how neural structures that preside over action 
execution are similarly activated when reading or listening to action-related 
sentences. Brain-imaging and fMRI studies show that when listening to sentences 
describing actions performed with the mouth, hand, and foot, different sectors of the 
premotor cortex in listeners’ brains are activated in ways that “correspond, though 
only coarsely, with those active during the observation of hand, mouth, and foot 
actions” (Gallese, “Intentional,” 139).  In the recognition of emotions displayed by 
others, “the sensorimotor system appears to support the reconstruction of what it 
would feel like to be in a particular emotion, by means of simulation of the related 
body state” (141). Intriguingly, this is accomplished to varying degrees not only by 
seeing a physical performance but by hearing and reading language that conveys 
action and emotion. The rule of propriety in rhetorical imitatio was meant to 
maximize the effects of those features of communication that allowed for greater 
audience identification.  
This mimetico-affective “contagion,” which can now be mapped neurologically, 
does not just allow for persuasion to occur; it is persuasion itself if you believe, as 
Marilyn Cooper does, that “persuadability is not just the condition for rhetoric . . . it 
is the condition for the existence of all actual entities, and thus that being is 
rhetorical” (“Rhetorical Being,” 6). When mimesis is conceived in terms of expression, 
not just representation, the role played by affectivity in communication links that 
communication with our being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty tells us that the 
“disclosure of an immanent or incipient significance in the living body extends . . . to 
the whole sensible world, and our gaze, prompted by the experience of our own body, 
will discover in all other ‘objects’ the miracle of expression” (PP 230). The cultural 
ecologist David Abram, drawing on this intercorporeal dimension of expression in 
Merleau-Point, points out how the actual sounds of words betray how language is “not 
a purely mental phenomenon but a sensuous, bodily activity born of carnal reciprocity 
and participation” with the surrounding landscape (82). The English words that 
describe surging water – rush, splash, gush, wash – show how “our discourse has surely 
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been influenced by many gestures, sounds, and rhythms” and suggest that language 
“arises from the perceptual interplay between the body and the world” (82). In short, 
its mimicry of the world, language expresses that world’s being along with our being-
in-it. 
The emphasis on rhetorical appropriateness as a means to enacting a felt 
experience by re-enacting an “event” was one way the ancient rhetoricians sought to 
harness this natural perceptual interplay for persuasive purposes. But imitatio’s rule 
of propriety was also, as is the case with anything mimetic, a double-edged sword. 
Because it sought to express events so that they came alive, so to speak, through 
language, the school became increasingly associated with realism, an association we 
see in the distinction Carruthers makes between mimesis and mneme (4). Although we 
can appreciate how the law of propriety was often enforced to combat the stylistic 
excesses and “artificiality” of that was encroaching on discourse through the increased 
use of “written language” (479), we cannot ignore its resemblance to a sentiment 
expressed centuries later by Thomas Sprat who, writing on behalf of the Royal Society, 
longed for a scientific language that opposed the “[o]rnaments of speaking [that] . . . 
Poets began of old to impose the deceit” and which would separate “the knowledge of 
Nature, from the colours of Rhetoric” among other influences (qtd in Covino, 6, 63). 20 
Indeed, the ideologizing of “appropriateness” in language use can result in a narrowing 
of the scope of its mimetic dimensions even when, paradoxically, it is in the service of 
mimesis. 
Still, we should not let our opinion of the formal “rules” exacted by ancient 
rhetoricians obscure our awareness of that which the rules were meant to elicit. 
Conceiving of imitatio in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is helpful in 
recovering the enactive and embodies dimensions of mimetic expression in rhetoric. 
Expression in language and literature, he tells us, brings “to life in an organism of 
words . . . opening a new field or new dimension to our experience” (PhP, 212). This 
meaning is only partly conceptual since it derives from a more “immanent” gestural 
one which “presents thought as style, an affective value, a piece of existential 
mimicry” (9). What he describes is an intentional feel, an embodied attunement to 
situations whose significance or “meaning” is enacted in rhetoric in the moment of its 
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recounting. At the heart of imitatio’s rhetorical project lies an awareness that 
meaning is immanent in experience itself.  
 
Embodied Repetitio: Binding the Body with the Mind 
Although in rhetoric the Latin repetitio signifies a figure of speech that uses a certain 
form of phrasal repetition (specifically anaphora and epanalepsis) to help make a 
point compelling, repetition itself manifests itself in a variety of ways across the 
rhetorical spectrum.21 As noted earlier, it is one of the three R’s that Debra Hawhee 
identifies as the core of Sophistic rhetorical training. Like its sibling “imitation,” the 
word “repetition” also has pejorative connotations because of its association with 
mechanized rote performance. As we all know, so-called “rote learning” has been 
largely criticized in educational fields as productive of mindless automatons who will 
conform to and hence perpetuate the dominant status quo. But does repetition 
deserve this reputation? It is notable that one of the first proponents of early 
education, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, taking a cue from Dionysius, stressed 
that repetition sharpened memory but opposed this practice to rote imitation, which 
he believed made people lazy.22 Perhaps we should have a phenomenological theory of 
repetition to accompany the version of imitatio I present above, one that attends to 
its embodied dimensions that hence might be called embodied repetitio. The Chilean 
biologist Humberto Maturana picks up on these dimensions when warning educators 
against devaluing the practice of repetition to an “avoidably boring routine behavior” 
and thereby giving it “an additional significance that it does not deserve” (Poerksen, 
27). Maturana recognizes that “even simple repetition” can improve understanding, 
sharpen the vision, and produce new insight:  
All of a sudden we find it easier to solve the equations before us; all at once 
our muscles change after we have dropped the ball into the net a few hundred 
times; our shots have become more precise. (27). 
“Intelligence,” according to Maturana, “manifests itself in the possibility of varying 
one’s behavior in a changing world” (31). The extent to which this intelligence is 
bodily is revealed by his example of dropping a basketball into a net: the repeating of 
an action changes the muscular exertion required to perform it, refining our 
conceptual ability to tackle the equations we are faced with. Repetition builds up our 
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experiential knowledge base and yokes it with conceptual thinking. Body and mind, 
the physical and the mental, are one – an understanding not lost on ancient educators 
of athletics, rhetoric, and other arts. 
 As an aspect of mimesis, what I am calling embodied repetitio was also not lost 
of the rhetorician Kenneth Burke. For Burke, mimesis describes the “two way 
relationship between the mental and the physical” that manifested itself in what he 
called prayers – the “substantiation of an attitude in a bodily act” (Attitudes, 322). 
“Any mimetic act,” he wrote, “is a prayer” and “all mimetic procedures, in the dance, 
the plastic or graphic arts, music, and verbalization are aspects of ‘prayer’ . . . and 
have a great deal to do with the building of character.” This is as much bodily as it is 
mental in that “mimetic expression” is, in Burke’s view, a correspondence between 
“visceral expression (in glandular and nervous actions)” and the “state of mind” in a 
particular situation; one’s “attitude,” hence, emerges from this mental/bodily 
correspondence (322). Recent studies by Harvard psychologist Amy Cuddy and her 
associates23 provides some empirical support for Burke’s mimetic theory here. Cuddy 
et al., reveal that the bodily adoption of nonverbal poses associated with social power 
(or the lack thereof) triggers the hormonal release of testosterone and cortisol in both 
men and women, impacting the endocrine system within just two minutes of making 
such poses. In a widely popular TED Talk, Cuddy describes how the physiological 
effects of adopting conventional “power poses” can help transform a person’s attitude 
toward themselves and their immediate situations within minutes, and by repeating 
such poses on a regular basis can alter their body chemistry in such a way that they 
are able to adapt more easily to complex social situations. By imitating body language 
associated with a culturally dominant or powerful stature and repeating those 
imitations over and over, Cuddy says, one can “fake it until they become it.” 
Consciously24 and quite simulating the bodily attitude (“praying”) that one wishes to 
adopt dramatically transforms her mental self-conceptions and social behavior.   
One might argue that “becoming” the kind of person whose postures and 
attitudes are simulated is akin copying a predetermined formation. But, again, we 
need to attend to the dual nature of mimesis: its familiar style ultimately expresses 
something new, variations of a theme that can be transformative. Jane Bennett’s 
reading of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of “mimicking the strata” of the 
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Body without Organs (BwO) helps us here. Bennett describes the BwO as a 
“multispecied and ongoing project of becoming in which new links are forged among 
‘things, plants, animals, tools, people, power, and fragments of all of 
these’”(Enchantment, 24). In its attempt to deterritorialize the space of the 
“organism” – the dominant form of organization of bodily experience – BwO manifests 
itself through disruption of its usual habits of posture, movement, facial expression, 
voice, etc. These habits form the “strata” that organizes your body. To play the game 
of becoming a body-without-organs is to twist and tweak those usual habits. (25) 
One way to enact such a disruption, Bennett tells us, is to “mimic” the strata 
by using “the organism as a model, but a model stretched by means of parody.” She 
describes the method of this mimicry as placing “organism-strata alongside slightly 
altered copies of them,” and then composing yourself in a way “that’s almost like your 
usual way, but with a twist” that involves “repeat[ing] yourself but with a difference” 
(26). Such a “meticulous relation” with the strata allows for “a temporary escape from 
it,” resulting in a flight of the “very forces that form the body as organism” in the first 
place (26). Transposed to real-world experience, this is not far from the conscious 
method advocated by Cuddy in which a person “fakes” – in a sense, parodies – an 
organizing model of power to the point of becoming it, but not necessarily to the point 
of complete replication: “To become is not to achieve a final state of being,” Bennett 
says of this practice, “it is to give more of a chance to that which rumbles in you, but 
[which] you are not” (26). This which rumbles expresses itself through the conscious 
imitation of organizing models and conscious repetition of habits.  
In language evocative of the sound effect that were so important in the 
practice of imitatio, Bennett places a high premium on the onomatopoeic words that 
harbor “cries, moos, meows, buzzes, mutterances, laughter, etc,” since they 
contribute to what she calls language’s sonority, the “spell-binding effects of stories 
told aloud, the enchanting power of chants” which Bennett associates with mouth, 
tongue, and body and reads as disruptive of the hegemony of meaning (155-6). Even 
words whose sounds do not directly correspond to active occurrences in nature can, 
through repetition, bring forth sonority. She cites Deleuze and Guattari’s observation 
that children’s “well-skilled” repetition of words, even the phrase “end of the month” 
which Kafka repeated incessantly as a child, releases languages sonorous dimension 
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and distracts people from the meaning of what is being said by propelling them toward 
other meanings, including “idiosyncratic associations and thoughts” (154). 
Correspondingly, Merleau-Ponty claims that when a text is read to us, “provided it is 
read with expression, the words fully occupy our minds,” fulfilling our expectations 
and possessing us to such an extent that the “end of the speech or text will be the 
lifting of a spell” (PhP, 208). It is not because of the representational quality of words 
but, rather, the style – the sonority, the resonance – evoked by their articulation to 
which readers and listeners are so attuned that they “reach back for the word as 
[their] hand reaches toward the part of my body which is being pricked” (PhP, 210). 
I have claimed more than once in this dissertation that mimesis is productive of 
difference. I believe that repetition conceived mimetically as embodied repetitio 
helps to support that claim. For instance, Gebauer and Wulf assert that an actor’s 
repetition of pre-existing motor schemata embedded in the language of a script allows 
him to constitute “something of his own, which must by no means correspond to prior 
realizations of the schemata.” Similarly, the repetition of a gesture in a certain 
situation “gives prominence to qualities that originally played no special role in the 
action being imitated, qualities of time and space, of rhythm, of the execution of the 
movement” (316-17). When an actor, for example, points skyward during a 
performance, the pointing may resemble all other pointing gestures experienced 
previously by both him and his audience but that particular pointing is nonetheless 
expressive of meaning in that particular situation. In other words, this gesture, despite 
its resemblance to all other instances of pointing, is nonetheless unique in it both 
significance and circumstance. Similarly, the multimodality theorist Gunther Kress 
shows how the production of difference through repetition can enhance learning in a 
traditional science classroom. The teacher has drawn a diagram on a blackboard that 
illustrates how blood circulates among organs in the human body. The general 
mapping of the process represented by the diagram – which is what students record in 
their notebooks – does not tell the whole story here. That story is told most fully when 
the teacher “overlays” the diagram with a sequence of gestures which serves as a 
“tangibly, mimetically witnessed movement of the blood from organ to organ . . . . 
[that is] physiological felt by the onlookers, mimetically experienced in their bodies, 
and then gone . . .” (86). Gesturally “restating” what is being shown visually and 
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explained verbally, there is “a kind of repetition” that intriguingly “is not experienced 
as a repetition” but which nonetheless “allows different students to engage with ‘the 
same’ issue via routes which may be affectively, sensorially, or culturally more 
congenial to them. At the same time it affords a fuller exploration of the topic at 
issue” (169). 
 Clearly, we as educators need reconsider whatever assumptions we hold about 
repetition and imitation and rediscover what the Greek and Roman pedagogues knew 
well: that both are essential ingredients in learning and rhetorical performance. From 
their perspective, to strive to be completely original in the composition of a text or 
performance would be a futile attempt, pitting the rhetor not just against the 
traditions in which he or she is composing but against the natural world to which we 
are all mimetically connected. It is therefore important for scholars to continue the 
recovery efforts of concepts and traditions that are marginalized or unduly 
stereotyped by dominant paradigms. Doing so can enrich our own approaches to the 
teaching of rhetoric and composition, as I hope the next section demonstrates. 
 
Imitatio as a model for a “Mimetic Pedagogy” of Rhetoric 
In his 2011 article “Mimesis, Duality, and Rhetorical Education,” Robert Terrill revives 
imitatio as a rhetorical pedagogy – he calls it “mimetic pedagogy” – as a way to 
cultivate a sense of engaged, articulate, resourceful, and sympathetic citizenship in 
students. Of particular interest to Terrill is imitatio’s inherent duality, which he 
believes can help to break the “third wall” of the rhetorical classroom, “producing an 
interactive space in which the world outside the classroom necessarily impinges on the 
education and practice within” (301). When one emulates the work of an exemplar, he 
or she “tries on” another self and inhabits another’s point of view. This is not a 
parroting of the language of another, he argues, so much as it is a dialogue with that 
person and with that person’s world. Such a mimetic pedagogy is important because it 
“fosters an understanding of the self as an inherently doubled product of the ongoing 
dialogues that characterize a democratic culture” (310). In doing so, it disrupts 
notions of transparency and authenticity associated with a “discourse of sincerity” 
that Terrill believes emerges from the notion of a central self whose utterances 
fundamentally adheres to a “real me” (299). Imitatio’s insistence that one does not 
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produce facsimiles of, say, Demosthenes but instead speaks as effectively as 
Demosthenes, ultimately aims to “sustain the otherness, the strangeness of the model, 
maintaining the gap between student and model” which prevents the collapsing of one 
into the other (303). 
 We see in Terrill’s description of imitatio many of the themes pointed out 
above and in previous chapters - its dual-aspect, its potential disruptiveness, its 
production of difference – and get an idea of their importance to the contemporary 
classroom. But I think instructors who follow suit might want to point out to students 
how mimetic pedagogy has its roots not in Greco-Roman rhetoric but, first and 
foremost, in the experiential knowledge of the body and a learning process that 
reaches back to our first years of life. Merleau-Ponty describes language acquisition as 
a phenomenon of identification through role-playing: “To learn to speak is to learn to 
play a series of roles, to assume a series of conducts or linguistic gestures” (CRO 109). 
He notes evidence that if a child up to two years of age “does not have a linguistic 
model to imitate” – as is the case with children reared in isolation – he or she will 
never speak like those who grew up in environments where they could identify and 
assimilate themselves to those around them (109). This role-playing that is essential to 
our knowledge of others and hence of ourselves remains an important form of 
identification throughout our lives. Imitatio simply formalizes this vital knowledge 
work in the service of communication and civic engagement. Haskins believes that 
Isocrates, Plato’s contemporary and pedagogical rival, emphasized the repetition and 
recitation of epic poetry and other texts because he believed that “by identifying with 
what fictional and historical characters say and do, a student grasps the repertoire of 
social roles and the range of situations more fully than does a person who receives 
lessons in moral philosophy without ‘living’ its principles” (21). Indeed, because 
imitatio is open to the language of others – as Terrill puts it - it resists “discourses of 
monologic sincerity with ways of speaking that acknowledge and deploy a double-
voiced multisperspectivism.” It also cultivates habits of mind given to repurposing by 
inviting students to see themselves as enfolded in a culture that “constantly is being 




 Being able to identify the situation of multiple stakeholders through role-
playing, and then repurpose the discourses of those stakeholders, is vital to 
understanding how to construct an effective argument. Bryan Garsten writes of how 
Cicero, in De oratore, has the character Marcus Antonius (a great orator of the Roman 
courts) describe his first meeting with a client prior to a legal case. He makes his 
client respond to this opponent’s case, a process that involves playing three roles 
[personas]: “my own, that of my adversary, and that of a juror” (qtd 161). By role 
playing himself, Garston tells us, Cicero’s Antonius sharpens his sense of the best 
argument to make by partially adopting the point of view of all parties in the dispute. 
Doing so allows an orator not only to feel the emotions the he wants his jury members 
to feel, but to emotionally identify with the client he is defending: “[W]e cannot, 
even if we are defending total strangers, keep on regarding them as strangers” (qtd 
161). Such identification with what Garsten calls, following Seyla Benhabib, “the 
concrete other” (actual individuals, not “the generalized other”) does not stop with 
the individuals but extends to their “concrete situations” – their histories, identities, 
commitments, and needs (198). Persuasive rhetoric ultimately is concerned with the 
latter, the contexts in which individuals are situated, and ultimately strive not to 
change the minds of people (which many will resist anyway, p. 4) but rather influence 
situations by “looking for deliberative pathways” through language and beginning their 
argument “inside the framework these pathways provide” (141). 
Again, the strategies formalized under the aegis of mimetic rhetoric are rooted 
ultimately in the experiential knowledge our bodies are constantly in production of. 
We do not consciously seek to identify with others because we think it will help us in 
some way. As brain researchers are fond of saying, we are “wired” that way – and this 
wiring may very well be the seat of the kind of innate rhetoricity at work in the 
example Rickert gives of an individual joining a circle of people. The neuroscientist 
Marcel Kinsbourne believes that “a core predisposition of the human brain to entrain” 
with others generates natural persuasive capacities that all humans share. Adopting 
shared rhythms of behavior at the largely unconscious level of human interaction is 
“more innately compelling than reasoned argument in inducing two, or many, to adopt 
the same point of view” (172). Although he does not use the term “rhetoric,” it is 
precisely rhetoric that is at work in this phenomenon: 
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Entraining is compelling for people generally. I suggest that when one entrains 
in another’s point of view, one is half persuaded simply by doing so. Being 
persuaded by the other is not just an exercise in assessing the merits of their 
case. Rather, being persuaded is as much emotional as it is cognitive, and the 
mere fact of entraining is a step toward accepting the other person’s point of 
view. (170)26 
In Chapter 5, I will argue for a broadening of rhetoric beyond persuasive 
argumentation so that it attends to multiple facets of communication that 
argumentative models rarely take account of. For now, though, it is worth conceiving 
argument as an outgrowth of intersubjective and – first and foremost – intercorporeal 
entrainment. At the basic level of experience, our bodies move in accordance with the 
bodies it interacts with. This movement remains a vital force even when we “argue” 
with people in social and academic contexts where conceptual knowledge plays a 
constitutive role in communication. As the rhetorician John Gage puts it, arguments 
engage our “ability to move into different positions,”27 including positions that may 
not be the socially “acceptable” version so many of us initially adopt (here Terrill’s 
point about imitatio’s disruptiveness resonates). Argument is more than debating for 
the sake a winning a forensic contest by proving to audiences that your make the 
strongest case. David Lynch, Diana George, and Marilyn Cooper value it as a “crucial 
social responsibility . . . . that is not just a matter of winning or losing but a way to 
connect with others which may lead to change, not only in the world but also in 
ourselves” (84). Hence, “agonistic positioning” generated through argument is 
simultaneously confrontational and cooperative (63). Debra Hawhee describes how in 
ancient rhetoric agon was conceived as not just an actual space for competition for a 
prize (a better term for which is athlios) since what matters is not the outcome but 
the process that leads to it. As a space she calls the “shared between” (which in 
ancient gymnasia literally infused athletic with rhetorical training), agon, for Sophists, 
was what produced rhetoric as a “gathering” of cultural, bodily, and discursive forces 
(40). Inhabiting this space required “a particular modality of knowledge production – 
knowledge held and made by our bodies” (40, 43). In other words, it is experiential 
knowledge work that produces the rhetoric in which our arguments are steeped. 
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Re-envisioning argument as ultimately rooted in in-between spaces may sound 
somewhat unorthodox but in fact is quite intuitive. When Scott Marratto, following 
Merleau-Ponty, describes a “two-sidedness” to our perceptual experience where the 
body is both subject and object (Marratto, 85), he is speaking to the potentiality that 
cognition is fundamentally reflexive. This reflexivity requires us to attend to the 
reversible relationships between our bodies and the situations they are enmeshed in. 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that the actual experience he has of his own body “runs counter 
to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other,” 
turning the body into a conceptual thought or idea that suppresses the experience of 
the body in reality (PhP, 231). On the other hand, “true reflection,” which is 
generated from our material rootedness in things, makes Merleau-Ponty realize that “I 
am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and historical situation, but . . . by 
being this body and this situation, and through them, all the rest” (525).28  True 
reflection occurs at the conjunction of body and mind and reveals our reflexive 
relations with others.  
Barbara Couture describes phenomenological reflection as a “perceptual state 
of attention” and notes its importance to rhetors (as Cicero’s example illustrates) who 
must attend “both to their particular experience of the world and to their process of 
interacting with others in order to accommodate others’ perspectives on shared 
phenomena” (114). She believes it is time for rhetoric to move beyond traditional 
models of argumentation since they cannot teach us “how to accumulate, build, and 
synthesize a worldview from the particular positions that it encourages us to hone and 
defend” (111). I will come back to this point in Chapter 5. But for now I would like to 
conclude by suggesting that students would indeed benefit from a more reflexive 
approach to rhetorical engagement, one that stems from their own bodies-in-the-
world even while that engagement is formalized by models bequeathed by textbooks 
and tradition. Earlier in this chapter I described Richard Boyd’s call for students in 
university composition courses to study the dangers of mimesis – using Rene Girard’s 
theories as their framework – in order to resist the double-bind he sees David 
Bartholomae’s advocacy of discourse mimicry of ensnaring them in. Perhaps it would 
be worth introducing students as well to the other dimensions of mimesis that this 
dissertation is most concerned with. I therefore believe that a multifaceted 
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phenomenological account of “imitation” can help us think not only about how we and 
our students might go about composing arguments, but how those arguments speak to 
dimensions of our experiences we are so familiar with that we often do not recognize 
that familiarity. Attuning students to what Merleau-Ponty terms the style inherent in 
making arguments reveals a vast experiential dimension to rhetoric that few, if any, 
would have ever considered “rhetorical.” This is wonderful way to enhance how 
students think about rhetoric – by revealing how they experience it on a daily basis – 
and one that can be profitably accomplished in classes informed by what I call mimetic 
multimodality, which is the subject of my next chapter. 
                                                            
1“Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto,” April 11, 1910. Quoted in Halliwell, 370. 
2 In an artful critique of a book about Ezra Pound published in New Yorker magazine’s website, Louis 
Menand deconstructs what he calls “the Pound error,” revealing how the “It” in “Make It New” is the 
“Old” from which Pound cannot extract himself: “A great deal of Pound’s poetry therefore takes the form 
of translation, imitation, allusion, and quotation. He is trying to breathe life into a line of artistic and 
intellectual accomplishment, but it is a line of his own invention—a ‘tradition’ that includes, among 
others, John Adams, Confucius, Flaubert, the Provençal troubadours, and Benito Mussolini. Not, prima 
facie, a canon. This means that to understand what Pound is doing you often need to have read the same 
writers, studied the same languages, and learned the same history that Pound read, studied, and learned 
(or rely on the commentary of a person who has).” (June 9, 2008.) Accessed: July 20, 2014. 
Available:  http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2008/06/09/080609crbo_books_menand?curre
ntPage=all 
3 Quoted in Berman, 73. Hence, Berman tells us, Plato had to attack poetry, mimesis, and the whole 
Homeric tradition that involved identification with other people and things  and therefore, in Plato’s 
view, the surrendering of one’s own identity. 
4 “Excised” may be too strong a word here since Aristotle did recognize the strong pull of emotion in 
persuasion. But pathos in rhetoric was seen as a means to an end, a specific kind of “appeal” in the 
service of a larger argument whose main thrust should be accomplished through logos (logic, rational 
appeal, and the stuff of theoretical knowledge that Aristotle prized most highly) and ethos (appeal by 
way of character, a form of practical knowledge that Aristotle valued less than theoretical knowledge but 
more than the productive knowledge of the arts, including mimesis and rhetoric itself). 
5 You will notice that imitatio will always be italicized in this dissertationwhereas mimesis is not. I do this 
mostly to distinguish it from instances when I use the visually similar imitation. Imitatio is the Latin 
translation of mimesis and stands for a school that became dominant in rhetoric and aesthetics during the 
Roman Empire and continued to exert force throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance as well. 
6 Chris Drew describes the pedagogy of sophistic training as a form of experiential learning in “Sophistic 
Training and Experiential Learning: A Methodology of Mind-Body Syncretism” (Pedagogy, 7:2, Spring 2007, 
pp. 303-8) 
7 In earlier drafts of this dissertation, in fact, metis played a significant conceptual role. I even called my 
theoretical approach “mime[ti]sm,” a combination of metis and mimesis (here I played on the fact that in 
the word “mimetism,” an alternative translation of mimesis, one can see the spelling of “metis”). My 
research has convinced me that metis and mimesis are deeply related concepts and tracing the contours 
of that relationship was one of my original ambitions. Alas, time constraints and other commitments as a 
graduate student prevailed on me to narrow the scope of this project, so I reluctantly jettisoned metis 
with the ambition of returning to its conjunction with mimesis and experiential knowledge in other 
venues.  
8 Where Couture wants to erase the dichotomy between competing truths, Stormer goes a step further, 
diluting the essential humanity of rhetorical action which historically has been dependent on matter 
imagined as exterior to who or what is acting: “the capacity to act rhetorically is not because we’re 
human but because we are material” (226, “Encomium”).   
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9 One major distinction that can be made between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is that the latter puts by 
far more emphasis on the body as a sensorimotor subject. In Heidegger, the body tends to be absorbed by 
the “world” in which it dwells, and it is this world that is central to his phenomenological analysis; for 
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, the body is our “primary medium for having a world” and the body is 
at the forefront of his phenomenology – which is a phenomenology of perception. 
10 The philosopher Baruch Spinoza famously described natura naturnas as “nature naturing.” 
11 Kennedy argues that rhetorical ingenuity derives from instincts of self-preservation and manifold 
emotional reactions and is evident in the “cunning” observed in animals when faced with a threat or 
seeking to gain an advantage (26). 
12 Occasionally I use the term “rhetorics” to indicate that there are multiple forms of rhetoric to be 
drawn from. Although I use rhetoric in the singular here, I do not believe there is one monolithic Material 
Rhetoric. Rather, the term stands as a category for several rhetorical approaches that take as 
foundational conditions of materiality. It is common in my field to use both phrases interchangeably. 
13Boyd’s language suggests that the “self” is a distinct entity against which mimetic models are posed – a 
subject. Francisco Varela describes the “self” as “transient, non-localizable, relationally formed” and 
describes Marvin Minksy’s argument (in his book Metropolis) that we should hold onto an essentialist idea 
of an autonomous self in order to safeguard the conceptual foundation of ethical behavior as “utter 
nonsense” and an “inane waffle” (Poerkson, 48). This “view of the mind of an ethical actor [as being] 
anchored inside that individual contracts empirical data” which reveal that “the mind we ascribe to an 
individual is . . . already of a collective, intersubjective nature” (47).  
14 The concept of reversibility is complex in Merleau-Ponty but I will here provide one simple example. 
When Merleau-Ponty touches his right hand with his left one, the body registers a “double sensation” that 
briefly disrupts the ordering of experience into subject and object. Is the left hand that feels the touching 
the “touched” or the “touching”? (PhP, 106). This kind of reversible relationship that the body knows well 
and has learned to negotiate is central to a larger ontological concept he develops of “flesh,” the worldly 
fabric or web in which all things are enmeshed. Hence, reversibility can be applied to many situations. 
When a rhetor gives a rousing speech, she “touches” audiences while simultaneously being “touched” 
back by their rousing responses. Hence the audience influences the rhetor just as much as she is 
influencing them. The rhetorical situation is shaped significantly by rousingness, a product of reversibility 
(or what I will call later reflexivity). 
15 In ancient Greece, debate was considered a kind of sport. A popular form of debate, eris, can be 
translated as “wrangling” or “strife.” The goal of such arguments was to defeat your opponent, to in a 
sense “pin him down” as one would an opponent in wrestling. Protagoras was apparently quite interested 
in the relationship between athletics and rhetoric. Hawhee tells us that there is an agonistic metaphor in 
the treatise in which he famously declared “Man is the measure of all things,” kataballontes, which 
suggests the act of throwing over, as in wrestling. In addition, he wrote a treatise translated as “On 
Wrestling” (Peri Pales) “wherein he appears to have demonstrated how the art of rhetoric could be of use 
in the art of wrestling” (36). 
16 This rhetorical pedagogy embodied “two central concepts” – kairos and metis – “at the heart of which” 
was the notion of bodily transformation (86): kairos represented the “nowness” of time that pervaded 
repetition and the difference it produced in the encounter with the immediate; metis (and here Hawhee 
references Empedocles) was the intelligence that emerged from the encounter with the immediate, an 
encounter that was “more than perception – mind meets and (masters) matter,” but instead was a “bodily 
production, a mutually constitutive struggle among bodies and surrounding forces” (145). 
17 I am reminded here of what the rhetorical scholar Joseph Dunne refers to as the “unofficial” or second 
kind of techne he finds in Aristotle (a version of techne that is also of great importance to Martin 
Heidegger). Unlike the first or “official” version of techne associated with the “reason” of episteme that 
conceives of a maker (technites) as hylomorphically imposing a form on matter (249, 251), this second 
“unofficial” techne in Aristotle presents the technites as “intervening in a field of forces, or as immersing 
himself in a medium” where the materials were in more or less in “capricious motion,” requiring the 
maker to adopt a strategy that was less involved “in imposing a form on the material than in turning some 
of the energy in the material to his own advantage” (254, 256). This required a responsiveness to, an 
“outwitting” of, both matter and situation of the kind Hawhee identifies in wrestling which drew on the 
practical intelligence of metis (256).  
18 It is unclear from my source is these quotations are Quintillian’s or the sources Potolsky cites here: 
Russell, D. A. and Winterbottom, M. (eds) Ancient Literacy Criticism: The Principal Texts in Translation, 
Oxford UP: 1972 
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19 “Longinus” is the name given to an unknown rhetorician who may have lived in the first or second 
centuries A.D. Because one medieval copyist attributed his most famous work, On the Sublime, to 
“Dionysius Longinus, “some scholars believe the work may have been written by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassas. Another candidate is Cassius Longinus, a Hellenistic rhetorician. 
20 William Covino suggests that underlying this desire was the same kind of “associational thinking” that 
was central to the “magical composing imagination since antiquity” that they were eager to stamp out 
(68). He provides as an example John Wilkin’s influential 1668 Essay Towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language, which called for a language in which “the Names of things might consist of such 
sounds, as should bear in them some Analogy of their natures; and the Figure or Character of These 
Names should bear some proper resemblance to those sounds. . . But how this can be done in all the 
particular species of things, I understand not” (qtd in Covino, 67). 
21 This statement can be found at the Repetitio entry at Brigham Young University’s impressive online 
catalogue of the Western rhetorical tradition, Silva Rhetoricae (The Forest of Rhetoric). Accessed: June 
29, 2014.  Available: http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/R/repetitio.htm 
22 See Russell, D. A. (2001). Quintilian: The Orator's Education, Books I through XII. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 323-7, Book X 
23 Cuddy is listed as the second author (after Dana R. Carney and before Andy J. Yap) of the 2010 article 
published in Psychological Science called “Power Poses: Brief Nonverbal Displays Affect Neuroendocrine 
Levels and Risk Tolerance” (21:10), 1361-1368. She has popularized this theory.  Her TED talk at 
TEDGlobal 2012 currently ranks as the fifth most viewed video on the TED website (out of more than 
1,600 talks), viewed by over 12 million people. This number, of course, does not include views of the 
video on sites like YouTube. (http://blog.ted.com/2013/12/16/the-most-popular-20-ted-talks-2013/) 
24 Burke’s likening of mimetic expression as secular prayer, like Cuddy’s power poses, operate largely in 
the realm of conscious intentionality: one must consciously decide to adopt certain behaviors with the 
purpose of succeeding in certain situations. Noting Burke’s “absolute faith in the power of reason” (33), 
Davis turns to Sigmund Freud’s psychological theories, which reveal that “suggestive influence is less 
rational, less manageable, less consciously correctable than Burke allows” (33; italics in original), and it is 
in her reading of Freud that she draws on the concept of mimetico-affective contagion.  While that may 
indeed be true, we should not lose sight of how mimesis operates at all levels of human experience, 
including the conceptual and “rational” levels of consciousness.  
25 One excellent example of this is the writer Montaigne, whose Essays “quite specifically call on the 
readers’ mimetic capabilities, without which the writings remain mute” (Gebauer and Wulf , 94).  The 
author weaves into his prose a wide variety of other texts, but he quotes falsely and disguises quotations 
so that in both form and meaning they differ from the original meaning. The writing subject plays with his 
readers, hiding from them, changing his position, melting into the context of the work itself so that 
theme becomes a reference point for the author and vice versa; in other words, not only does he play 
with previous texts but he plays with the reader as well to the point where it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between the I that is the author and the I that is the theme as well (95). His essays, say 
Gebauer and Wulf, offer a version of mimesis that “give rise to a new intertextuality” while 
simultaneously conveying to readers a sense of their own relativity, the “relativity of the I” (98-9).  
26 Kinsbourne notes how the patterns of limbic system activation at in a baby’s imitating of a parent’s 
smile do not differ widely from those in the Heil Hitler! cheer and salute (171). Clearly, applications of 
this theory to the practice of rhetoric need to attend to these ethical dimensions. Marilyn Cooper’s 
neurophenomenological account of the emergence of rhetorical agency coded as responsible offers a 
useful model. In her 2011 article “Rhetorical Agency and Emergent and Enacted,” Cooper describes 
responsible rhetorical agency as an awareness by rhetors “that everyone acts out of their own space of 
meaning and to affirm one’s own meaning as absolute truth is to negate the other person” (442). Being 
responsible requires acknowledgement of and respect for the difference of “concrete others” with unique 
dispositions that have been shaped by habitual patterns of experiences (432).  
27 Quoted in Lynch, George, Cooper, “Agonistic Inquiry,” 69. 
28 In a note he wrote to himself in December, 1960, on the draft of his last work, which was published in 
its incomplete form after his untimely death five months later (and posthumously titled The Visible and 
the Invisible), he described a phenomenon that clearly has a mimetic dimension. The “specular image, 
memory, resemblance,” specifically the “resemblance between the thing and the thing-seen,” are 
fundamental structures “that are immediately derived from the body-world relation.” He tells himself to 
“[s]how that our whole expression and conceptualization of the mind is derived from the structures: for 
example, reflection” (271). 
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Chapter 4: Bodies as Media in Multimodal Ecologies 
 
From Mimesis to Multimodality: Toward a Theory of Multimodal Rhetorical 
Praxis 
I have shown how mimesis, relieved of its conventional association with direct 
reproduction, helps us conceive of our bodies’ immediate relationship with our 
material as the basis of experiential knowledge work – a type of work that has been 
historically marginalized. I have at times noted how this work is produced across 
“multiple” sensory and perceptual modalities that are steeped in our sensory-motor 
body schemas. In this chapter, I will develop this dimension of mimesis, arguing that, 
at the primary level of the body, experiential knowledge is acquired multimodally. I 
will therefore emphasize the cognitive dimensions of multimodality upon which our 
communicative acts are based. As noted previously, in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com, 
multimodality tends to emphasize how communicative modes – specifically writing, 
speaking, and visual design – are shaped by what Gunther Kress calls the “social-
semiotic” forces of culture. While Kress, as I will show, does not ignore the body’s role 
in the production of meaning, this emphasis on the social forces of semiosis ultimately 
attends to how culture shapes communication. While knowledge of these forces is 
vital to effective learning and communication, it does not quite capture the whole 
story. We learn and communicate first and foremost at the affective level of bodily 
engagement with the situations we inhabit. At this level, culture is not always the 
primary shaping force of our knowledge work.  
We might recall how Merleau-Ponty describes as mimetic the body’s sensory-
motor apprehension of experiential data and its “translation” into meaningful action 
(CRO 146). This primary level of perceptual apprehension gives rise to human 
communication, and childhood sociability is generated “on the foundation of mimesis” 
(154; emphasis his). What he describes as the “power” of mimesis manifests itself 
through “sympathy” or, following Henri Wallon, “syncretic sociability” (124, 125-6). It 
is the schematic operation which “translates” the smile, yawns, and other expressive 
actions that “all have in common a certain style of action, a certain gestural meaning 
that makes of the collection an already organized totality” (118; emphasis his). 
Because global identification arises from a “coupling” – Merleau-Ponty cites Husserl 
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here – between the body schema of the perceiver with the body schema of the 
perceived, there arises a kind of attunement (a sense of the familiar, that “certain 
style”) wherein “the other’s intentions somehow play across my body while my 
intentions play across his” (118-119). These intercorporeal transactions which allow 
for global identification and communication are not generated by a single perceptual 
modality but through multiple ones: kinesthetic, introceptive, cenesthesic, tactile 
(116-117). These perceptive modalities altogether enact the “world” in which we are 
situated. 
 It makes sense, then, that the cognitive operation linking perception to action 
and action to meaning that Merleau-Ponty identifies with mimesis is called 
multimodality by Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff in their 2005 article on the role 
of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. According to them, 
multimodality is a key characteristic of the sensory-motor system in that an action 
activates 
circuitry across brain regions [that] links modalities, infusing each with 
properties of others. The sensory-motor system of the brain is thus 
“multimodal” rather than modular. Accordingly, language is inherently 
multimodal in this sense, that is, it uses many modalities linked together – 
touch, hearing, motor actions, and so on. . . . Language exploits the pre-
existing multimodal character of the sensory motor system. (2). 
In other words, our communication practices, including language, are shaped by the 
interaction of neuronal clusters activated through our own bodily interactions others, 
generating the data of everyday experience. Significant segments of these clusters 
form the mirror neuron system. This system is clearly mimetic in that neuronal 
patterns activated when a person performs an action are simulated when the person 
observes the same action performed by another or, more coarsely, even imagines that 
action being performed. This multimodal system allows for embodied simulation that 
is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the observer of actions, emotions, 
and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed” (131).  
As also noted previously, like Merleau-Ponty, Gallese too relates his 
interactionist, multimodal account of the development of human sociability to the 
concept of mimesis. In “The Two Sides of Mimesis,” he contends that at the moment 
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of birth “humans are engaged in interpersonal mimetic relations” that occur in a 
shared “we-centric” space (11). These bodily “instantiations of unconscious mimesis” 
(9) are rooted in the sensory-motor system whose root neuronal operation integrates 
three modalities of human experience: doing, perceiving, and imagining. This 
cognitive multimodal model subtends what I call the “Big Three” model that largely 
conceives multimodality in terms of print, oral and visual composition. I should point 
out that Gallese and Lakoff are not alone in proffering cognition as fundamentally 
multimodal. Shaun Gallagher believes that perception is “intermodal from the start” 
(Gallagher, 3) in that our vestibular, proprioceptive, and visual systems are integrated 
through connections made by intermodal neurons, including mirror neurons (81); 
activations in these neural regions correspond to meaning that is “simultaneously 
shared in the modalities of observation (of others) and action capability (of my own)” 
(128). What Anna Gibbs refers to as “cross-modal” translation between a mother’s 
shimmy and her baby’s squeal is articulated by Gallagher as a “natural intermodal 
coupling of self and other” that occurs immediately, experientially, because of the 
innate visual-proprioceptive/sensory modal linkage (81, 82; emphasis his). Elsewhere, 
Gallagher and Andrew N. Meltzoff contend that this coupling involves an innate 
“supramodal perceptual system” that allows an infant to immediately recognize “a 
structural equivalence between itself and the other person” that enables imitation 
(Gallagher and Meltzoff, 223).1 
Imitation as mimesis, mimesis as multimodal: this conceptual linkage that is 
rooted in our everyday bodily engagement with the people and things of this world is 
just beginning to seep into the predominantly social-semiotic account of multimodality 
that in recent years has begun to inform pedagogical approaches to technical 
communication and composition. In the pages that follow, I will attempt to broaden 
the social-semiotic account of multimodality that has been pioneered by the theorist 
Gunther Kress so that it takes into account the prereflective, tacit, pre-social 
multimodal functions of the body schema. I am not, however, the first to attempt this. 
At the 2013 Eighth Congress of European Research in Mathematics Education, Laurie D. 
Edwards, Francesca Ferrara, and Ornella Robutti proposed a way of “synthesizing” the 
term mode or modality in a way that is helpful for analyzing mathematical thinking.2 
They argue that the integration of the neural multimodality of Gallese and Lakoff into 
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the predominantly social-semiotic modes affords “a broader definition for modality 
that . . . goes beyond the notion of semiotic mode, and synthesizes the sensory and 
neurological meanings as well: modalities are the cultural, social and bodily resources 
available for receiving, creating, and expressing meaning.”  
I will take a similar route in the chapter. Working within the phenomenological 
framework I have been constructing of mimesis, I will argue for a cognitive account of 
multimodality as a means of balancing out the current cultural account, and I will 
argue why this is pedagogically important. I will begin by revising the history of 
pedagogical multimodality by going back more than three decades before the New 
London Group popularized the term in 2000 to Robert McKim’s cognitive theory of 
multimodal integration, a concept that informed a multimodal course he helped 
develop for Mechanical Engineering students at Stanford University in the 1970s. I will 
then take on the strong orientation toward digital technologies in current multimodal 
pedagogy by arguing for an expanded concept of media – and hence of multimedia – 
one that resists, in some pedagogical contexts at least, the recent call for a distinction 
between multimodality and multimedia. I will argue that at the level of cognition, of 
learning and inventing, the blurring of the boundaries between what are considered 
modes with what are considered media can prove to be pedagogically compelling. I 
will then consider how the work of Gunther Kress, despite its complex classification 
system and emphasis on social and cultural semiotics, actually facilitates the 
expansion of multimodality to include its cognitive dimensions – dimensions that he at 
several points associates with the concept of mimesis. I will conclude this chapter with 
a case study conducted in the late 1990s by two researchers in technical 
communication, Christina Haas and Stephen Witte, which nicely demonstrates how the 
cognitive account of mimetic multimodality I develop in this chapter can be applied to 
real-world application. This final section will segue to the following chapter which will 
be devoted entirely to pedagogical applications of this approach in the fields of Rhet-
Comp and Tech Com. 
 
From a Communicative to a Cognitive Account of Multimodality 
Although the term multimodality is supposed to reflect an increasing awareness that, 
as Gunther Kress puts it, the focus on writing and written communication “has 
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dampened the development of all kinds of human potentials . . . cognitively and 
affectively” in traditional classroom environments (“Visual and Verbal,” 75), in 
practice students rarely attend to the cognitive and affective dimensions of 
multimodal composition. This could be due in part to the general textualization of the 
term, one that emerges from a puzzling classification schema that appears in the 
introduction to Multiliteraries: Literacy Learning and the Design of Social Futures, an 
influential collection of pedagogical essays published by the New London Group (NLG) 
in 2000. Editors Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis subdivide “meaning” into six modes: 
linguistic, visual, audio, gestural, spatial, and multimodal. Of all these modes, they 
tell us, “the Multimodal is the most significant, as it relates all the other modes in 
quite remarkably dynamic relationships” (28).  Despite this statement, I find it a little 
odd that the multimodal is listed here as a separate category, one of the six, when in 
fact it seems to be a key characteristic to meaning itself. Cope and Kalantzis 
recognize this when they observe how in “a profound sense, all meaning-making is 
Multimodal” (29). But when they break down the Multimodal into two categories – 
hybridity and intertextuality – their focus shifts away from cognition to the resources 
that are drawn on in the composition of  “available designs” (30). Although they 
recognize that people inhabit multiple lifeworlds, providing multiple layers to 
everyone’s identity (17), and note how the human mind is embodied, situated, and 
embedded in social, cultural, and material contexts (36), the metalanguage they 
develop for rethinking and revising our literacy practices are meant to elaborate their 
concept of Design, which has a production-heavy emphasis and, therefore, unduly 
emphasizes the written, spoken, and visual media platforms that have the most 
popular currency in contemporary culture. The NLG’s popularizing of the term 
multimodality has had far-reaching effects. Not only have teachers across the K-16 
spectrum begun to move away from the long-standing assumption that students should 
be enculturated to a monolithic (and primarily linguistic) literacy, many educators are 
designing assignments that appeal to multiple learning styles and incorporate 
marginalized literacies into their curricula.  
So considerable has the influence of the NLG been that the group is assumed to 
have actually coined the word multimodality around 2000.3 But that is not quite the 
case. In fact, as a pedagogical term, multimodality has a longer and largely forgotten 
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history – one that dates back to at least 1972 when it showed up in Robert McKim’s 
textbook Experiences in Visual Thinking. A professor of Mechanical Engineering at 
Stanford University, McKim developed this text as part of a course he helped to create 
a decade earlier that emphasized visual and kinesthetic properties of learning for 
mechanical engineers. McKim’s course influenced the creation in 1988 of a similar 
course, ME 313, then called “Ambidextrous Thinking,” which has since morphed into 
“Human Values and Innovation in Design.”4 The 1988 course was created by Rolf A. 
Faste, a pioneer in human-centered design, to meet the needs of incoming Masters 
students in the programs of Mechanical Design, Manufacturing Systems Engineering and 
Product Design, and it served as an introduction to “the unique spirit and tradition of 
the Design Division of Stanford’s Mechanical Engineering Department” (Faste).5 Faste 
credits McKim with the course name. McKim subscribed to the then popular theory 
that the right and left sides of the brain served different primary functions, and that 
creativity emerged from the brain’s integration of those functions. More importantly, 
though, the course philosophy was informed by a commitment to the idea that 
“[b]rain-body functioning should not be and [sic] issue of either/or but rather 
both/and,”6 and the course was designed to break down the artificial boundaries that 
separated the two. Students practiced rapid sketching and free-hand drawing for the 
first two weeks of the class, and as the quarter progressed approached problem-
solving using a variety of techniques that included improvisational drama, athletic 
visualization techniques, story boarding, and mind mapping; they were even 
introduced to subjects like lucid dreaming, theta-wave bio-feedback, yoga, the role of 
posture, and even focused humming and jazz dancing. Most importantly, the course 
sought to instill in students a complex awareness as well of how our brains and bodies 
interact in the process of thinking and designing.  
 Although McKim does not label his entire pedagogy multimodal, he does use 
that word to describe a memory retrieval technique that he likens to Marcel Proust’s 
multisensory remembrance of past things, which resulted in the inspiration to write his 
most famous novel (98).7 This technique requires an imagination that does not rely 
solely on visual imagery. “In our culture, we unfortunately tend to repress much 
sensory experience,” McKim writes. This is unfortunate since the “feelings that 
accompany the nonvisual senses are particularly intense” (98). To illustrate for 
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students how the body absorbs information about an experience that needs to be 
recalled, he quotes the German Gestalt psychotherapist Fritz Perls, who tells us that 
imagining or recalling something like a landscape “requires more than just visualizing 
pictures”: 
[Y]ou must do more. You must walk in, climb the trees, dig the rich brown 
earth, smell the blossoms, sit on the shadowed grass, listen to the birds 
singing, throw stones in the stream . . . This sensomotoric approach, especially 
that of touching . . . will develop your sense of actuality and will bring about 
that eidetic memory (identity of perception and visualization) which in dreams 
themselves is always present. (qtd 98) 
This multisensory recall – in many ways evocative of imitatio’s attempt to enact actual 
events that could be experientially felt by audiences – McKim calls multimodal 
assimilation: trying to bring to consciousness sensory experience that has been 
acquired by the body and, in a sense, stored by the body’s unconscious memory (98). 
These “sensory modes” are not static; they are constantly engaged in what McKim 
calls operations of thinking that occur below the level of conscious awareness. These 
operations are vital to how we learn, and yet 
[w]hen thinking is taught in the classroom, conscious modes of thinking are 
stressed and subconscious modes are rarely even mentioned, much less 
encouraged. One purpose of this book is to point to this educational oversight, 
and to suggest ways in which you can become aware of and utilize thinking that 
occurs below the threshold of your normal waking consciousness. (4) 
Writing nearly thirty years before the New London Group popularized the term in the 
fields of literacy and composition studies, this professor of mechanical engineering at 
Stanford University employs multimodality in ways that, I believe, is theoretically 
richer than the New London Group’s. Where the NLG emphasizes a design account of 
multimodality, one that attends mostly to the social and semiotic dimensions of 
composing, McKim provides a more cognitive account that clearly attends to the 
body’s role in the making of meaning that subtends our designing practices. His 
account clearly puts him in the general range of Gallese and Lakoff’s description of 
the cognitive operations of the sensory-motor subject and Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the perceptive, living body. Below I will develop this cognitive 
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account of multimodality further by re-envisioning the relationship between modes 
and media – and hence between multimodality and multimedia – within the framework 
of mimesis. 
 
Mimetic Modalities and Cognitive Multimedia Ecologies 
One of the challenges I face in advancing a cognitive account of multimodality is the 
widespread attribution of that word to digital technologies or multimedia. Clair Lauer 
notes that in the field of rhetoric and composition, multimodality and multimedia “are 
not only defined similarly, they are often used interchangeably” (229). Indeed, that 
seems to be the case. In the first chapter of Multimodal Composition: Resources for 
Teachers (2007) Pamela Takayoshi and Cynthia L. Selfe focus almost exclusively on 
how our “communication modalities” – moving and still images, animations, sound, 
color – are “increasingly depending on digital communication networks” and, hence, 
require us “to make informed and conscious choices about the most effective modality 
for communicating in particular rhetorical contexts” (9; italics in original). Of the five 
reasons they give in support of the attention teachers must give to multimodal 
composing, three are explicitly related to digital technologies and all five reflect 
rhetorical approaches to the affordances these technologies offer us. Elsewhere, Selfe 
argues for an expanded semiotic theory that goes beyond the privileging of print and 
takes “advantage of multiple expressive modalities” enabled by video and audio 
editing systems, conferencing software, electronic white boards, digital video 
cameras, digital audio recorders  and multimedia sites like MySpace and Facebook 
(“Movement,” 637, 639).  
While I agree that the new “digital composing environments” (Takayoshi and 
Selfe, 1) are important spaces students should learn to communicate effectively in, in 
this section I want to focus on how certain expressive modalities are enabled first and 
foremost by the human body that is situated in these environments. One way to do so 
is to integrate into the concept of multimedia the medium that is the body itself, 
which Merleau-Ponty asserts is “our general medium for having a world” (PhP, 169). 
Technologies play an important role here, but only insofar as their use corresponds to 
the intentional acts of our bodies. We cannot separate, he tells us, the skilled organist 
from the organ he has habituated himself to since “so direct a relation is established 
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that the organist’s body and his instrument are merely the medium of this 
relationship” (168). If it is true, as Gallese and Lakoff argue, that the sensory-motor 
system of that organist’s body is multimodal, then “the medium of his relationship” 
with his instrument must in some way be multiple. Hence, at the most fundamental 
level of perception – at the level, that is, of mimesis – terms like multimodal and 
multimedia are less distinct and easy to separate from each other. In this section I 
consider the nexus between these two concepts, for it is from this overlap that their 
difference inevitably springs. 
While we are not accustomed to thinking of our bodies as a “platform” of 
media, such an idea is not alien to the media theorist Jussi Parikka. In Parikka’s hands, 
the term media is not limited solely to conventional technologies; rather, media “are 
a contraction of forces of the world into specific resonating milieus: internal milieus 
with their resonation, and external milieus affording their rhythms as part of that 
resonation” (xiv). In other words, media is not a thing separate from the mediator, 
and all acts of mediation resonate with the forces it both generates and is generated 
from. In this configuration of the term, media bears a close relationship to phusis (see 
Chapter 2) in that “we do not so much have media as we are media and of media” 
(xxvii; emphasis his). Like animals who “live in and of media” in that their worlds are 
“formed of the constant interactional sensing, movement, and memory of their 
surroundings,” so too do we inhabit a media environment that “is constituted of our 
ethological bodies interacting with bodies technological, political, and economic” 
(xxvii). This conceptualization of media as a milieu or Umwelt in which we are bodily 
enmeshed is not a far cry from Merleau-Ponty’s claim that each object we encounter – 
his example is a fireplace – becomes integrated with our body schema in that it, too, is 
a “system of equivalences not founded on the recognition of some law, but on the 
experience of a bodily presence” (PhP, 215). Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty describes the 
body as “a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world,” and objects, 
technologies, nature are simply “an annex or prolongation of [the body]; they are 
incrusted into its flesh . . . [and consequently] the world is made of the same stuff as 
the body” (E&M, 163). Our intercorporeal attunement to our situations, our ability to 
recognize and interact with the things we encounter, is enabled though our 
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enmeshment in a network of forces that Aristotle and the Greeks called phusis and 
Parrikka calls media. 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the actions generated through 
our bodily engagement with the multiple “media” of our worlds occur through 
mimesis. In Chapter 1, I describe the “great phantom” that Merleau-Ponty 
appropriates in relation to Diderot’s mimetic theory of character development. To a 
large extent, the actor develops a character by relying on a “special operation of a 
prelogical character” (which seems similar to what McKim calls subconscious 
operations) rather than through “conventional imitation” (EO, 50). He or she seeks to 
imaginatively inhabit that character’s world and allow its sundry forces to materially 
shape the character. Once developed, the character expresses not only a unique 
identity but the world in which that identity is situated. This in a sense requires an 
engagement through multiple sensory and communicative modalities with the “media” 
that constitute that character’s subjectivity and world. Habits, vocal accents, attire, 
stride – these identity markers that we all have do not emerge in the vacuum of a 
solitary self.  Like the power-poses I refer to in the previous chapter, the actor bodily 
“fakes it until he or she becomes it.” To accomplish this, the actor does what the 
brain-damaged veteran Schneider is unable to do due to his permanent injuries: enacts 
a virtual meaning from the actual experience. That is, he or she generates action 
through perception that becomes meaning. Because of the way our body schema is 
structured in relation to both ourselves and the world, this “existential operation”8 is 
something which we all do on a regular basis: “the actor’s art is therefore only an 
extension of the art which we all possess,” the only difference being that for the actor 
it is “a much more complex case of such an operation” (53, 52).   
This “art” is simply what Gallese identifies as mimesis: an embodied simulation 
of the multiple forces at play in the situations we enter and attune ourselves to. In 
doing so, we in a sense “imitate” certain processes of phusis or what Parrikka calls 
“the technics of nature.”9 This latter phrase, according to Parrikka, “refers to the way 
in which it is not only humans who fabricate artifacts to establish relations with the 
world; the whole of nature can be seen as a dynamic process of relations, perceptions, 
durations, and cohabitations that is creative” (“New APPS Interview”). Just as nature 
is not an “extension” of the human, neither are media. Rather, “media are extensions 
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of a variety of affordances of nature: of different materials, of different ways of 
sensing, thinking, memorizing” (“New”).10 Considered within this expanded view of 
media, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the “intentionality which links our body to the 
world” (53) might be thought of as an intercorporeal interface – one that is enabled 
through mimesis and allows for what Anna Gibbs describes as mimetic communication 
between our bodies and the world at all levels of experience: affective, productive, 
conscious. Because mimesis “produces the virtual by enabling ensembles of these 
disparate media,” Gibbs argues that the body “is not so much a medium as a series of 
media, each of which connects in its own way with technological media, including 
writing” (201).  
A similar perspective of body-as-media / media-as-body has recently been 
advanced as a pedagogical framework for multimodal composing. In the introduction 
to their 2012 Composing (Media) = Composing (Embodiment), a collection of essays on 
composition theory and multimodality, Kristin L. Arola and Anne Frances Wysocki 
argue that the integrated disciplines of Rhetoric and Composition are currently trying 
to work with “a historically situated—mediated—sense that we are fragmented 
between a perceiving and a perceived body, between a potentially expressive 
mediating body and a body that exists only in mediation by others” (13). Offering 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the body is one’s primary medium – “taking medium here 
in its grounding sense of that which is between, in the middle” (3) – Arola and Wysocki 
advance a view not unlike Parrikka’s: media should be thought of not as a carrier of 
messages but as a living environment in which we are “always already embedded—
embodied—in mediation” (4). While this is a step forward for multimodal pedagogy, it 
is also ironically a giant step backward in time to the Sophistic rhetorical training that 
occurred in ancient Greek gymnasia. Let’s briefly revisit this ancient pedagogy within 
the context of an entwined multimodal/multimedia theory to see how it can shape 
contemporary approaches to multimodal pedagogy. 
 
Multimodal/Multimedia Ecologies for Sensory-Motor Subjects 
As described in Chapter 3, the Sophists who infiltrated the gymnasia of Athens at the 
start of the Classical era conceived of the agon as both an actual place (a site of 
contest) and a virtual space that produced rhetoric as a gathering of forces, cultural, 
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bodily, and discursive (Hawhee, 16). Unlike the staid Academy later established by 
Plato where students studied mathematics and contemplated (Plato’s) philosophy, the 
gymnasia that became the classrooms of the Sophists were a “network of forces” (128) 
in which young men engaged with multiple media – wrestling, rhetoric, music, and 
other bodily arts – that engaged multiple perceptual modalities. “This network of 
objects, people, and practices and their attendant sounds and smells,” Debra Hawhee 
tells us, “comprised a distinctive material setting for a highly textured, bodily 
pedagogy” (128). The rhetorical and athletic training was mediated through mimesis 
(“mimetic learning happens through a relation with someone or something else, an 
observation and repetition of another’s actions and practices” [148]) and the 
“habituated practices” resulting from their overlap 
likely produced a set of linked habits – the habits of discursive moves and 
wrestling moves, the habits of competing, pushing, developing, responding – 
linked if not in the mind, then certainly in the body. (128) 
 One is reminded of Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “habit has its abode neither in thought 
nor in the objective body, but in the body as mediator of the world” (PP 167). It is 
habituated knowledge gained by experience and not conceptual wisdom acquired 
through study that allows the experienced organist to play a variety of different 
organs; because his body has “incorporated” the relevant directions and dimensions of 
the general instrument, he can settle into the organ “as one settles into a house” 
(168). Such an understanding of experiential knowledge was not lost of Plato’s 
contemporary (and rival) Isocrates, whose school of rhetoric sought to cultivate 
practical wisdom (phronesis) in students through the mimetic pedagogy of ethismos, 
“habituation” (Haskins, 16). Albeit in a more formal manner than his Sophistic 
predecessors,11 Isocrates subscribed to the ancient pedagogy mousike – the 
musicopoetic subjects Plato attempted to replace with philosophy – which refused to 
separate the “twin arts” of gymnastics and philosophy; like body and mind, these two 
educational disciplines were “parallel and complementary” (qtd in Haskins, 15). In 
short, the body served as the primary medium for learning for the ancient Greeks; 
learning was achieved through multiple experiential modalities which linked that 
medium with the multiple media that constituted phusis;12 and that linking was 
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enabled through a process of rhythmic, repetitive, responsive habituation that the 
Greeks associated with mimesis (see Hawhee, 135, 148-151).  
Although ostensibly designed to create a strong athletes, effective rhetors, 
philosophical thinkers, and civic leaders, this training regimen seemed to position 
young men13 not simple as “students.” In a larger sense, the knowledge-making 
process exploited the fact that they were also sensorimotor subjects. I borrow this 
term from Scott Marratto, who uses it to describe Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
painters like Cezanne. As Marratto observes, Merleau-Ponty’s painter (as a 
sensorimotor subject) is “autofigurative” in that he is “a kind of point of passage, or 
translation, where all of the elements of the art of painting can come together,” 
which is true of the subjectivity of perception in general (105). While the painter has 
“resources” to draw on – cultural traditions, established styles, personal histories, 
skills and techniques, materials like oils and brushes – he or she does not draw on them 
“knowingly.” Rather, “the know-how arises from within the sensorimotor dynamics of 
the activity” itself, generated less by knowledge than by expressive movement (104). 
In this sense painting does not reproduce what the painter sees or even the subjective 
experience of seeing; instead it expresses the “voice” of things, it is, as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “the language of the thing itself that springs from its configuration” (qtd 104). 
There is clearly an overlap here of perceptual and sensory modalities with the various 
media afforded by the activity of painting. The medium of the painting intersects with 
the medium of the sensorimotor subject that itself intersects with the medium of each 
of the resources drawn upon. The sensory mode of seeing intersects with those of 
hearing and listening; the communicative medium of speaking, of language, intersects 
with that of painting; the conscious or conceptual mode arising from the act of 
painting intersects with the largely unconscious mode that is the action of painting 
itself; and, of course, the body schema of the painter intersects with the larger 
corporeal schema of the situation and thence of the world.  
When Isocrates writes of how the ancient teachers invented and bequeathed an 
education made up of “twin arts – parallel and complementary” – philosophy and 
gymnastics (qtd in Haskins, 15) – he is pointing to an underlying philosophy of mind 
that might also be called a philosophy of body. What we some call “higher-level 
thinking” is not (meta)physically divorced from bodily action. Multiple perceptual and 
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cognitive modalities are engaged with multiple expressive and communicative media. 
At the base of all this is the correspondence between perception and motility that 
generates an original motor response in the sensorimotor subject, what Merleau-Ponty 
calls mimesis. This “correspondence” should not, however, be conceived as a 
transmission, as if perception “signals” motility to combine with it to produce action. 
It is better to think of this process as a dynamic interface – one that is multimodal or 
even intermodal14 -- that is always-already engaged in the generation of phenomena. 
Merleau-Ponty believed that perception is originally synaesthetic but that scientific 
knowledge has made us “unlearn” how we really see, hear, speak, and feel by dividing 
the senses into separate modalities (see Marratto, 69). Indeed, studies of macaque 
monkeys reveal that mirror neurons fire not only at the sight of an action but at the 
sound of it, enabling a “multimodal representation of action this is not linked to the 
visual channel only” (Iacoboni, 92). Studies in transcranial magnetic stimulation, or 
TMS, similarly reveal that the tongue muscles in human subjects listening to a speech 
were more excited by words that required strong tongue movements to pronounce 
than by words that were less strenuous to pronounce (92).  
Clearly, mimetic identification is not something that you can control by 
banning wayward performers and rhetors from an orderly society; it is a bodily and 
neurological operation enabled by what Gallese and Lakoff call “multimodal 
integration”: “sensory modalities15 like vision, touch, hearing and so on are actually 
integrated with each other and with motor control and planning” (5). David McNeill, a 
researcher in psycholinguistics at the University of Chicago, offers a similar model (and 
one that nicely complements Merleau-Ponty’s claim that speech is primarily gestural), 
theorizing that speech and gesture arise through the interaction of opposite 
neurological operations and dialectically “co-occur” as two modes of representation 
(imagistic and linguistic) that blend together as one.16 Like the painter, we are all 
sensorimotor subjects whose multimodal body schemas are linked – interfaced – with 
multimedia ecologies to which we attune ourselves whenever we perform an action, 
including those with the explicit purpose of communicating with others. At some level, 
the ancient Greek teachers seemed to understand that conceptual thinking was best 




The Affective and Synaesthetic Modes of Mimetic Cognition 
Examining the role of experiential knowledge work in learning and communication 
requires that we look at past practices – ancient Greek education, imitatio, etc. – and 
recover those experiential dimensions that have been marginalized through the 
development of theories that have privileged conceptualism. But we also need to look 
at more recent theories – many of which provide us with the tools that make recovery 
efforts possible. One theory of importance here is affect. Like the concept of mimesis 
that I have been developing throughout this dissertation, affect places emphasis on 
bodily experience and how knowledge is constituted experientially through our 
material interactions with people and things. In the next section, I show how affect 
plays itself out in the multimodal pedagogy of Gunther Kress. Here, though, I would 
like to provide a context for how affect relates to mimesis. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Mark Hansen, a theorist of media and technology 
who draws on phenomenology and cognitive science in his work, argues for a 
movement away from discursive theories he calls “epistemological embodiment” to 
more materialist theories he designates as “phenomenological embodiment” (27).  
Such a shift should be accompanied by a philosophy of mind informed less by semiosis 
than by mimesis – specifically the “corporeal mimesis” he derives from Walter 
Benjamin’s mimetic theory (also discussed in Chapter 2). Hansen discerns in 
Benjamin’s description of the poet Baudelaire how the cultivation of a “tactile 
unconscious” allows for “bodily attunement” that allows him to absorb the “shocks” of 
everyday living without recourse to conscious processing (Embodying, 248). This 
attunement “transforms the poet’s body into a medium,” and this corporeal 
engagement with the material space of his immediate situation channels “the energy 
of shock into mimetic, psychologically rooted creative activity” (249). Elsewhere 
Hansen turns toward Brian Massumi’s affect theory as way of illustrating how bioart – 
something I will come back to in the next chapter – affords all of us who engage with 
such exhibits the opportunity to absorb similar kinds of “shocks” Baudelaire was 
apparently so adept of absorbing. In such exhibits, what we often “see” cannot quite 
be fully articulated in terms of the visual experience alone. That is because 
[a]ffectivity becomes the very medium of the interface with the image. What 
this means is that affectivity actualizes the potential of the image at the same 
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time as it virtualizes the body: the crucial element is neither image or body 
alone, but the dynamical interaction between them. (New Philosophy, 130). 
As we will recall, this interaction between actual and virtual is denied to the brain-
damaged veteran Schneider who cannot, as Merleau-Ponty shows in his Phenomenology 
of Perception, immediately engage in the kind of “normal imitation” we all do 
naturally when asked to perform even a simple task like a salute. That is, he cannot 
apparently interface his sensory-motor system with a consciously evoked image of an 
act he himself had performed automatically countless times. His injury has resulted in 
the loss of a capacity to synthesize perceptions into a synaesthetic whole.  
 The division of our sensory perceptions into the Big Five – sight, smell, hearing, 
taste, and touch -- has contributed to an impression that our sensorimotor system can 
be empirically divided into parts and processes that “work together” while also being 
distinct.17 Models like this one are helpful in developing conceptual knowledge 
necessary for scientific research of the kind that has, for example, resulted in the 
expansion of the life spans of humans in developed societies. But when the body is 
rendered as an object, which is often the case in scientific discourses, the vital 
experiential dimensions are often collapsed. Affect theory not only puts those 
dimensions front and center, it revitalizes the body as a subject while interrogating 
the clinical models that objectify it. Hansen notes how Massumi manages to 
encompass “all the sensory modalities of bodily life” by simply broadening “vision – 
the perceptual sense associated exclusively with “sight” – so that it more closely 
reflects the fundamental synaesthetic operation of perception itself (New Philosophy, 
110). In Massumi’s account, “optical vision derives from proprioceptive and tactile 
‘vision’” (110). In this synaesthetic sense, we “see” with our bodies and not just with 
our eyes.  
While hard to conceptualize within the predominantly empirical framework 
that has informed the curricula of the educational system we have grown up in, we 
actually experience this phenomenon every waking moment of our lives. Some people 
like Daniel Kish, a nonsighted man who developed a system of echolocation which 
allows him to “see” as he rides his bike and walks the crowded streets of Long Beach, 
California,18 actually inhabit a world in which a synaesthetic account of multiple and 
overlapping senses is more applicable than the Big Five model in which the separate 
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senses simply “work together.” Kish serves as a fine example of Hansen’s claim that 
“affectivity infiltrates perception in a way that renders the latter . . . bodily and that 
reveals the full richness – the multimodality or, as we might say, high bandwidth – of 
embodied perception” (New Philosophy, 227). It is not uncommon to think of Kish’s 
development of a sophisticated echolocation system as an extraordinary feat by a 
gifted individual, or to consider the experiences of actual synaesthetes a neurological 
disorder or “condition.” But I think it is more helpful to consider these occurrences 
not as anomalies but as exemplifications of an innate skills-set we all have – namely, 
the capacity to simultaneously experience multiple media multimodally. In the case of 
Kish and many others, a particular disability simply creates conditions for the fine-
tuning of an ability inherent in us all. We need to extend this logic to the pedagogical 
realm. 
While it may indeed be helpful for students to distinguish, as Clair Lauer 
does,19 between multimedia and multimodality in production-based contexts, in 
process-based contexts where cognition is understood as embodied, extended, and 
situated, students would benefit from an understanding of the two as fundamentally 
interrelated at levels we only become conscious of under rare or remarkable 
circumstances. As I have pointed out repeatedly in this dissertation, such thinking, 
while unconventional, is certainly not new. It is also reflective of significant recent 
currents in scientific and philosophical thinking which seeks to move beyond 
subject/object dualism by attending to the relationality of things. Being able to 
discern, say, form from content can be helpful in creating useful ways to think about 
doing something; but an overemphasis on the distinction can impoverish how we 
experience the things we do and limit the ways we do them. Merleau-Ponty tells us 
that form and content cannot exist separately from each other, that what is presented 
cannot exist separately from the way it is presented (WP, 72, 75). Similarly, the 
cognitive psychologist David McNiell tells us that the meaning of something being 
spoken about by a person may not be fully “realized” until the final moment in which 
it is expressed since that moment results from a synthesis of speech and gesture. “This 
is an act of communication,” he notes, “but also of thought” (246).  Both are 
multidimensional since some dimensions of thought are presented in gesture (this need 
not be a literal gesture but a kinesic form, an internal “growth point” or rough mental 
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from which an actual gesture arises) while others are presented linguistically (246). 
Observations such as these should inform our approaches to teaching multimodal 
composing in the classroom, the subject of my next chapter. For now, though, I would 
like to provide one example of how the form of cognition I am describing here – one 
that is mimetic and multimodal – can be discerned in the problem-solving thinking of 
an important thinker: the 20th century physicist Albert Einstein. Need to come back to 
affect. 
 
Albert Einstein: Multimodal “Sympathy” and the Materiality of Conceptual 
Thought 
As I hope I have made clear by now, at the fundamental level of cognition the media 
that constitute our communicative acts cannot be separated from our perceptual 
modalities in the enactment of meaning. Mimesis provides a useful framework in 
which to conceive this relatively complex concept. We should recall how it is from the 
“foundation of mimesis” that Merleau-Ponty believes the “system me-and-other” 
emerges and manifests itself through sympathetic behavior (CRO 124, 125-6). Indeed, 
as Eric A. Havelock points out, the early uses of the term in Greek culture “refers to 
‘sympathetic behavior,’ not to abstract copying or imitation, and in great many cases 
this behaviour is physical, a matter of speech, gesture, gait, dress, and the like” (qtd 
in Haskins, 10). This behavior that resulted in the contagion of sumpaschein,20 of 
course, was a manifestation of a way of thinking. This is what probably so alarmed 
Plato since it ran contrary to his commitment to epistemic knowledge that could only 
be acquired conceptually through rational analytic reflection. But the body’s 
expressive insistence on playing a major role in the making of meaning can never be 
completely repressed. Albert Einstein wrote of how he liked to be “sympathetically in 
touch with experience” when thinking about phenomena (qtd in John-Steiner, 
Notebooks, 16-17) and in his famous letter to Jacques Hadamard described the 
important role visual and kinesthetic imagination played in his extremely abstract 
conceptualizations: 
The words of a language, as they are written and spoken, do not seem to play 
any role in my mechanism of thought. The . . . 21 entities which seem to serve 
as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which 
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can be voluntarily reproduced and combined. . . . The above mentioned 
elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional 
words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously in a secondary stage, 
when the above mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can 
be reproduced at will” (qtd in McKim, 11) 
It is remarkable to hear from so abstract a thinker as Einstein that certain of his 
“elements of thought” were not only of a visual but a “muscular” type. Vera John-
Stiener calls such polysensory thinking that is related to muscular movement “enactive 
representation” (Notebooks, 16) and in studies of the notebooks and other material of 
pioneering scientific thinkers reveals that Einstein was not alone in his reliance on 
kinesthetic and visual modes of thought. Elsewhere she notes how many 20th century 
physicists relied on “diverse modes of thought” (multimodality) and sought out 
“multiple representational modes” (multimedia) in the midst of a major paradigm 
shift (Creative Collaboration, 45). She cites Vivian Gornink’s observation that 
“[w]hatever a scientist is doing – reading, cooking, talking, playing – science thoughts 
are always there at the end of the mind” (qtd in Notebooks, 203). Often what Gornink 
calls the “crucial flash of insight” that so many scientists and other thinkers report as 
groundbreaking moments in their thinking emerge from the unconscious periphery and 
not from the focal point one’s conscious mind is set to. This periphery is not some 
purely mental space; it is generated by the body’s engagement with the very real, 
very material world in which it is acting. 
For example, after much mental deliberation concerning the paradoxes that 
emerged when trying to theorize the velocity of light as it traveled through space, 
Einstein reached his solution not by working out equations on a chalk board but by 
simply glancing at the famous clock tower in Bern, Switzerland, while riding in a street 
car one evening. “A storm broke loose in my mind,” he wrote later, which caused him 
to replicate the situation as he perceived it at that moment by imagining a number of 
clocks ticking in different locations in space – a dynamic image that paralleled time 
with space and quickly led him to the theory of relativity.22 Prior to this flash of 
insight, Einstein had considered the time/space conundrum in various ways. Working 
through complex mathematic equations was one of them. But as he would later write, 
“the germ of the paradox of the special relativity theory” that suddenly sprouted in 
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the trolley car that evening was actually embedded in an image he visualized of 
himself riding through space astride a light wave and looking back at the wave next to 
him (John-Steiner, Notebooks, 85)23 This virtual representation Einstein had imagined 
using the material of daily life (riding a vehicle astride another object) only attained 
its full significance in the moment when he was actually riding a vehicle and paying 
attention to the objects it passed (like a light beam) and which included Bern’s now-
famous town clock. 
Such mimetic reciprocity between the conceptual/virtual and the 
experiential/actual that Schneider’s brain injury had blocked was a major force of 
Einstein’s intellectual processes. Gebauer and Wulf assert that “the often unconscious 
blend of doing and knowing found in mimesis designates a particular type of thinking 
or a faculty, which fuses the practical and technical skills we gain through experience 
with our theoretical abilities to recognize and evaluate” (3). As a result, the concept 
of mimesis 
implies a resistance to splitting the human spheres of experience, action, and 
symbolic production into two parts, one practical and the other theoretical. . . 
. The history of mimesis as a whole makes reference to the mutual 
interpenetration of spheres, to a nonrecognition of the split, to symbolically 
constituted worlds (3). 
A mimetic approach to multimodality, then, would resist its absolute distinction from 
multimedia – at least in certain contexts, most notable those that attend to the 
cognitive dimensions of doing and knowing, or experience, action, and symbolic 
production. It is striking then, how students in university classrooms continue to learn 
static forms rather than the variety of ways such forms become realized by those who 
helped create them. How many students in the science, for instance, know what 
E=mc2 means but not how E=mc2 was arrived at? This disconnect between conceptual 
knowledge and experiential knowledge has impoverished education for too long. 
  We need to bring to the forefront of students’ awareness the interface that we 
all cognitively and bodily have with the world we are enmeshed in, the situations we 
move through, and the things we interact with. In the last chapter, I showed how 
recent theories concerning the materiality of rhetoric are moving the field in a 
direction that allows for a broader account of rhetoric – one that places greater 
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emphasis on the experiential dimensions of thinking and communicating. This is 
important for composition and technical communication since a largely transmission-
based, conceptual version of rhetoric informs so many writing and communication 
programs. Changing how we think about and teach rhetoric, however, is not enough. 
As I have been arguing, we need to rethink standard versions of multimodality since 
multimodal composing is becoming increasingly popular in these programs. I now turn 
to the work of the renowned theorist Gunther Kress, whose work in multimodality 
never strays too far from the world in which we all compose and communicate. 
 
The Role of Mimesis in Gunther Kress’s Pedagogical Multimodality 
Anyone who writes about multimodal pedagogy cannot ignore the work of the 
pioneering figure Gunther Kress, currently a professor of semiotics and education at 
the University of London’s Institute of Education. While a complex thinker, Kress’s 
advocacy of the need for educators of all disciplines to adopt a multimodal approach 
to teaching and learning is based on some fairly simple observations. For example, in 
an essay published in the 1998 collection Page to Screen in Kress compares a page 
from a 1936 science textbook to one from a 1988 textbook, rightly pointing out that in 
the older textbook the “major meaning was carried by language alone” while in the 
more recent one “the main meaning is carried by the images” (64). While his 
conclusion that the older book “was read from beginning to end” whereas the new one 
“is not read at all, it is used” (65-6) is an assumption (the new book may indeed be 
read from beginning to end and the older one may indeed have been used in certain 
contexts), his observation certainly points out an important historical shift in 
convention that is central to his point that visual modes of representation in modern 
Western societies can no longer be thought of as mere supplements to print texts.24 
Observations such as this one have resonated widely with compositionists who are now 
integrating visual rhetoric into their writing classes.  
 Less known by compositionists, however, and hence less resonant in the 
discipline, is his observation that since “the body is coming to be used as a medium of 
communication, so aspects of bodily motion are increasingly used as modes of 
representation and communication” (58).  Although sometimes limited by a tendency 
at to treat that body as the sole site of agency, as if it were disconnected from the 
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situation in which it is moving, 25 Kress nonetheless moves us in an important direction 
with this remark – and in this section I will trace the contours of that direction within 
the theoretical framework I have developed thus far in this chapter. I should note, 
though, that his nearly trademark emphasis on the “social-semiotic” dimensions of 
modes/modalities tends to privilege culture as a monolithic force in the production of 
meaning. While he acknowledges that “material qualities” inhere in material 
substances, once that material is appropriated by a culture those qualities “become 
part of the cultural and semiotic resources of that culture and [are] available for use 
in the making of signs” (Multimodal, 69, 111). A theorist like Bruna Latour might point 
out that this conventional notion of what constitutes the “social”26 tends to 
instrumentalize nonhuman actants, transforming them into available resources (what 
Heidegger called bestand or standing reserve) for their “use” by humans. 
 As a result of this conceptual tendency, along with his development of an 
extremely complicated classification scheme that would make tough reading even for 
Aristotle, Kress offers definitions of key terms that seriously limit their “use” in 
discussions of multimodality that do not conform to their designated locations within 
his complex framework. One key term, mode, is defined by Kress as “a socially shaped 
and culturally given semiotic resource for making meaning”; food, clothing, furniture, 
and so on, all have meaning “due to their social making . . . and the regularity of their 
use in social life” (Social-Semiotic, 79). Media, on the other hand, he defines as “the 
material resources used in the production of semiotic products and events, including 
their tools and the materials used” (Multimodal, 22). A medium is a thing “separate” 
from a mode even though in “design and production, they are hard to separate” (6-7).  
Although he insists that “media are socially formed,” he recognizes that “the fact of 
their existence can be considered pre-semiotic”; however, culture usurps these since 
“certain of their pre-semiotic characteristics will place constraints on their semiotic 
potential” once they are transformed or “socially (re)produced” (69). Kress’s tenuous 
distinction between modes and media often collapses in his repeated attempts to 
define and illustrate them – he describes both, for instance, as “resources” – and the 
time and space he devotes to qualifying these definitions testifies that he is aware of 
an underlying ambiguity. While making for a difficult read, this ambiguity nevertheless 
provides an entrée to a richer understanding of how multimodality is inextricably 
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woven into the multiple media from which it can only be separated within certain 
well-defined contexts.27 That entrée is widened considerably with reference to 
mimesis. 
 Fortunately, I do not need to spend much time here developing the connection 
between mimesis and multimodality in Kress since he does that himself. As noted 
previously, in his 2010 book Multimodality: A Social-Semiotic Approach to 
Contemporary Communication, Kress credits the anthropological scholarship of 
Christophe Wulf and “his work on mimesis, in particular” as pushing him to become 
clearer in his own interests in meaning and learning, “especially in relation to ‘the 
body’” (iv).  In an interview at Florida State University in 2012, Kress said that we 
need to “extend the notion of mimesis” so that “we can understand a whole range of 
ways that humans instantiate knowledge,” specifically in how tacit knowledge at play 
in our “engagement with the world and the transforming and shaping of one’s 
identity.”28 Clearly Kress is aware not only of recent recovery and revisionist work 
about mimesis but also its relevance to multimodal theory and pedagogy. Not only 
does his description of mode as answering the question “How is the world represented 
and how do I aptly represent the things I want to represent in this environment?” (114) 
place mode squarely within the realm of mimesis (if we adhere to the conventional 
association of mimesis with representation), his emphasis on the materiality of modes 
(in order “to move away from abstractions” like the “linguistic system” and 
“grammar” so that we can more profitably “link the means of representation with the 
bodilyness of humans . . . and the possibility of seeing meaning as embodied . . .” 
[83]) nicely approximates the account of mimesis I have been developing here. Finally, 
Kress’s increasingly expanding theory of semiosis as “forms of meaning-making which 
are founded as much on the physiology of humans as bodily beings” as they are on the 
“meaning potentials of the materials drawn into culturally produced semiosis” 
(Multimodal Discourse, 28) contributes the kind of balancing act I am trying to pose – 
via mimesis interpreted phenomenologically – between conceptual and experiential 
knowledges. 
 In the last chapter I referenced Kress’s example of mimesis in how repetition 
operates gesturally in a science classroom. The teacher has drawn a diagram on a 
blackboard that illustrates how blood circulates among organs in the human body. 
145 
 
When the teacher “overlays” the diagram with a sequence of gestures in explaining 
the process, he enacts a “tangibly, mimetically witnessed movement of the blood from 
organ to organ . . . . [that is] physiological felt by the onlookers, mimetically 
experienced in their bodies, and then gone . . .” (Social Semiotic, 86). This mimetic 
moment is enacted multimodally and mediated by multiple media. The visual, verbal, 
and gestural components of the explanation altogether allows for “different students 
to engage with ‘the same’ issue via routes [i.e., media] which may be affectively, 
sensorially, or culturally more congenial to them. At the same time it affords a fuller 
exploration of the topic at issue” (169). From a neuroscientific point of view, the 
gestural dimensions of the teacher’s explanation are simulated neurologically by 
students’ mirror neuron systems; Kress tells us that such physiologically felt moments, 
mimetically experienced through the bodies of students, are also of significant 
educational value. But it is not so much what the teacher says or what the diagram 
illustrates that matters here. It is the style in which the information is conveyed that 
facilitates learning – a facilitation that occurs unconsciously at that bodily level of 
learning Kress helpfully associates with affect. Communication is not only conscious. In 
a world that is “mediated and made accessible through the semiotic categories that 
culture provides,” Kress asserts, “[a]ffect is inevitably part of such a mediation; it 
must have a central place in the theory of meaning,” and doing so requires us to 
“erase the boundary between affect and cognition in this frame” (Social Semiotic, 
109; italics in the original). It is this type of experiential learning is what McKim and 
his colleagues at Stanford University sought to attune students to through their 
innovative approaches to learning that resulted in the ME 313 “Ambidextrous 
Thinking.”  
 I believe that an expanded cognitive account of multimodality – enabled in this 
dissertation through the conceptual lens of mimesis – can explicitly integrate 
experiential learning and knowledge into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many 
programs in composition, technical and professional communication, and in 
communication generally. Nathan Rivers, a scholar who advocates more collaboration 
between the fields of technical communication and the cognitive sciences, offers one 
example of how to do this by defining a rhetorical situation as “any moment of mind 
extension, of augmenting human cognition artifactually and environmentally” (422). 
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Affect, Kress suggests, seems to enable the extension of cognition in such situations. A 
multimodal project such as a museum exhibit, he tells us, must attend to affect if it is 
to rhetorically engage viewers. Because “rhetoric goes to the initial conception of the 
exhibition and from there to the overall ‘shaping of the exhibition” in terms of the 
multiple media29 employed – objects, lighting, captions, space – “the question of 
affect has to be addressed in the case of the exhibition: the wrong affect will ‘turn 
off’ potential visitors” (Social Semiotic, 177). What the exhibition designers must tune 
into consciously we are all attuned to unconsciously in our daily activities. Paul Prior 
and Jody Shipka, noting theories developed by the Vygotsky school,30 observe that 
when we sit at a table that table’s “meaning” is never singular; for each table we 
encounter we “sense” its multiple referents, metaphorical extensions, and individual 
subjective versions – warmth, family conflict, etiquette, and so on – and we 
unconsciously situate ourselves into those which are (rhetorically) appropriate to each 
specific situation. This “sense,” which I see as mimetic, they describe as a 
“chronotopic31 interface of the embodied and representational, the social and the 
personal” (208-9). As I will discuss at some length in the next chapter, our learning 
and communication practices can be greatly enhanced by cultivating an awareness of 
the situations we mimetically interface with as fundamentally rhetorical. 
 As noted above, Kress’s social-semiotic definition of mode would present more 
difficulty if Kress himself did not provide the opportunity to move beyond that 
classification. Fortunately, across the corpus of his work he provides many of such 
opportunities. Clearly, affect is one of them. But a semiotic mode also offers many 
affordances,32 allowing for the “linking” of entities – “humans with humans, with 
places, objects; objects with processes; processes linked with processes” – many of 
which “involve reciprocal actions between the participants” (119). Although linked 
events, objects, and phenomena only take on full semiotic significance “as a result of 
social decisions and judgements” (120), his awareness of their affordances certainly 
takes into account “a whole range of ways that humans instantiate knowledge,” 
including bodily knowledge obtained mimetically through one’s “engagement with the 
world and the transforming and shaping of one’s identity.”33 The human experience 
with the mode of color, for example, certainly offers “semiotic possibilities of a 
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specific kind” (cultural associations with green land or blue sea, pink for girls and blue 
for boys, etc), but it also offers 
a specific sensory appeal, via sight and its physiology, and via both the 
physiological/experiential meanings of colour for humans as 
biological/physiological beings and the cultural/experiential meanings of colour 
– the meanings deriving from specific cultural and 
physiological/experiential/emotional effects (Multimodal Discourse, 27).  
In less convoluted terms: the conceptual meanings we arrive at within cultural 
contexts arise from our embodied interfacing with situations through their material 
affordances. To truly understand how color operates in our lives we need to attend to 
its affective dimensions. We therefore need a “new theory of semiosis,” Kress tells us 
elsewhere, that offers an account for “the processes of synaesthesia, the transduction 
of meaning from one mode in meaning to another semiotic mode, an activity 
constantly performed by the brain” (“Visual and Verbal,” 76). In moments like this, it 
becomes difficult to subscribe to the distinction between mode and media that Kress 
has gone to such pains to sustain. 
 It is apparent here that Kress is operating on the same assumption as Merleau-
Ponty – that perception is fundamentally synaesthetic. Unfortunately, because 
“synaesthetic activity has been suppressed in institutional education, due to the social 
and cultural dominance of language in the written mode in the public domain,” Kress 
looks toward multimodality as a means of tapping into the marginalized “cognitive and 
affective potentials of individuals” (76). The anthropological model of mimesis offered 
by Christopher Wulf (whose book on mimesis, co-authored with Gunter Gebauer, 
informs much of this dissertation) has helped Kress become “clearer” on his 
understanding of how meaning and learning is instantiated by the body is important 
here. Indeed, Anna Gibbs compares mimesis to affect in that neither is a “property” of 
the body or the individual; mimesis, Gibbs tells us, should rather be thought of as a 
trajectory which makes use of “vision, hearing olfaction, morphology, or behavior, or 
several of these” in operations whereby one responds to the other, “a borrowing of 
form that might be productively thought of as communication” (20, 19). Although 
repressed by formal educational models, we all engage such cognitive and clearly 
synaesthetic processes daily when our bodies help us navigate what Kress calls the 
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“multimodal ensembles” of our immediate situations. Even a mundane act such as 
crossing a busy street requires us to make a multimodal ensemble out of the many 
resources available – an especially powerful operation for disabled people (Social-
Semiotic, 161) which I noted earlier. This means that “[s]treetscapes constitute both 
curricular and pedagogies” (168) in that the cognitive operations our bodies engage 
when crossing a street are the same ones generated when we observe the science 
teacher gesturing in front of a diagram representing blood circulation – also a 
multimodal ensemble (168). It goes without saying that the affective, physiological, 
mimetic dimension Kress assigns to the classroom example (86) is operative in crossing 
the street and all our other daily activities. 
 Does the picture emerging here not in some way resemble Aristotle’s claim that 
when we create something – a painting, a composition – we follow the process of 
nature (mimeitai ten phusin?). Is not “nature” the ultimate multimodal ensemble that 
we navigate mimetically? If so, then I believe that the composition theorist Byron 
Hawk may want to rethink his assertion that traditional formalist, expressivist, and 
audience-based rhetorics are grounded in a “positive, mimetic epistemology” – one he 
opposes to the “holistic model” offered by Paul Kameen, which draws heavily on 
Coleridge’s theory of intuition. As Hawk describes it, following Kameen, Coleridge 
“wants to move away from the examination of things, which leads to dead 
classifications, toward relations of things, which leads to a continuous transition and 
reciprocity” (104). In Coleridge’s words: 
[A]s soon as the mind becomes accustomed to contemplate, not things only, 
but relations of things, there is immediate need of some path or way of transit 
from one to the other of the things related; – there must be some law of 
agreement or of contrast between them; there must be some mode of 
comparison; in short, there must be Method” (qtd 104-5) 
As described by Hawk, Coleridge’s “method” sounds a lot like mimesis both in the 
phenomenological sense, in that “[m]ethod begins in embodiment,” as well as in the 
Aristotlean sense, in that it must theoretically be “representative of the relations in 
nature and continuously progress and change with them” since it is the “relations in 
nature, not subjective genius, [that] drive intuition” (Hawk, 105). Since method is 
“multiple and situational,” compositional practices like writing require “being open to 
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the multiple paths that can emerge out of any given rhetorical situation” (47). Writing 
about ships, Hawk says, requires knowledge of the oar, the stars, the helm, the sail, 
the artillery, and so forth. In other words, to write adequately about ships the writer 
must attune herself to the multiple affordances in the multimodal ensemble that 
emerges from the semiotic domain of certain “ships.” In tracing the linkage of ship-
oar-sail-stars-etcetera she learns the concept ship in ways that are not transmitted 
through a Wikipedia entry. In other words, she slips into the mimetic phantom that 
enables ship to be virtually experienced, not just conceptualized. The Wikipedia page 
is just one of multiple media she engages with in the process of learning, none of 
which are easily separated from the perceptual modalities that enable her to achieve 
a more complex awareness of all that constitutes a certain kind of ship. 
 In this section I have tried to show that despite Gunther Kress’s separation of 
mode and media, his attention to mimesis and to the phenomenological body, to 
affect and to affordances it responds to, ultimately prevent the kind of clear 
distinction his initial definitions attempt to designate. The result is an ambiguity that 
yields a richer theory of multimodality that can certainly contribute to rhetorical 
theory and composition pedagogy. Admittedly, this chapter has been, like the ones 
that have led up to it, very theoretical in scope. It is time now to consider how the 
theory makes for praxis. The next and final chapter of this dissertation will be devoted 
entirely to classroom pedagogy and to the design of curricula that puts that pedagogy 
to work. But first, as a means of seguing to that objective, I want to look at a real-
world example that I feel illustrates the multimodal/multimedia nexus I have 
developed here quite effectively. It is to this example that I now turn. 
 
“Embodied Practice”: Putting it All Together 
In Chapter 2 I noted how the parent term of mimesis, mimos, originally denoted both 
performer and performance, comparing that dual-meaning to Yeats’ famous 
observation of the impossibility of separating the dancer from the dance. In a 2001 
article published in the Journal of Business and Technical Communication, Christina 
Haas and Stephen P. Witte set the stage for a case study they document with an 
epigraph quoting the composer Franz Liszt: “Le concert, c’est moi!” With this 
declaration, the authors tell us, Liszt “was not only declaring that music is inseparable 
150 
 
from its performance but that differences in bodily manipulations of musical 
instruments yield different music from the same score, a discovery that Liszt 
repeatedly capitalized on in his own concerts” (413).34 This act of remediation is 
imitatio at its best: the style (“the same score”) that the pianist taps into yields an 
expression that is “different” from earlier performances, shaped as it is by the forces 
at play in that specific situation in which the performer is immersed and hence 
“representative” of – that is, he and his score and his remediation of it bring to full 
expression all the forces at play on that particular occasion. The medium of expression 
here is not just Liszt; it includes the concert and all that constitutes it, including that 
particular audience in that specific location and that certain occasion. Hence, that 
unique expression is enacted across multiple media through the engagement of 
multiple sensory and perceptual modalities.  
Haas and Witte extend Liszt’s performative remediation  to writing and other 
means of communication, which they describe as an “embodied practice” since its 
“recurrent nature, its goal directedness, and its intimate linking with technologies and 
with knowledge are always enacted in part through bodily and sensory means” (416). 
Because embodiment “signifies a unification of mind and body,” they argue that “the 
possibility of abstracting the body as an analytic category” (of the kind found in social 
theory, literary theory, and cultural studies) is denied by “studies of everyday human 
acts such as situated writing.” The authors claim that studying the embodied, situated 
nature of writing “is one appropriate and useful way to pursue research on technical 
communication and other kinds of literate performances” (417). In addition, the case 
study around which their article is built helps to illustrate the mimetic approach to 
multimodality and multimedia I have been developing in this chapter. Intriguingly, 
although they do not explicitly frame their study as multimodal, in their conclusion 
they tell us that 
[w]e believe that a multimodal approach . . . and explicit attention to writers’ 
embodied practices will illuminate some thorny issues within writing studies – 
issues that have to do with the nature and development of specialized 
knowledge and expertise, with the interrelationship of complementary (or 
conflicting) representation systems, and with the nature of power in 
collaborative work. (448-9) 
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As I argue below, their use of the term multimodal here cannot easily be dissociated 
from the term multimedia in that the “multiple systems of representation” (444) that 
emerge through the interactions of participants “entails the distribution of cognitions” 
in which knowledge, expertise, and other cognitive acts are “shared – ‘stretched over’ 
. . . [and] across individuals, organizations, tools, technologies, and systems of 
representation” (425, 430). 
 In their case study, Hass and Witt study the joint production and revision by 
two organizations of a lengthy, 15-chapter standards document. This document would 
“standardize procedures and products related to the infrastructure maintenance and 
expansion of a small but rapidly growing city in northeast Ohio”; not only would it 
mediate the work of people in various city departments (water, planning, engineering, 
wastewater, etc.), it would “mediate the work and interactions of a wide range of 
persons and companies doing business with the city for many years to come” (418).  
The first organization is a large engineering firm made up mostly of civil, mechanical, 
and environmental engineers; these “consulting engineers” are responsible for 
developing the initial drafts of the document sections, gathering input from city 
personnel, and revising the standards document. The second organization is the city 
itself, specifically the employees who work in the engineering department under the 
guidance of the city engineer; these “city employees” collaborated with the consulting 
engineers on developing this document that would become a reference for anyone 
involved in city maintenance and expansion (419). The document contains a range of 
representational systems – charts, timelines, maps, sketches, tables, verbal texts, and 
technical drawings – each of which, the authors argue, “requires distinct embodied 
production processes using different material and computer-based technologies” 
(418). The focus of their study, however, attends to another dimension of embodied, 
thoroughly experiential knowledge that emerges during the joint meetings of these 
two teams and which expressed itself in ways that none of the participants were 
conscious of. The expression of this knowledge that was enacted during their meetings 
significantly (re)mediated the writing and design of the specs document. 
 In order to illustrate how “embodied practice” came to bear on the project, 
the authors focus on one small subsection of the standards document – a spec and 
drawing concerned with channel easement – and carefully analyze approximately six 
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minutes of a videotaped discussion between the consulting engineers and city 
employees that took place in a meeting room in February 1999. They note that the 
issue of channel easement is especially relevant for their purposes since it “brings the 
phenomenological, material world – with all its unpredictability – directly into the 
writing process” (424).35 Because so much of the city employees’ work is on-site or “in 
the field,” their knowledge of the channel easement is “embodied,” that is 
experientially acquired. This is contrasted with the largely conceptual knowledge 
possessed by the consulting engineers who have less experience with the material 
conditions of that specific easement: 
Whereas the consulting engineers often represent what they do as practical or 
applied science, their knowledge differs in significant ways from the knowledge 
of those who must work with and within the material structures that engineers 
design (e.g., a wastewater lift station) or specify (e.g., a channel easement). 
In short, although the consulting engineers do not deal every day with such 
material structures, the city employees do. Therein lies the difference in the 
knowledge the respective groups bring to the channel easement discussion. 
(435) 
It is the experiential knowledge – “the practical and applied knowledge that derives 
from the work within such material structures” – that they call “embodied 
knowledge,” and this kind of knowledge is what the city engineers “repeatedly access 
and activate in their reading and revising of the spec and drawing” of the channel 
easement during this particular meeting (435). Their study reveals how this embodied 
knowledge materially expresses itself and, in doing so, enacts an alternative 
representation system to the official ones (the text about and the drawing of the 
channel easement) produced by the consulting engineers in the room. This concern 
with how situated cognition and embodied knowledge manifests itself through the 
representation of a certain material reality aligns their study with key characteristics 
of mimesis even though that term appears nowhere in their article. 
 The six-minute segment of the meeting studied by Haas and Witte involves a 
disagreement between the consulting engineers and the city employees regarding the 
accuracy of a drawing and its textual description prepared by the consultants. The 
disagreement stemmed from the term top of the bank, which appears three times in 
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the initial draft and was “apparently deployed to overcome the inherent difficulty of 
materially fixing a channel easement as compared to fixing engineered structures on 
the basis of, for example, surveying stakes” (436). Although the term is proffered as 
nonambiguous, the city engineers quickly point to the need for some kind of “legal 
definition” of that term (436). Haas and Witt trace their concern to a knowledge base 
informed though actual experience, which the consultants – operating outside the 
material conditions of the city and its channels – do not have. For the city employees, 
“materially ungrounded verbal constructs such as top of the bank have the potential to 
problematize the relationship between property owners or residents and the city 
itself” – a problem that the city engineer, the engineering assistant, and the utilities 
manager must contend with frequently (438). As one participant insisted, there must 
be “some type of formula for establishing” the top of the bank or a “common point” 
for deciding its location (438). As the authors studied the taped proceedings and 
transcripts from this meeting, they observed how the “city employees repeatedly drew 
on their embodied knowledge of antecedent and future states in critiquing the 
engineering firm’s work in the channel easement subsection of the document, and 
they repeatedly voiced their concern that top of the bank be fixed or grounded in the 
material world” (439). 
 What the authors refer to as a “distribution”36 of the city employee’s embodied 
knowledge – which they contend “permit[ted] the consulting engineers to revise the 
spec and the drawing” (436) – was accomplished not only linguistically but gesturally. 
These “embodied representations” played a “critical role in distributing the city 
employees’ knowledge across all participants in the work group” (441). Purely 
indexical gestures made by city employees – that is, gestures that focused on the 
consultants’ drawing projected on the screen, the official representation of the 
channel easement – emerged simultaneously with their vocal critique. Nonindexical 
gestures made by the city team, such as the widening of hands to suggest a future 
state where the width of the channel is legally and materially bounded in ways not 
represented in the drawing, emerged as a “new representation” in opposition to the 
official drawing and contributed to its revision by the consultants. The authors also 
identify 24 instances of the gesture of pointing, 23 of which were directed toward the 
screen on which the consultants’ initial drawing of the channel easement was 
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projected. However, the actual objects at which members of the two groups pointed 
differed. Working with a model of the deictic gestures offered by David McNeill, the 
authors determined that of the 23 pointing gestures aimed at the screen, the four 
made by the consulting engineers “all had as their object the literal drawing on the 
screen”; of the 19 pointing gestures made by the city employees, on the other hand, 
twelve “seemed to have as their object an entity from the material world represented 
(for the city employees) by the drawing – a nonliteral object,” such as a bank or a 
stream, which the city workers were familiar with from their on-site experience (443). 
The authors conclude that the focus of the consulting engineers during most of the 
meeting was on the document itself, not the material world it sought to represent 
visually and textually that the city employees – in an act of expert imitatio – made 
present through the gestural language of both body and speech. In fact, they believe 
that for the city employees “the initial drawing no longer exist[ed] though it 
remain[ed] projected onto one of the screens in the room” (442). Through their 
actions of “representing” the channel easement without recourse to their own set of 
visual and textual representation, their minds were situated elsewhere.  
 There is much to be learned from Haas and Witte’s study of this six minute 
segment of the meeting between these two groups. This clearly multimodal ensemble 
is a rhetorical situation, an agon, in which the primary argument is enacted across 
diverse communicative media that are themselves generated on the basis of mimesis. 
The city employees’ gestures – including the many pointing gestures – not only helped 
to enact a alternative representation system to the official one projected by the 
consultants on the screen, they seem to have emerged through a sympathetic 
entrainment, a syncretic sociability, physically (but quite unconsciously) enacted by 
the city employees’ embodied simulations. These simulations even roughly 
“represented” certain dimensions of an absent agent – the channel easement itself 
and its network of material and social relations – that nonetheless came to serve as a 
third party to the negotiations. These unofficial representations, Merleau-Ponty might 
point out, allowed for the channel itself to express its own properties; that is, the 
world of the channel speaks through the language and gestures of those who 
perceptually inhabit that world, and it is made material through the communicative 
modes and media that become operative through their representational actions. I 
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think this case study nicely illustrates the how the term media is impoverished when 
its signification is associated solely with print and electronic modes of information 
delivery, and how – at the level of cognition and practice – its intimate relationship 
with our perceptual and sensory modalities warrant the case for thinking multimedia 
and multimodality together, first, before seeking to establish the difference that 
arises as a palpable production process begins to take shape. 
 As I noted earlier, this dissertation has maintained a strongly theoretical focus. 
Haas and Witte’s case study helpfully serves as a segue to a “real world” account of 
how the mimetic theory I have used to re-envision rhetoric and multimodality can be 
applied pedagogically. This will be the subject of the next and final chapter. 
 
                                                            
1 It should be noted that Gallese and Lakoff distinguish multimodality from supramodality in the following way: 
Supramodality refers to information that arises from “association areas” that are distinct from the sensory motor 
system and which integrates information from the motor system with information from sensory modalities. 
Multimodality, however, refers to what “is neutrally enacted using neural substrates used for both action and 
perception” and that the “modalities of action and perception are integrated at the level of the sensory-motor system 
itself and not via higher association areas” (5).  
2 This conference paper does not have page numbers. A pdf is available at the CERME 8 website: 
http://cerme8.metu.edu.tr/wgpapers/wg16_papers.html 
3 Clair Lauer of Arizona State University, for example, attributes the coining of the term to the NLG. See “Contending 
with Terms,” 227. 
4Here is the current (March, 2013) description of the course: “ME 313: Human Values and Innovation in Design.” 
“Introduction to the philosophy, spirit, and tradition of the product design program. Hands-on design projects used as 
vehicles for design thinking, visualization, and methodology. The relationships among technical, human, aesthetic, 
and business concerns. Drawing, prototyping, and design skills. Focus is on tenets of design philosophy: point of view, 
user-centered design, design methodology, and iterative design.” 
https://explorecourses.stanford.edu/search?view=catalog&filter-coursestatus-Active=on&page=0&q=ME313 
5 Rolf A. Faste’s article about the class was published in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in Innovations 
in Mechanical Engineering Curricula for the 1990s (New York, November 1994), which is no longer in print. All further 
references to this text will therefore not be cited. A pdf (with no page numbers) of the article is available at the 
website for the Rolf A. Faste Foundation for Design Creativity here: http://fastefoundation.org/publications/ 
6 It is interesting that this clearly multimodal pedagogy stemmed from a dual-aspect theory of the brain, one that 
divided it into left and right sides. As I noted in Chapter 2, Aristotle was inclined to conceive mimesis as having two 
aspects, requiring an observer to enter a more complex awareness of the mimetic act by keeping both aspects 
conjointly in focus. 
7 He quotes Ernest Schachtel on Proust: “In Prousts’ account, visual sensations are far outnumbered as carriers of … 
memories by those of the lower, more bodily senses, such as the feeling of his own body in a particular posture, the 
touch of a napkin, the smell and taste of a flabor, the hearing of a sound – noise or melody, not the sound of words. 
All these sensations are far from conceptual thought, language, or conventional memory schemata” (qtd 98) 
8 Merleau-Ponty describes the body schema as a “system whose different introceptive and extroceptive aspects 
express each other reciprocally, including even the roughest of relations with the surrounding space and its principal 
directions” (CRO, 117).  Hence, “[i]t is through my body that I understand people, just as it is through my body that I 
perceive things” (PP, 216). 
9 While Parikka does not state that humans and animal “imitate” nature, it is worth noting that he cites Roger Caillois’ 
“famous writing on mimicry and the praying mantis” as works that shaped his thinking of a “slightly alternative 
cultural history and media theory” (New APPS Interview:  http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/03/new-apps-
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interview-jussi-parikka.html. Accessed March 1, 2012.) He also discusses Caillois’ work in his book, specifically in 
relation to digital gaming, on pages 105-110. 
10 Parikka’s book in a way brings us all the way back to Empedocles, who claimed that humans learned the technical 
arts by mimicking animals. Parrikka offers insects as a figure for thinking media as an extension of nature. He reverses 
the “insects as media” logic implicit in the popular swarm metaphor to “media as insects.” Insects are an “invention” 
of nature that will outlast humans. They reflect those sides of our experience that are non-conscious: affect, instinct, 
and knowledge that stems from embodied relations with their milieu. See his interview with the New APPS blog for an 
overview of his book’s themes: http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/03/new-apps-interview-jussi-parikka.html 
11 Although Isocrates identified himself with the ancient Sophistic tradition, like Plato he was appalled by the rigid 
formulae and deceitful trickery practiced by the multitudes of sophists of his time. His speech “Against the Sophists” 
captures his attempt to distance himself and his educational doctrine from their pandering activities. The Wikipedia 
webpage (accessed April 13, 2014) describes his speech here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Against_the_Sophists 
12 Clearly, I’m using pairing phusis with Parrikka’s broadened description of media. However, that pairing Hawhee 
borrows a term used by Democritus to describe the philosophy of mind that seems to have informed these ancient 
pedagogies. “Phusiopoiesis” derives from Democritus’s statement that “Nature and instruction are similar; for 
instruction shapes the man, and in shaping produces his nature (phusiopoiei)” (qtd 93).  Pedagogically, according to 
Hawhee, it “occurred in a tangle of dynamics and forces” (108) that included not only the immediate environment of 
the gymnasium as a “network of practices” (97) but the intimate, often erotic and painfully stringent relationship 
between instructors and students (100-108). 
13 Apparently women did not enter these male-dominated spaces. We might conjecture that a handful of exceptional 
women might have participated in these bodily arts from time to time. However, no historical evidence exists to 
support that conjecture. 
14 Marratto notes that James J. Gibson refers to the phenomenon of synaesthesia as “intermodal” or intersensory (69) 
15 Gallese and Lakoff note that there are other modalities involved in the “multimodality of actions” (such as the 
somato-sensory component, or what it feels like to grasp something), but they do not discuss them (4-5). 
16 This theory has it correlates in composition theory. Kristie S. Fleckenstein, for example, invents the term imageword 
to semantically account for the dual logics operating in “ecological systems of meaning”: image (an immersive is logic) 
is the incarnation of meaning in various modes and modalities and word (an emergent as-if logic) is the linguistic 
manifestation (Embodied, 33). 
17 At the neurological level, this is called by Gallese and Lakoff “supramodality,” in which each association mechanism 
is a distinct mental operation. 
18 There are many news stories and videos available online about Daniel Kish’s incredibly accurate way of navigating 
complex landscapes. This ABC News video (accessed June 12, 2014) is one of them: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/video/blind-man-echolocation-13688305 
19 “’Multimodal’ is a term valued by instructors because of its emphasis on design and process, whereas ‘multimedia’  
is valued in the public sphere because of its emphasis  on the production of a deliverable text. Ultimately, instructors 
need to continue using both terms in their teaching and scholarship because although ‘multimodal’ is a term that is 
more theoretically accurate to describe the cognitive and socially situated choices students are making in their 
compositions, ‘multimedia’ works as a gateway term for instructors and scholars to interface with those outside of 
academic in familiar and important ways” (225). 
20 Halliwell associates this term with “sympathy,” “fellow feeling,” and “identification” (80) 
21 The ellipsis here replaces a word that in some texts is rendered as “psychical” (for example, McKim, 11) and in 
others as “physical” (for instance, John-Steiner, 85). I cannot determine which is the actual term since both renderings 
are found in multiple texts where this phrase is quoted. 
22 See Michio Kako’s account of this experience (“The Theory Behind the Equation,” posted October 11, 2005) at the 
Nova series webpage on the PBS website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/theory-behind-equation.html 
(Accessed April 1, 2014). 
23 The quotation comes from Kako’s account (ibid). I cite John-Steiner since the general description of his visualization 
can be found on that page in her text; however, a readable, public-friendly interpretation of that visualization (using a 
police pursuit) is illustrated in Kako.  
24 Paul Prior cites this example in particular to illustrate his “sharp disagreement not only in terms of basic questions 
of theory but also often in terms of readings of particular texts offered as illustrations” and cites examples of other 
texts from the same time period as Kress’s first science text that do not conform to his interpretation. Kress’s 
periodization of texts, he argues, “erases (or discount[s]) social and communicative hybridity,” an approach that 
“could easily lead us to a multimodal replay of the orality-literacy debates of the 1980s” (26). This tendency by Kress 
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derives in part from a “remarkable theoretical claims are driven by an abstract theoretical commitment rather than 
by close and serious consideration of the actual semiotic landscape.”  Because Kress’s “certain classifications” (a 
problem I have with Kress as well) limit the scope of interpretation of multimodal practices and their affordances, 
Prior advises us to look at the work of James Elkins, Elizabeth Rohan, and Anne Wysocki for “more complex” 
approaches to multimodal education. (26)  
25 As I will show shortly, Kress does indeed stray from an anthropocentric account of agency. However, in many of his 
real-world examples he often invests full agency into the human textmaker. In his ESL Classroom article, his 
description of the work produced by children does not attend to the role played by material and other actants in the 
networked situation of the classroom (339-40). A multimodality theorist like Jodi Shipka, who I will discuss in the 
pages ahead, uses Actor Network Theory as a framework for classroom activities. 
26 As opposed to, say, Bruno Latour’s concept of “social” as a dynamic network of associations between human and 
nonhuman actants that cannot be reduced solely to human groups (ethnic, class, subculture, etc). Latour develops 
this perspective of “the social” across the body of his works, but it is perhaps most directly articulated in his 2005 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. 
27 Because mode answers the question “How is the world best represented and how do I aptly represent the things I 
want to represent in this environment?” meanings are made material “with specific ontological effects . . . . according 
to the intentions of the rhetor and designer” (114). Clearly, I need to depart from this hylomorphic and culturally 
deterministic definition of mode. I will do so, however, by way of Kress himself. Fortunately, because Kress’s 
classification system – which extends across several of his works – is so inordinately complex, it collapses under its 
own weight. Once the barrage of italicized terms designating categories, subcategories, and sub-subcategories 
recedes to the background – where it belongs – Kress’s theories have much to offer the mimetic approach toward 
multimodality of the kind I develop here. 
28 A transcript of this interview was accessed on 29 July 2013 and is currently available at 
http://www.english.fsu.edu/rhetcomp/transcripts/kress_transcript.pdf 
29 This is not he term Kress uses. It is mine.  
30 This was an informal network of psychologists, educators, medical specialists, and neuroscientists associated with 
Lev Vygotski and Alexander Luria. The school spanned several cities in the former Soviet Union from the 1920s 
through the 1940s. In opposition to Cartesian dualism, they developed a philosophy of mind (loosely referred to as 
cultural-historical psychology) in which body, brain, and behavior were integrated. 
31 The term “chronotope” is borrowed from Bakhtin and can be described as time-space: “For Bakhtin, the 
chronotope became emblematic of a fractured ontology – a complex fluid unfinalized and unfinalizable world—in 
which representational chronotopes (those on paper, in talk, and in the mind) co-evolved with embodied 
chronotopes, the actual concrete times[,] places, and events of life” (Prior and Shipka, 186) 
32 The psychologist James J. Gibson developed his theory of affordances in the late 1977s as part of an “ecological” 
theory of (mostly visual) perception. An affordance is a property of an object that allows for an “action possibility.” 
Such possibilities differ according to situations, both immediate and global. A window pane affords a human the 
opportunity to break through and escape from an enclosure while simultaneously denying such an opportunity to a 
fly. Hence the affordances of objects in a very real sense constitute our respective “worlds.” 
33 A transcript of this interview was accessed on 29 July 2013 and is currently available at 
http://www.english.fsu.edu/rhetcomp/transcripts/kress_transcript.pdf 
34 Haas and Witt here refer to Frank R. Wilson’s The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language, and Human 
Culture. New York, Random House: 1998. 
35 They continue: “Unlike roadways, which are primarily or completely designed and constructed by people, channels 
are naturally occurring phenomena, such as streams and creeks of various kinds that can change through natural, but 
largely unpredictable, processes” (424).  
36 This term evokes the theory of distributed cognition in which knowledge is seen as not confined to an individual but 
is distributed in her or his material and social environment. It is most dramatically developed by Edwin Hutchin’s 
study of nautical navigation of an Iwo Jima amphibious assault ship in his 1995 book Cognition in the Wild. Applying 
what was then the dominant metaphor of cognitive science – cognition as computation – to a ship’s complex 
navigation system, which includes but is not limited to the cognitive processes of humans, Hutchins shows how 




Chapter 5: Integrating Experiential Knowledge into College 
Curricula 
It is now time to apply my phenomenological interpretation of mimesis to pedagogy. 
As I noted in the introduction, one key objective of this dissertation is to integrate 
experiential knowledge into the rhetorical theory that informs so many undergraduate 
programs in composition and technical communication. While I do not wish to collapse 
the distinction between these two different academic disciplines, it is important to 
recognize the role the rhetoric of persuasion plays in both fields and the significant 
pedagogical overlap between them. One reason for this overlap is purely logistical. 
Because Composition and Technical Communication programs generally are housed in 
English departments, it is not unusual for instructors of composition (and even 
literature) to teach courses associated with “Tech Com” (like, for example, 
undergraduate technical writing) and vice versa, allowing for significant pedagogical 
crossover between the two curricula.1 In Composition the market is currently flooded 
with textbooks that emphasize rhetoric as persuasive argumentation,2 and this 
rhetorical orientation has worked its way into Tech Com. This is quite obvious from 
even a casual glance at the “Teaching Resources” currently available at the website of 
the Association of Teachers of Technical Writing (ATTW), which reveals rhetoric’s 
central role in a variety of undergraduate technical communication courses offered at 
both the undergraduate and graduate level at numerous U.S. universities.3 In addition, 
many of the most commonly purchased technical writing textbooks explicitly designate 
persuasive rhetoric as a key or even primary context for technical communication.4  
Rhetorical principles used in making persuasive arguments inform the 
instructional guidelines of Freshman Writing Programs (FYPs) across the United States. 
Many of these composition programs had adopted an institutional model of 
administration that conforms generally with guidelines established by the Council of 
Writing Programs Administrators (CWPA), a national organization for composition 
administrators, faculty, and graduate students. Although the CWPA recommends that 
students explore writing for different purposes and audiences across a variety of 
genres, such activities are generally ancillary to the privileged form of the academic 
research paper. This form is rhetorical in that it is widely conceived as an “argument,” 
one that seeks to promote and defend a claim – formerly called a thesis – by appealing 
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to audience using reasonable evidence (logos), thereby establishing the writer’s 
credibility (ethos). This form of “argument” may be conceived as both classical in its 
application of Aristotelian appeals in service of a purpose within an analyzable context 
and neoclassical in its approximation of the scientific method: the “claim” begins as a 
hypothesis; it is researched and then modified into a thesis-as-claim, which is then 
defended empirically by evidence that seeks to establish its validity.5 In the current 
paradigm as represented by the CWPA’s national guidelines, rhetoric in undergraduate 
writing programs is generally articulated as persuasive argumentation and the thesis-
driven research paper is its standard bearer for this type of communication. 6  Because 
this form is directed primarily at academic audiences (or else it employs academic 
conventions such as proper citation and documentation styles), students are 
automatically oriented to adopt a deliberative or (perhaps less frequently) judicial 
position rather than take the kind of epideictic stance that was of such great import to 
ancient practitioners of imitatio.7 
 The imperative to persuade and convince audiences that has become a central 
objective of so many composition programs is also at work in Tech Com. This results 
partly from the fact that most undergraduate Tech Com programs provide instruction 
to students who are majoring in non-“technical” fields, including the sciences and 
business or professional majors. It is for this reason that nearly all the Tech Com 
textbooks include chapters on professional correspondence (business letters, memos, 
emails), career documents (resumes, cover letters), business plans and proposals, 
grant writing, and reports. Even core topics like usability are broadly adapted to suit 
the purposes of non-technical majors. These genres are “technical” not because they 
deal with technology but because they deal with specialized discourses related to the 
private and public sectors. Hence, “technical” writing for many undergraduate 
programs means writing for professional purposes outside the academy. Because of the 
competitive nature of the professional and industrial sectors, students must know how 
to communicate persuasively – how to “sell themselves” to potential employers by 
convincing them not only of their qualifications, their professional ethos, but of their 
ability to participate in the “selling” of products, proposals, legislation, and so on. 
This orientation to industry makes persuasive rhetoric a particularly useful pedagogy. 
Where student writing in composition classes tends to be shaped by a privileging of the 
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academic argument, in Tech Com their writing is often shaped by a pedagogy that 
privileges the reified formats associated with the professional sectors. 
I believe that the current emphasis on persuasion and argumentation in Rhet-
Comp and Tech Com serves to instrumentalize rhetoric by emphasizing outcomes that 
take the shape of forms – thesis-driven evidence-supported academic arguments, 
hierarchically structured technical reports, compelling grant proposals. These forms, 
like the eidos of Platonic metaphysics, contribute to the privileging of conceptual 
knowledge in the college classroom. While it is certainly necessary for students to 
learn how to use these forms so that they can successfully work within the structures 
of the professional environments they pay universities to help prepare them for, the 
curricular reification of forms in a sense metaphysicalizes them; they become ideal 
formats that are then applied across genres, hylomorphically imposed on the matter 
that is writing and creating a static cookie-cutter approach to communication that 
standardizes iconic representation and stifles innovative expression. Presentation 
software programs like PowerPoint, for example, can be employed in remarkably 
effective ways, but most people mimic the templated approach (text lists, bullet-
points, occasional pictures) that has become the norm and which even some textbooks 
even provide examples of.8 As discussed in Chapter 3, even in its formalized rhetorical 
instantiation as imitatio, mimesis eschews rote mimicry. As Seneca proclaimed, a 
rhetor must resemble another as a child resembles a parent, not as a picture 
resembles its original (cited in Potolsky, 57-58).  
I believe that students should be encouraged to think of forms and templates 
as helpful suggestions on how to structure a visual presentation. Because they are 
familiar, they serve as what Merleau-Ponty calls style that we tap into “in an imitative 
way” that helps guide us toward an original expression of meaning. The key, then, is 
to get students to think “outside the box,” to tune into their experiential knowledge 
of all things related to, say, PowerPoint (presentations they have seen where it 
“worked,” “made a difference,” “hit home the point,” as well as those where it was 
an obstacle to communication or just plain boring) as a way of moving beyond the 
conceptual structures (visual and textual hierarchies of information) built into the 
program’s templates. It is not the templates we should imitate, it is the style of 
presentations-using-PowerPoint we know from experiences that we pick up on, again, 
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“in an imitative way,” repurposing those templates so audiences will sense the 
familiar in our visual presentation but also be engaged by the innovative manner in 
which they are employed. 
Later in this chapter I will reveal the theoretical parallels between the mimetic 
tradition and the currently popular pedagogy in multimodal pedagogy of repurposing 
through remediation and remix. But here I want to stress the importance of balancing 
material rhetorical approaches to learning with the conventionally persuasive ones 
that emphasize strategies for developing arguments. A material rhetorical model 
insists on the central role of the body in developing and refining our skills in learning, 
thinking, producing, and living. This is not an alien idea that we must think hard about 
in order to conceptualize. It is the kind of learning we engage in all the time but have 
taken for granted. In his 2011 book Being Alive, anthropologist Tim Ingold devotes a 
whole chapter to the significance that arises from the seemingly simple act of sawing 
through a plank of wood. He breaks down that significance into three “themes”: the 
processional quality of tool use, the synergy of practitioner, tool, and material, and 
the coupling of perception and action (53). The sum of these themes is implicit in the 
action of sawing itself, which has the effect of bringing “together the resistances of 
materials, bodily gestures, and the flows of sensory experience, rhythmically 
coupl[ing] action and perception along the paths of movement” (16). 9 This movement 
reveals how cognition is essentially distributed in that the 
entangled currents of thoughts that we might call “mind” are no more confined 
within the skull than are the flows of materials comprising corporeal life 
confined in what we call the body. Both spill out into the world. (16) 
Consequently, the carpenter “who has a feel for what he is doing” is not separate 
from but situated in “a context that includes the trestle, the wood, and all the other 
paraphernalia of the workshop” (60, 58). “Mind,” then, emerges as a kind of network 
with the body serving as a medium. This physical activity that the body engages is 
experiential knowledge work and as long as our living bodies move through the worlds 
we inhabit we are always producing, developing, and refining this knowledge. 
As noted earlier, Merleau-Ponty calls our direct enmeshment in corporeal life  
intercorporeity. Through the perceptual interface of our body schema with our 
immediate situation “intentional threads” link our muscles and nerves with the tools 
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and other objects with which we interact (PP 121). The medium that is one’s “vehicle 
of being in the world,” the real phenomenal body is so “interinvolved” with a definite 
environment that “to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually 
committed to them” (94) is something we do automatically. Lakoff and Johnson tell us 
that conscious thought is just the “tip of an enormous iceberg” that floats on the 
ocean of what they term the cognitive unconscious: “It is a rule of thumb among 
cognitive scientists,” they assert, “that unconscious thought is 95 percent of all 
thought – and that may be a serious underestimate” (13). It follows, then, that most of 
our knowledge is acquired unconsciously, and that conceptual knowledge – especially 
formalized conceptual knowledge of the kind we are supposed to learn in classrooms – 
is the frosting the cake. As vital as this thin outer layer is, we cannot ignore the 
knowledge work we acquire through body-engaged (or what is more popularly known 
as hands-on) experience. Although much of it is unconscious, it is still knowledge work 
and any institution that is committed to enhancing knowledge in people – including 
university programs in writing and communication – needs to create conditions in order 
to maximize such work.  
Even if it is true, as Lakoff and Johnson tell us, that these “other” complex 
forms of thought may not be accessible to conscious awareness and control (11), an 
understanding of cognition that extends beyond the conscious mechanisms of the brain 
and the purposeful actions of the mind needs to be made front and center whenever 
administrators and instructors set about establishing a meaningful curriculum. In doing 
so, we need to move beyond finite sets of product-based learning outcomes by 
attending not to what should be learned in our classrooms but how we learn, and how 
this learning situates us in institutional, cultural, environmental, and ethical contexts. 
This is why familiarity with the conceptual dimensions of mimesis that were known to 
the ancients can be of such import to current rhetorical theory. “If pedagogy is to 
accomplish a categorical integration of the individual and the world,” Gebauer and 
Wulf tell us, “it must make sufficient room for the operation of mimetic abilities, 
which has the added benefit of avoiding desensualization and abstraction” (319).  In 
other words, we need to descend from the high plane of conceptualism and root 
ourselves, first and foremost, in the material world that metaphysics has sought for so 
long to transcend but which our inherent mimetic abilities refuse to let go of. The 
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“sufficient room” Gebauer and Wulf call for, I believe, needs to take into account 
what Merleau-Ponty has called bodily space. The Greeks called this bodily space hexis, 
and it was indistinguishable from the habits and practices we perform with our bodies. 
When a man is doing something he is learning, Parmenides asserted, “the constitution 
of his limbs [hexis] is that very thing which thinks” (qtd. in Hawhee, 58). In a similar 
vein, M.A. Wright interprets a paraphrase of Empedocles by Aristotle in this way: 
“when men change their hexis they change their thinking” (qtd 58).10 Bodily space is a 
fundamental site of cognition and an integral element of any learning environment. 
Students in our writing and communication classes – as in all classes in all disciplines – 
need to understand the vital role their experiential knowledge plays in everything they 
do. I believe that such an understanding will help them not only to become better 
thinkers but more attuned beings – attuned not only to the work they do but to the 
situations in which that work is done.  
In Chapter 3 I matched up my phenomenological take on mimesis with material 
rhetoric as a means of reintegrating the body, and along with it experiential 
knowledge, back into rhetorical philosophy. In Chapter 4, I presented a mimetic theory 
of multimodality (and multimedia) that includes the body as a medium in the 
construction of knowledge. In this chapter I will consider how this all plays out 
pedagogically. I will begin by considering play – playing with, tinkering, fiddling with – 
as an essential form of praxis that our programs in Rhet-Comp and Technical 
Communication needs to take seriously. I will make the case for a complete 
materialist overhaul of what we call information and, relatedly, data, arguing for a 
more data-driven as opposed to hypothesis-driven approach to research – research, 
that is, which is inventive and not simply a task students take on in order to write a 
“research paper.” Drawing on the links I have made previously between multimodality 
and mimesis, I will then offer a way of expanding how we currently address writing in 
our classes in such a way that it is intimately connected to the related modalities of 
speaking, reading, listening, and writing called OVAL (an acronym for oracy, visuacy, 
auracy, and literacy). I will then consider how in multimodal composing the concepts 
of remix and remediation are, in addition to being contemporary instantiations of 
classical invention practices associated with mimesis and imitation, pushing 
composition and technical communication to adopt a more “real-world” approach to 
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learning and communication that begins not with forms and formats but with our 
bodily engagement with the material we later seek to formally structure for certain 
communications. I will conclude this dissertation by arguing that we need to rethink 
rhetoric beyond persuasion, and specifically the model of persuasive argumentation 
that informs – and, in my view, impoverishes – so many undergraduate composition 
programs. Drawing again on mimesis and multimodality as I conceive them 
phenomenologically, I argue that we balance the more traditional transmission-based, 
claim-anchored, symbol-oriented rhetoric of persuasion with a more reflexive, data-
driven, affective rhetoric of influence. 
 
“Tinkering” and “Fiddling”: Enhancing the Bodily Space of Learning through 
Play 
Aristotle believed that our life’s long process of education begins with mimesis. He 
writes in his Poetics that “imitation [to mimesithai] and the joy derived from it are 
natural to human beings since childhood” (1448b2);11 poetry, music, and other arts, he 
continues, gradually developed from humans’ “natural instinct for imitation and for 
tune and rhythm” (1448b7). Ekaterina V. Haskins observes how the first stage of 
learning described in this passage – “our spontaneous identification with and mimicry 
of sights and sounds” that Aristotle links to joy [to chairein]  – emerges not through 
contemplation but through play (27). For humans as well as for many animals, bodily 
miming has for long been a form of play – charades, for example. But as Johan 
Huizinga and many other scholars have argued, play is about much more than simply 
having fun or “clowning around.”12 In proffering a mimetic framework of cognitive and 
practical activity as a specific form of “praxis” through which “the world comes to be 
through our enactment” (37), the theological ethicist William Schweiker draws on 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s interpretation of mimesis (see Chapter 4) as spiel – “play” – 
through which, in Schweiker’s words, “the emergent power (physis) of reality or 
nature presents itself” (25). For Gadamer, all that constitutes the world, phusis,13 is 
essentially mimetic, hence always in a state of “performative enactment that includes 
us, and hence is always already structured figuratively, at once ideal and real, 
intelligible and phenomenal” (26, emphasis in the original).14 Where Aristotle tended 
to see mimetic play as a starting point the lifelong learning process whose ultimate 
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telos would be conscious learning and inferential thinking (Haskins, 27),15 Schweiker, 
following Gadamer and other thinkers, takes a long-term view of mimesis “not as 
iconic copying but as the praxis of figuration . . . . through which we participate in a 
meaningful world” (24).16 We are, through the playful art of practice, constantly 
engaged mimetically with our world. 
 Translated into pedagogy, mimesis as figurative praxis, as play, asserts that 
learning is primarily experiential. Similarly, Marilyn Cooper, in words that echo 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of mimesis as a correspondence between perception and 
motility that generates an organized action, describes learning as essentially “a 
matter of gradual attunement of movement and perception that comes dominantly 
through practice, a lot of playing around with stuff” – stuff being pieces of wire or 
grass, string, words, cell phones, computer programs – “in any kind of production or 
invention” (“Being Linked,” 28, 24). By equating the term practice with play, as 
Gadamer and Schweicker do, Cooper also touches on the mimetic dimension at play 
here. While in one strict sense of the word, practice is a term associated with the 
development of skills through mimetic repetition, as in “practice makes perfect,” in 
other senses practice signifies situations in which the body becomes materially 
engaged in activities that generate knowledge. Traditional education has made much 
of the former formulation of mimesis. The emergence in recent years of experiential 
learning paradigms makes the time right to explore how knowledge work is conducted 
in terms of the latter. 
Two separate studies by scholars in the fields of technical communication and 
engineering studies help to point us in this direction. The technical communication 
scholar Dorothy Winsor reveals how body-engaged practice is vital to the knowledge 
work of six engineering students whose internships at an engineering center for a large 
manufacturer of agricultural equipment she followed from 1999 to 2002. Winsor found 
that a primary mode of learning for these interns resulted from “their hands-on 
contact with the organization’s objects, and their playing around with the tools 
available to them” (26). The formalized training sessions the interns received that 
were “very similar to school class work,” while valuable in that “they conveyed a large 
amount of information in a compressed amount of time,” were not their primary 
access point to what she describes as the “distributed cognition operating at Agricorp” 
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(12).17 Rather, the interns’ knowledge developed through a “kind of learn as I go” 
manner, by “fiddling with” the software programs and other aspects of their company 
they were learning about. She likens the interns’ use of the phase “fiddling with” to 
the engineering ethnographer Gary Lee Downey’s similar study at an engineering firm 
where student interns described their learning of CAD systems as “playing with” the 
programs. Downey speculated that the word play suggested building familiarity with a 
program or machine in a way that differed from what we normally think of learning in 
school. “This kind of learning,” Winsor tells us, having observed it as well in her own 
case study, “involved experiencing the machine rather than understanding it 
abstractly as the way to gain knowledge” (16). In other words, the most meaningful 
knowledge-work was experientially acquired by the intern’s material engagement with 
things, not the abstract information conceptually transmitted through formal training 
and school work. The “meaning” of things – the tools, objects, people, company, 
professional field - was generated mimetically through body-engaged interaction with 
the material that constituted their work. 
Huizinga believes that the most essential qualities of play emerge from our 
“faculty of repetition,” which helps to structure play in such a way that “the elements 
of repetition and alternation (as in the refrain) are like the warp and woof of a fabric” 
(10). As noted previously, it was this faculty that the ancient Greek teachers of 
rhetoric and wrestling sought to cultivate with their mimetic pedagogy.18 It is perhaps 
this faculty that allows for the “almost imitative way” Merleau-Ponty says we naturally 
adopt when acquiring new knowledge and habits through a “rearrangement and 
renewal” of our body schemas (PhP 382, 166). Even the simple act of reading a text is 
fundamentally embodied, he tells us, in that “patterns are formed as I look, and these 
are endowed with a typical or familiar physiognomy” (167) – a kind of intercorporeal 
attunement, I might add, not unlike that which allows a newborn to imitate her 
mother’s smile.  In the repetition of this act of looking at a text while reading, our 
body schemas tap into a “style” to which it has been attuned previously. This style 
threads its way across different perceptual modalities. “When I sit at my typewriter,” 
he continues, “a motor space opens up beneath my hands, in which I am about to 
‘play’ what I have read” (167). The “modulation” from the mode of visible space (“the 
reading of the word”) to that of manual space (“the performance of the movement”) 
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enabled by the body schema is a naturally occurring operation, according to Gallese 
and Lakoff, of our multimodal sensory-motor system. 
The repetitive structure of play seems, then, to facilitate knowledge work. 
That Merleau-Ponty uses the verb “play” in describing the typist’s modulation from 
reading to writing suggests this. Play is quite literally what the subject of his next 
example – the experienced organ player – does when he settles into the space of an 
instrument whose dimensions have been incorporated into his bodily space through 
habituation (PhP 167-8). It is that “performance of movement” we all engage in when 
we “think” through the knowledge we have acquired experientially. Merleau-Ponty 
gives to this practical, experiential knowledge a name: praktognosia (162). It is bodily 
knowledge that allows for imitation, the “knowledge in the hands” that allows the 
typist to “know” where the keys of a keyboard are as he knows where his own limbs 
are, “a knowledge bred of familiarity” (162). Without having to make use of any 
symbolic or objective functions, this type of practical, experiential, ultimately 
mimetic knowledge should be “recognized as original and perhaps as primary” (162).  
 For centuries, body-engaged experiential knowledge has been marginalized by 
the privileging of conceptual knowledge in Western education. But now that paradigm 
is shifting. I contend that multimodality is one site where this educational shift is 
occurring. Consider, for instance, the Situated Multimedia Arts Learning Lab (SMALLab) 
that was founded in 2010 at Arizona State University’s School of Arts, Media, and 
Engineering (and which has since branched off as its own company). In this mixed-
reality “student-centered learning environment,” students collaborate and interact 
with sonic and visual media through vocalization and full-body 3D movements in an 
open physical space. SMALLab aims to “cultivate the students’ sense of ownership and 
play in the learning environment” (Birchfield, et al, 2). Created by an interdisciplinary 
team of researchers in education and human-computer interaction, SMALLab is an 
attempt to advance theories of embodied cognition19 in schools and other learning 
institutions such as museums.20 Because cognition is “grounded in the sensorimotor 
system,” SMALLab’s high-tech mixed-reality learning environments encourage students 
“to physically explore concepts and systems by moving within and acting upon an 
environment” (2). Multimodality is the term the authors employ to describe the 
“bodily kinesthetic modes of representation and expression” that are put into play in 
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the multimedia environments afforded by SMALLab (3). I would like to point out the 
difficulty in distinguishing between modes and media in their definition of 
multimodality: 
By multimodality we mean interactions and knowledge representations that 
encompass students’ full sensory and expressive capabilities including visual, 
sonic, haptic, and kinesthetic/proprioceptive. Multimodality includes both 
student activities in SMALLab and the knowledge representations it enables. (3) 
In the context of SMALLab environments, cognition is generated through multiple 
modes of perception and distributed across media that include the bodies of students 
and their sensorimotor systems.  
The knowledge work students produce is called by the authors – appropriately, 
in my view – composition. In this scenario, composition is not limited to writing 
academic essays; instead, it refers to how students “compose new interaction 
scenarios in service of learning” though human-computer interaction tools21 and 
experiences” (4). Embedding physical interaction into objects for composition – which 
has a rich history in Human-Computer Interaction research and application – 
specifically helps to advance what the authors call embodied multimodal composition 
by encouraging “composition, learning, and play” (5). Defining play as “the capacity to 
experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of problem-solving,”22 the 
multimodal/multimedia learning space of SMALLab products affords students the 
opportunity to learn through a kind of unstructured “tinkerability.” One such example 
is a “layer cake” used to teach geologic time. This game divides a classroom of 
approximately 25 students into four or five teams that together compose a layer-cake 
structure. The game can be structured in at least two ways: as completely open 
ended, as an “exploratory compositional process,” or in a more goal-directed manner 
in which students collaborative reconstruct a layer-cake structure in reference to a 
“script” of geologic layers. In response to sonic and imagistic representations of 
certain geologic conditions, students use interactive devices to grab virtual rocks, 
fossils, etc., and place them in sedimentary layers projected on the floor of the 
SMALLab environment. 23 Play is structured by the interaction network but is open-
ended as well, since the play activity can take different forms according to the 
metarules set by the instructor (12).  
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 SMALLab recognizes the importance of integrating experiential knowledge into 
educational frameworks. Even though it has long been hypothesized that “bodily 
kinesthetic modes of representation and expression are an important dimension of 
learning,” the authors correctly note how these modes have been “severely 
underutilized in traditional education” (3). What makes SMALLab worthy of our 
attention is how it seeks to balance conceptual knowledge with experiential 
knowledge work. This is evident in, for one example, an interactive tool it developed 
to teach students about centripetal force. Operating the device allows “students to 
experience centripetal force kinesthetically” while providing the opportunity “to 
instruct and to reify the concept that objects released from centripetal force travel in 
a tangent at the point of release” (italics mine).24 In the following sections I will offer 
a model that attempts to integrate experiential learning and knowledge into the 
teaching of composition and technical communication, balancing it with standard 
conceptual approaches that privilege persuasive argumentation and formats. Doing so 
requires broadening how we use and think about concepts such as information, data, 
research, and ultimately – and most importantly – writing, reading, speaking, and 
listening. 
 
Body-Engaged Data-Driven Research: The Materiality of Information 
In their article about SMALLab, the authors at one point use the word “information” in 
a way that I would like to flesh out and build on in this section. Because cognition is 
embodied and hence “grounded in the sensorimotor system,” they write, perception 
and action are not “separate and sequential stages in human interaction with the 
physical world [but] occur simultaneously and are closely entwined” (2). Therefore we 
need to interrogate the conventional understanding of information of Western 
education: 
 Traditional didactic approaches to teaching strongly favor the transmission of 
conceptual structures [information coded as symbols, words, equations], and 
there is evidence that many students struggle with the process of translating 
these into spatial representations. By contrast, information gleaned from the 




The “above” here refers to their previous paragraph’s description of multimodality, 
which includes both student activities and the knowledge representations they enable 
– doing and thinking combined into an integrated function. The significance that 
emerges when students in SMALLab materially “interact with computation using 
innovative multimodal interfaces such as 3D physical movements, visual programming 
interfaces, and audio capture technologies” is what these authors call information (3). 
In conceptual knowledge frameworks, information is comprised of facts and 
details about a subject that is transmitted from a sender to a receiver. The Wikipedia 
page on information, for example, currently describes information as “the content of 
a message . . . [that] can be encoded into various forms for transmission and 
interpretation. For example, information may be encoded into signs, and transmitted 
via signals.” The Latin informationem (nominative informatio) means “outline, 
concept, idea” and in Old French (informacion, enformacion) was associated with the 
act of advising or instructing.25 Geoffrey Nunberg describes this conceptual account of 
information as “a kind of abstract stuff present in the world, disconnected from the 
situations that it is about” (111). It is against this conventional understanding of 
information as abstract and “disembodied” that Phillip Thurtle and Robert Mitchell pit 
their 2004 book Data Made Flesh. This collection of fourteen essays are meant to serve 
as a theoretical foundation for what the authors call “materialist information studies.” 
Information, the editors argue, is fundamentally embodied, and each essay “focuses 
on those moments when information and flesh coconsitute one another” (2). Drawing 
from an account that first emerged in the 1950s at the Macy Conferences that 
foregrounds the “inherently contextual nature of information,” Thurtle and Mitchell 
promote information “not as the coded ‘content’ of messages, but rather, as 
something that enables, and emerges through, communicative acts” (9).26 Because 
communication occurs across an array of bodies – human, technical, cultural, 
environmental – information cannot be extracted from the embodied contexts in which 
it is enacted.  
The composition theorist Kristie S. Fleckenstein offers a similar account of 
information. The model that conceives information abstractly conforms with the 
Cartesian model that separates mind from body. But a model that posits “mind” as 
somatic – “a permeable materiality in which mind and body resolve into a single entity 
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which is (re)formed by the constantly shifting boundaries of discursive and corporeal 
materialities”(286)  – grounds information in the cognate body that is itself grounded 
in a material situation.  Fleckenstein eschews the transmission model of 
sender/receiver of coded messages by comparing information to the mixing that goes 
on in a cell in which DNA, RNA, ribosome, proteins, and other material processes serve 
variously as sign, object, and interpretant: “Information does not exist in the gene or 
in the environment, but is constructed in the developmental context” (288). Writing 
somatically is her alternative to “the kind of disembodied writing privileged by the 
academy” whose insistence on maintaining “rigid boundaries” between genres, theory 
and practice, and other dichotomies “permeat[e] research methodology” (299, 303).  
In this section, I contend that the form of the standard research paper that we 
are all taught in writing classes from middle school onward, and which serves as the 
basic structural model of this dissertation, contributes to a transmission view of 
communication by conceptualizing information as abstract symbolism. I contend as 
well that the privileging of this form and the manner in which it is taught is due to its 
approximation of the so-called scientific method. This hypothesis-driven method for 
making empirically-based arguments has for long been the ideal model for all 
academic writing, and this is the manner in which it is taught to undergraduates. After 
students become generally acquainted with a topic, they are asked to develop a 
hypothesis – more commonly called a “claim” in Rhet-Comp and Technical 
Communication – which they then seek to prove by accumulating data as evidence in 
support of that claim. With the hypothesis guiding the inquiry, data are then collected 
and composed into sets that either prove or disprove the hypothesized theory that 
allows for the establishment of the thesis, a kind of “Truth” whose successful 
transmission to audiences – frequently the grading teacher with a background in 
rhetoric – substantiates the argument and establishes the ethos of the arguer. This 
argument-based, hypothesis-driven format greatly informs not only the kind of 
academic writing emphasized in many freshman composition courses but also in 
undergraduate technical communication courses.27  
While it is unlikely that the standard argumentative research paper is going to 
go away any time soon, we can still broaden the genre in such a way that student 
writers can engage in more experiential knowledge work. I believe one way to do this 
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is to adopt a modified version of the kind of data-driven methodology many 
researchers in the sciences have turned to in recent years. According to K. Eric 
Drexler, a pioneering figure in molecular nanotechnology, scientists in a number of 
fields are now rethinking the standard scientific method. He attributes the first 
“break” with the prevailing view that “research must always be conducted as a 
hypothesis driven enterprise”28 to lessons learned by scientists working on the Human 
Genome Project in the 1980s. The methodology employed by these scientists was 
primarily data-driven approach. Data-driven methodology becomes “practical when 
experimental methods can amass enormous amounts of data, enough data to test more 
hypotheses than any mortal scientist could conceivably imagine.”29 Driven by powerful 
new data technologies – also known as Big Data – and new computational methods, 
scientists are increasingly advocating that “we collect data first, then see what it tells 
us.” This is the opposite of the hypothesis-driven approach, according to which 
researchers “try to guess the truth, and only afterward collect experimental data to 
test whether the guess predicts the results.” He explains: 
The basic idea is that if we can collect enough data to form a large, rich 
picture — as in modern genomics, but not in old-style gene-by-gene 
investigation — then we are likely to learn something by looking at it. . . . But 
what does it mean to ‘look at it’? For these methods to work, we must know 
enough about patterns (repetition, correlation, difference, functional 
correspondence…) that we can recognize some of them and separate the real 
patterns from the statistical illusions. 
Drexler recognizes that the recognition of patterns can be seen as a hypothesis, but it 
is a “humble” one that carries with it “no pretense of vast insight.”  
If we divorce Drexler’s description from the software technologies with which 
data-driven research is currently associated, we see that this kind of research is not 
new. In fact, I would argue that is precisely this method that – albeit belatedly -- 
earned the renowned cytologist Barbara McClintock the Nobel Prize in Physiology and 
Medicine in 1983 for work she had done decades earlier on maize that led to her 
discovery of genetic transposition. It has been well-documented that McClintock’s 
belated recognition stemmed in part from attitudes toward women that permeated 
the male-dominated scientific world of the 1940s and 1950s. But gender was not the 
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only thing McClintock had to contend with.  In a 1973 letter to the British geneticist 
J.R.S. Fincham, McClintock claimed to have stopped publishing detailed reports of her 
findings when she realized the extensive “lack of confidence in the conclusions I was 
drawing from the studies" on the controlling elements in maize and their unique 
operations. In another letter that same year to maize geneticist Oliver Nelson she 
described how difficult it was “to bring to consciousness of another person the nature 
of his tacit assumptions” that had calcified into such a “fixity” about these elements 
that all she could do was “await the right time for a conceptual change.”30  
The conceptual change she refers to here seems to refer to a scientific 
paradigm. It suggests that McClintock’s largely data-driven approach – her search for 
emergent patterns – did not fit the scientific community’s commitment to hypothesis-
driven methodologies. Not only did her emerging methodology depart from the 
dominant paradigm, how she conceptualized data seems remarkably similar to recent 
revisions of information as described above. According to her biographer Helen Fox 
Keller, McClintock described the human mind as always “processing and integrating 
data far more complex than we can possibly be conscious of” (102). As the data 
McClintock accumulated during her six years of research on corn became so “complex 
and confusing” she left much of it to be processed subconsciously as she immersed 
herself further and further into the material context of her corn plants. Although 
McClintock did indeed establish identifiable data sets that she presented formally 
along with her findings, these emerged from a much larger flow of information – what 
today might be called Big Data – that she could not possibly subject to analysis. But 
these large data flows were cognitively processed nonetheless, resulting in what she 
famously described as a “feel for the organism” – her code word for a “living form, an 
object-as-subject” (126, 199).31 While she consciously focused on the fine stripes of 
recessive tissue of a segment of corn material, Keller tells us, “a prodigious amount of 
cognitive processing intervened between the spots of pigment she could actually see 
on the corn plant and the controlling elements she eventually came to write about” 
(126). As a result, the annual reports she wrote for the Carnegie Institute of 
Washington reveal “the unfolding of her theory as a hierarchy of hypotheses, each 
more abstract and further removed from the objects of perception than the one 
before, yet, in concert, providing an internal logic so compelling as to give anyone 
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who grasps that logic the sense of being able to ‘see’ the abstractions themselves” 
(126). In other words, McClintock’s method of recognizing patterns as they emerged 
from vast amounts of data exemplifies Drexel’s claim above that data-driven research 
produced “humble hypotheses” with no pretenses of vast insight.32 In this sense, 
McClintock was indeed ahead of her time when it came to anticipating the current 
paradigm shift in scientific method. 
I think McClintock’s story might serve as model for how we address research in 
our composition and communication courses. Research should be, first and foremost, 
learning. In rhetoric, this is invention; the objective of persuasive argumentation, if it 
is to play a role, comes much later. Research that is conducted with the aim or 
proving or disproving a proposition may be a helpful heuristic in some circumstances, 
but we need to recognize how such an approach narrows the learning process. As I will 
discuss in the next section, students have been taught to read texts for conceptual 
information – ideas, arguments, facts – and to think of data in purely objective 
contexts. So narrow is their focus that they lose their attunement to the larger flow of 
information that gave McClintock not just conscious knowledge of the organism but a 
material feel for it – the data she encountered and processed were not abstractions 
but materially constituted.33 We need to ground research first in the material world 
our students inhabit and in doing so demythologize the concept so many students have 
of “research.” For many, this loaded term is associated with papers they had to write 
in high school classes on subjects they didn’t care about. Writing “research papers” is 
part of the grind they must endure, another hoop to jump through in their educational 
experience. It is the result of a laborious attempt to find “sources” – facts, statistics, 
quotable things, “data,” – that they can cite in their papers in support of their 
argumentative claim, which of course enhances their chances of getting an A in their 
English class. They hate writing them just as much as teachers hate reading them. We 
need to think strenuously about transforming our curriculums so that students can 
actually learn about the subjects they study rather than perfunctorily constructing 
claim-driven “arguments” about them. 
I contend that part of our job as instructors of writing and communication is to 
inspire students to think differently about the meanings of concepts like information, 
data, and research. We need to remind them how for thousands of years before there 
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were libraries, before even there were cave paintings, human beings learned how to 
survive and set the building blocks of civilization by assessing and evaluating the 
“sources” at their disposable: which plants could be mixed with others to produce a 
certain medicine, which clay powders when mixed with so much water produced the 
best earthenware, which animals had certain vulnerabilities in certain situations, and 
so forth.  The indigenous tribes who inhabit the Andaman and Nicobar islands 
collectively survived the massive tsunami from the Indian Ocean earthquake in 2004 
that killed over 230,000 people in fourteen countries because their lives were steeped 
in generations of research – yes, research – which allowed them to read the material 
“data” all around them, including the behavior of animals and birds, and then literally 
“head for the hills” before the tsunami reached their coasts. This attentive 
attunement to the world all humans inhabit is the foundation of research and, hence, 
even of formal scholarship. Research is something we all do on a daily basis and mostly 
unconsciously: we enter a situation, collect information, analyze it, and act 
accordingly. It’s a cognitive disposition in humans. 
The developers of SMALLab recognize this. And while their innovative products 
offer fun and innovative ways of teaching students complex concepts by situating them 
in technically enhanced ambient environments, there are also the ambient learning 
environments that come to us all free-of-charge: the “real world.” I would like to 
conclude this section by considering a multimodal, data-driven research project that I 
feel nicely demonstrates how experiential knowledge work is conducted by students in 
the material settings of this everyday world whose ambience emerges as they engage 
with the information they acquire for their final papers and presentations. 
Karen E. Moynihan, an English teacher at Central Catholic High School in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, had her students create a multimodal project that was 
initially inspired by her reading of Susan Orlean’s book The Orchid Thief. To write her 
book, Orleans “immersed herself in orchid culture,” hanging out with botanists, orchid 
lovers, historians, flower store owners and conducting standard research in multiple 
genres. Moynihan asked her students to do what Orleans did. Students would choose a 
collectible and do “real-life research” by immersing themselves “in a subculture and 
examin[ing] it from multiple vantage points,” including the perspective gained through 
being - by becoming - the collector (69). The students came in with a variety of 
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objects—Depression glass, pipe sets, vinyl records, comic books, Barbies (70). After 
doing some traditional research on these items, they began to immerse themselves in 
the actual cultures - museums, yard sales, flea markets, specialty shops, talking with 
people and observing the activities that happened there (71). At the end, they 
produced a multimodal project that included the Big Three: writing (a creative 
nonfiction account of their experiences, including incorporation of research), visuals 
(images and graphic representations like pie charts and column graphs), and audio-
visual representations (including videos) (73-5). The collectibles project was a great 
success. Moynihan describes students as “animated” when they presented or talked 
about their projects. “I’m glad I did these ridiculously uncomfortable things,” one of 
them said. “I had never been pushed outside of my comfort zone,” said another; “I 
actually [got] out there and engulf[ed] myself in the world of trains”; “it was so 
different from anything I had ever done in school” (75). 
What Moynihan describes in her article is not just how a multimodal 
composition came to be; she describes bodies being affected by bodies, both human 
and non-human, in multiple ways, always effecting a transformation—a becoming of 
something new. One student attended a comic book convention. In doing so, this 
student became immersed in a collective, a complex ecology in which humans 
interacted with nonhumans and the meanings that became central to her observations 
were generated in various fields of interaction. She describes people “with lists,” 
flipping through “boxes,” haggling over “prices,” faces that were “disappointed,” 
“overzealous,” “excited,” all articulating around a central communicative mode: a 
comic (72).34  The observer, enmeshed in this ecology of multiple modalities, reports 
not only of being “very interested” in what she encountered but being affected: “I 
couldn’t believe I hadn’t found this special club of collectors sooner.” Another student 
reports on a Saturday afternoon she spent with her grandmother, a collector of 
Depression glass. Since “most of her collection was packed away,” the afternoon was 
“spent unpacking the glass and setting it up for a photo session.” The things which 
allow for their storage - boxes, wrapping paper - are not focused on by Moynihan, yet 
the role they play is none the less revealed in her narrative of this girl’s experience: 
“With each piece they unwrapped, the granddaughter heard another piece of family 
history or the story of where and when her grandmother had acquired the piece” (72). 
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The granddaughter reported that “more importantly” than writing the research paper 
was the “bonding time” she got to spend with her grandmother. The girl’s ensuing 
visual, written, and aural multimodal project emerged out of this complex multimodal 
ecology. 
Moynihan describes how another female student added a DVD to a fifteen 
minute PowerPoint presentation she gave on her father’s pipe collection. It showed 
images of the pipe “as well as an explanation of how to load a pipe with tobacco, 
tamp it down, light the pipe, and puff.” This may seem an innocuous representation, 
but there is more: the actions required to prepare a pipe for smoking have been 
performed predominantly by men in a culture in which certain practices, and hence 
the objects associated with them, were segregated by gender. Unable to find a woman 
pipe smoker to interview, the girl asked her father to teach her how to smoke a pipe. 
“There she was on the DVD,” Moynihan tells us, “smoking a pipe” (75).  
Beyond this multimodal project’s aural, oral, written, and visual 
representations, what we have is essentially a drive for data (see Chapter 4). 
Information is discovered but enacted as (female) fingers retrieve loose tobacco from 
a pouch, a pipe’s cavity accommodates the tamping of that substance at a level 
commensurate with its circumference, flame ignites from a match or lighter and 
interacts with the tobacco so that smoke is produced, and hence the act of “smoking a 
pipe” emerges in this intercorporeal schema of multiply interacting modes. In the 
process, the human actor is transformed, becoming more than just a student-doing-
multimodal-project to emerge as a haecceity, as young-woman-smoking-a-pipe.  
Multiple meanings emerge here, all dependent on the material modes (again, what 
Kress and Van Leeuwan call “media”) of a truly multimodal ensemble - one that brings 
into contact or “conversation,” among many other things, the body of a female 
teacher, the body of a female student, and the bodies of female humans in a culture 
where the set of artifacts known as “pipes” were historically segregated by gender 
(and oftentimes age).  
It is not surprising to learn that Moynihan’s initial promise to her students 
(made on the day she introduced this project to them) that “[o]nce you have done all 
the field work, the paper will write itself” (a cue taken from Jeffrey D. Wilhelm’s 
mantra “You Gotta BE the book”), was largely realized. “[S]tudents found that once 
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they started to write,” she tells us, “they couldn’t get the worlds out fast enough” 
(74). That is because, like McClintock, in the process of immersing themselves in the 
world of that which they were researching, they developed not just conceptual 
knowledge but a feel for the objects they studied. It worked. For the writing 
component, Moynihan departed from the traditional research essay and instead asked 
them to write from a first-person perspective in the form of creative nonfiction, but 
with research “embedded” (74). As a result, students had a better feel for the writing 
itself since it, like their research, was not a separated out as a stage or component 
but was integral to the knowledge-making experience. “I had to write about both my 
research and my personal experience at the same time,” one student wrote. “I had 
never been required to write about both in the same paper; it was always one or the 
other” (74). This integrative approach influenced what some students consider to be 
the hardest part of all: the writing. But as one student reported: “I learned that 
writing is very pliable… I feel like this paper, more than anything else I have ever 
written, has allowed me to grow as a writer” (74). The intrigue of discovery and, yes, 
even play that were components of their research experiences also facilitated their 
writing. “What surprised me about this paper was that I had fun,” said another 
student. “[W]hen  I started writing, trying to create a piece of creative nonfiction 
ended up being an interesting challenge. I was shocked!” (75). 
Although Moynihan does not use the term “data-driven,” her assignment is 
precisely that. The students took a grounded approach to research (as I did with this 
dissertation; see my section on my method in my introduction) in that they did not 
enter their project with any preconceptions or hypotheses. They simply immersed 
themselves in a series of situations that constituted the “world” of train sets, Barbies, 
pipes, and so on. The significance, the meanings, the theories emerged as they 
materially interacted with the data they encountered. Standard data in the form of 
quantifications and facts were not ignored (in fact, the students had several “library 
days” and produced pie charts, column graphs, and other visualizations for their final 
project); they were simply not privileged over the data and information derived from 
experience. By mimetically “becoming” like the subjects they studied – the pipe-
smoking woman, the comic book collector – a level of identification was reached that 
allowed for students to feel their topics in ways most students never experience when 
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composing standard research-based academic essays. Moynihan’s multimodal project 
illustrates how immersive, body-engaged, experiential learning can support new ways 
of thinking about information, data, and research and literally transform the 
curriculum without jettisoning – in fact, by building on – traditional models of 
production and assessment. This is one high school English class students will look back 
on with appreciation.  
 
The OVAL of Body Engaged Learning: Integrating Modalities  
In the previous chapter, I criticize the New London Group’s ambiguous treatment of 
the term multimodality, which on one hand they describe as central to all meaning-
making activity while, on the other, schematize it into two categories - intertextuality 
and hybridity – thereby limiting the scope of its multiple meaning-making roles. In this 
section I again seek to broaden that scope in order to argue that the mimetic 
interaction between listening, speaking, reading, and writing – an interaction that 
occurs always at the level of our sensory-motor system even if we are engaging in just 
one of these modes35 – strongly encourages undergraduate writing instructors to think 
these four communicative modalities together, as a kind of multimodal ensemble, 
which the privileging of writing in the contemporary academy unfortunately resists. 
We should remember, though, that the current emphasis on writing is a relatively 
recent development. For more than 2,000 years, reading, writing, speaking, and 
listening altogether “were cornerstones of Western rhetorical studies” (Ratcliffe, 
195). But in the 19th century a “new style” of education developed that saw the “study 
and analysis of written texts” begin to replace the “old” classical style that valued 
forensics, oratorical performance, debates, orations, and declamations (Selfe, “The 
Movement of Breath,” 620-1). As a result of this pedagogical shift, by the end of the 
twentieth century “the ideological privileging of writing was so firmly established that 
it had become almost fully naturalized” (627). 
Undergraduate Rhet-Comp and Tech Com curricula are very much entrenched 
in this now old “new style.” Although composition theorists have for long recognized 
the overlap between these four modalities, the fact remains that the vast majority of 
undergraduate composition programs are writing-based. They are collectively called 
“First-Year Writing” (FYW) programs and their directors “Writing Program 
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Administrators” (WPAs). Similarly, many undergraduate Tech Com courses are listed 
and taught as “Technical Writing” even though the discipline calls itself Technical 
Communication. And while textbooks in Rhet-Comp and especially Tech Com devote 
considerable attention to public speaking and graphic design, it is writing that 
receives the most comprehensive and detailed explication. The pedagogical 
framework established by textbooks and programmatic assessment protocols 
structurally marginalizes the intricately related modalities of reading, speaking, and 
listening. Because multimodality insists that facility in communication requires 
literacy in all four modes of communication, it promises to restore a more integrated 
view of language that resonates with both the neurolinguistic theories I have drawn 
on36 and the mimetic pedagogy of ancient Greek gymnasia as described by Hawhee and 
referred to previous chapters. In this section I argue that we need to bring all four of 
these communication modalities front and center in the “writing class.” If it is true 
that our body schemas and sensory-motor systems are inherently mimetic and 
multimodal, then a body-engaged pedagogy that attends to the experience of 
communicating through listening, speaking, reading, and writing seems especially apt 
for this purpose. 
To help me illustrate a mimetic-multimodal pedagogy that both embodies and 
integrates these four modalities. I will refer to this as OVAL, an acronym for the 
combination of oracy, visuacy, auracy, and literacy.37 I like the term OVAL not only 
since it is easy to remember but because its suggestion of circularity and connectivity 
suggests the mimetic interactivity between these four modalities that we know occurs 
neurologically when we engage with language. I begin by turning to the work of the 
late reader-response theorist Louise Rosenblatt, whose ideas on how readers 
“transact” with texts had considerable influence on compositionists in the 1980s.38 
Although Rosenblatt eschewed the term “interaction” in favor of transaction,39 her 
theory supports what I see as an interactive mimetic coupling between text and reader 
that occurs during the event of reading: 
In ecological terms, the text becomes the element of the environment to which 
the individual responds. Or more accurately, each forms an environment for 
the other during the reading event. Sharp demarcation between objective and 
subjective becomes irrelevant, since they are, rather, aspects of the same 
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transaction – the reader looks to the text, and the text is activated by the 
reader. (18) 
Rosenblatt distinguishes between aesthetic reading and efferent reading. Whereas 
efferent reading is concerned primarily with extracting usable information, aesthetic 
reading requires an acute sensitivity to how language operates. In aesthetic reading, 
the concept of transaction “emphasizes the [reader’s] relationship with, and 
continuous awareness of, the text,” including concentration on the words of the text, 
which is “perhaps even more keen than in an efferent reading” (69, emphasis in 
original). While I personally do not care for the terms aesthetic and efferent, I do 
believe that the kind of reading designated by aesthetic takes into account the feel of 
written language. In Rosenblatt’s model, students who read aesthetically become 
especially attuned to language as they read it – and this includes spelling conventions, 
grammatical styles, and punctuation. Such close engagement with language can 
clearly support the acquisition and refinement of their writing skills as well.   
 In my view, reading aesthetically as described by Rosenblatt is reading 
mimetically – that is, reading with our bodies so that we experience the text and our 
specific interactions. Robert Terrill believes that an explicitly mimetic pedagogy 
encourages students to learn how to continuously “toggle switch” between “looking 
through” language and “looking at” language (304).40  Rosenblatt argues that aesthetic 
reading asks students to “inquire more deeply into how the abstracting and 
conceptualizing activities involved in the use of language are related to the stream of 
feeling in which they are embedded” (43). This stream metaphor resonates with 
Keller’s use of flow to describe the emergence of data from cytological world of corn 
plants in which McClintock was so palpably immersed. It also speaks to an account of 
information as bodily experienced in that “the reader’s primary concern is with what 
happens during the actual reading event” in the flood of associations, feelings, 
attitudes, and other extra-textual information that is generated through what 
Rosenblatt appropriately calls an event (25; emphasis in the original). The manner in 
which readers attune themselves to this reading event is multimodal in that, as 
participants in this event, they manage to synthesize all these textual and non-textual 
elements into a meaningful structure by “listening to” while “looking at” both 
themselves and the language of the text (25, 18). Readers’ listening and looking here 
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are more than just conceptual metaphors because through their transactions they 
actually “sense” what the “visual and auditory stimuli” of the text are enacting (21). 
The world that emerges from this reading-cum-listening-cum-looking event “becomes 
part of the experience which we bring to our future encounters in literature and life,” 
creating what Merleau-Ponty calls a style that we will always mimetically attune 
ourselves to when encountering similar events.41 What the brain-damaged Schneider 
was not capable of doing when asked to imitate a salute – to mimetically “slip into the 
phantom” of the virtual that is generated by action in the actual (see Chapter 2) – we 
all do when reading mimetically and aesthetically.  
 Rosenblatt’s conflation of the visual act of reading with the auditory act of 
listening does what our sensory-motor body schemas do all the time as we experience 
the world. Because our educational systems classify reading as a distinct mode that is 
separate from listening, each of which is distinct from the modes of speaking and 
writing, it becomes possible to conceptually hierarchize them. Whereas what I call 
OVAL was once an integrated system for rhetorical invention, now, as Krista Ratcliffe 
points out, reading and writing are the dominant tropes, with speaking placing a 
respectable third and listening running at “a poor, poor fourth” (195). This slighting of 
listening is the result of several cultural trends: the gendering of speaking as 
masculine and of listening as feminine, the historical privileging of sight or 
“ocularcentism,” the foregrounding of “speaking and writing as means of persuading 
audiences,” and the appropriation of Western rhetorical theories to theorize writing 
(198-201). But even though listening has been displaced, claims Ratcliffe, it has not 
been erased (202) and rhetorical invention is one site she offers for its restoration in 
writing classes.42 Cynthia E. Selfe reaches a similar conclusion about this currently 
neglected mode, showing how aurality – a term that blends listening with vocal 
production – “has persisted in English composition classrooms in the midst of a culture 
saturated by the written word” (“Movement,” 618-19; emphasis hers). It exists in the 
metalanguage of writing through metaphors of “voice,” genres such as “oral reports,” 
even dissertation “defenses” (633-4). Selfe proffers an “expanded semiotic theory” 
that attunes students to the “sonic environments” (617) they inhabit primarily by 
attending to the affordances of digital media tools that many students have access to 
these days. Composition must move beyond writing to composing across a variety of 
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media: digital videos and audio podcasting, multimedia social networking sites, blogs 
and online correspondence – students must become aware of how to compose in 
“these new forms of expression” that are now standard features of social and 
professional communication (639). 
 I agree absolutely. But at the same time I feel it is important for students to 
see themselves as integrated in these new forms of expression, to conceive 
technologies as expressive not only of their persuasive purposes and goals but of 
broader intentional forces. That means focusing attention not only on the technologies 
that enable composing in digital media but on the cognitive situatedness of bodies in 
all acts of invention and communication. An OVAL-based pedagogy, then, would put 
the body front and center in its multimodal framework, perhaps by emphasizing the 
synaesthetic overlap between different modalities in language use that I describe in 
the previous chapter. We should recall Gallese and Lakoff’s claim that language “uses 
many modalities linked together – sight, hearing, touch, motor actions, and so on” (2). 
Rosenblatt believes that speaking and listening, like reading and writing, are 
“interrelated aspects of an individual’s transactions with the environment” (185). 
Therefore, to read aesthetically, one must in a sense listen “to the sound and rhythm 
of the words in the inner ear, [pay] attention to the imprints of past encounters with 
these words . . . the chiming of sound, sense, idea, and association,” all of which 
come together to constitute “the complex structure of experience”(26). The writer 
Margaret Drabble tells of how when she is writing she actually hears her own written 
prose: “I hear all my sentences out loud. . . . I hear it in my head to a very marked 
extent” (qtd in John-Steiner, Notebooks, 32). Later when she hears someone reading 
her book aloud, she finds it “odd” in how their voice differs in terms of accent and 
emphasis from her own imagined voice that she hears while writing (33). What this 
tells me is that when Drabble writes, she listens to her prose. Her prose, then, speaks 
to her in a voice that is at once her own but also, as revealed later, different from her 
own (33). This distinction becomes evident when hearing another voice articulating 
her own prose, indicating that Drabble’s hearing of her own prose while writing is also 
a form of reading it – and more, even revising it. 
 I believe that we all engage to some extent synaesthetically with language, 
most certainly when we write. But this dimension is something that rarely if ever is 
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attending to in standard writing classes. Even rarer is the textbook that actually asks 
students to explore this vital dimension of communication that we experience 
constantly but neglect. That is because our textbooks attempt to teach students 
concepts – the formats and formulae, conventions and strategies – rather than attune 
them to the dormant literacies they already possess by virtue of being human beings 
who use language to communicate. The numerous anxieties and frustrations that so 
many students report, like “writer’s block,” often result from an overload of 
disembodied conceptual information that they try to impose hylomorphically on a 
situation that they should instead be asked to dwell in. Writing academic “papers,” 
especially, has been taught to them in largely hylomorphic terms. Not having a feel for 
academic voice, academic style, academic structure, as David Bartholomae has 
famously pointed out, forces them to invent the university in trying to replicate the 
ideal “paper” for their freshman composition class. This is a huge burden to bear, and 
it is one reason why students experience anxiety about writing academic essays, 
developing writer’s block, or end up writing “bullshit” papers which roughly follow the 
standard models they think their instructors want but lack any intellectual 
engagement and editorial attention.  
 The OVAL model offers instructors an alternative way to address writing and 
communication. It broadens the focus beyond abstract concepts like “paragraph 
structure” and “dangling modifiers,” “claims” and “arguments,” “audience” and 
“logos/pathos/ethos,” and other conventions by putting attention on how we 
experience discourse. Because it grounds language in our multimodal sensory-modal 
systems, it encourages students to experience reading as seeing, writing as listening, 
speaking as writing, and sundry other combinations would be an innovative way to 
begin any class in technical communication and composition. Drawing students’ 
attention to their listening skills would support and potentially improve both their 
speaking skills and their reading skills, which in turn might improve their writing 
skills.43  
 
Remix and Remediation as Contemporary Instantiations of Imitatio 
OVAL might also be drawn on to round out theories of remix and remediation that 
have in recent years informed much pedagogical discussion in both composition and 
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technical communication. Is not Drabble’s hearing of her own prose while writing a 
remediation of the print discourse she is in the process of producing in the same way 
that the person who speaks her prose aloud, and which she listens to, is a remediation 
of the produced prose? In this section, I would like to emphasize how the multimodal 
component to remix and remediation is fundamentally mimetic.  
This is not hard to do. Kathleen Blake Yancey notes that remix - “the 
combining of ideas, narratives, sources – is a classical means of invention, even (or 
perhaps especially) for canonical writers” including Shakespeare, Coleridge, and Keats 
(5, “Redesigning,” italics in original). Remix is a slightly more specialized articulation 
of the wider practice of remediation, through which “nearly every medium is 
re/mediated on another medium. . . . [so that] we create the new in the context of 
the old and based on the model of the old” (Yancey, “Postmodernism,” 747).44 As 
discussed at length in Chapter 3, the classical means of invention Yancey calls 
remediation has a name: imitatio, the Latin translation of mimesis. According to 
Matthew Potolsky, as the “skillful imitation of role models and the ability to make 
something new out of old traditions,” imitatio “anticipates what literary theorists 
have called intertextuality, the notion that all cultural products are a tissue of 
narratives and images borrowed from a familiar storehouse” (50, 53-4). Just as the 
Renaissance scholar Erasmus’s renowned Adages sought to provide available designs 
appropriated from classical sources so that the writers of his day might gain “sure 
footing in their own use of classical materials,” so too do present-day sitcoms and 
popular music, hip hop, fashion, and numerous other forms of composing achieve their 
uniqueness in a way that can never be described as “absolute” because of the 
“creative use of existing ideas and conventions” (54). Writing as well about 
Renaissance instantiations of mimesis, Gebauer and Wulf criticize the totalizing 
restriction “to the mere reproduction of existing models” and argue that we need to 
“conceive this process of re-presentation as a process of creative transposition” (90). 
In writers like Erasmus, Montaigne, and Shakespeare, the new work “changes and 
supplements the model, bringing into existence something that did not previously 
exist” (91). In contemporary visual culture, this creative process of remediation can be 
observed – and possibly reaches its culmination45 – in the electronic character of video 
images in which “[i]mages are mixed, come into relations of exchange with other 
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images, and are referred mimetically to still others” in a process that contributes to a 
“fundamental transformation of contemporary image worlds” (320). 
 We cannot ignore the importance of mimesis or its more formal instantiation as 
imitatio to any statement that includes the term transformation. The same goes for 
composing across multimedia. Kalantzis and Cope tell us that designing “is never 
simply a repetition of Available Designs” since every moment of meaning “involves the 
transformation of the available resources of meaning” (22). Composing in any medium, 
according to Kress, is a dynamic process of “transformative engagement in the world, 
transformation constantly of the self and that engagement, transformation of the 
resources for representation outwardly and inwardly” – a learning process Cooper links 
to the comics theorist Scott McCloud’s observation of his young daughter’s learning of 
an arts program by playing with tools not explicitly built into the program: “This 
ability to play with the new tools, to learn them from the inside, is our best hope of 
understanding them” (“Bringing Forth Worlds, 32).46 Jody Shipka, who advocates 
multimodal frameworks for teaching composition, reflects on colleagues’ comments 
about how her classes seemed more “fun” because of their emphasis on creativity. 
While her students’ final products did not resemble familiar or traditional-looking 
texts, this framework still requires them to “conduct research, compose various kinds 
of written texts, and respond both purposefully and appropriately to different kinds of 
rhetorical situations” (Toward A Composition Made Whole, 107). In other words, 
traditional approaches to writing and communication are followed, in a sense 
“copied,” but in a manner that transforms the final compositions into forms or designs 
we might deem original. Indeed, in Robert Terrill’s appropriation of imitatio as a 
“mimetic pedagogy,” students are encouraged to cultivate “habits of mind” that invite 
them to see how they are “enfolded in culture, and in turn understand that culture is 
constantly being remade through the discursive intermingling of past form and present 
circumstances” (312). In writing and composing, students are always already 
repurposing something whose familiarity enables them to transform it into an available 
design for others to repurpose.  
 What can be applied to classrooms can also be applied to the programs that 
help shape what goes on in them. Yancey describes how between 2005 and 2008, the 
graduate program in rhetoric and composition at Florida State University was 
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redeveloped in order to better prepare students for the twentieth-century. The 
framework was informed by the concept of remix. Although she makes it clear that 
this framework did not conform to the “Great Model” approach (“a method designed 
to re-create an exemplary program in a new location, a program perhaps lauded as 
ideal”),47 she and her colleagues recognized that what made the development 
possible, at least in part, “was the set of practices and spaces already in place, 
practices and spaces permitting re-design and remix” (“Redesigning,” 10). Recognizing 
how “across the country, many programs are incorporating digital technologies at least 
optionally,” the redevelopment team – made up of both faculty and graduate students 
– researched existing models and then created their own version by “threading” digital 
technology, multimodality, and “electronic rhetoric” throughout the entire program 
(11, 7).48 While the new, transformed model has “benefitted generally, in a remix 
culture, from programs that came before, both nationally and locally” (7), it has its 
own cutting-edge originality in that the cognitive and practical dimensions of the 
process itself, re-seeing and re-mixing of existing models, have been incorporated into 
the program: “if we value the opportunity to re-see and to remix, we need to build re-
seeing and remixing into the model” (11; emphasis in the original). 
 Yancey elsewhere provides an example of how remixing and reseeing can be 
applied pedagogically. Noting how portfolios of the kind required by most 
undergraduate composition programs are exercises in remediation in that they 
“refashion other media” that are embedded in similar contexts (“Postmodernism,” 
747),49 she looks toward online digital portfolios as a remediation of traditional print 
ones. As opposed to print portfolio that “seems remediated on a book,” has usually 
one reader, the teacher, and is public only “in the small sense: in the classroom” 
(748), the online digital portfolio links to “worlds outside the student’s own purview to 
show multiple and complex relationships,” and has a readership which “is multiple, as 
are the ways of processing the portfolio” (750). Unlike the one-time-deal afforded by 
most print portfolios, digital portfolios can span courses and be a continuous space 
where students compose, creating multiple iterations by “returning to the original, 
carrying forward some prose and reworking it, creating new images, raising new 
questions” (751-2). In this obviously mimetic process, the student actually “composes 
identity between, as it were, electronic drafts” – an important affordance of the 
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dynamic, interactive, ongoing project of maintaining a digital portfolio since 
“[i[dentity is itself a composition” (752, 757). 
 In addition, the digital portfolio lends itself well to what M. Ann Brady and 
Joanna Schreiber call “rhetorical performance portfolios” (343), a pedagogical 
concept that attempts to link directly work done in technical communication 
classrooms to the kinds of professional workplaces most students these days expect 
their university courses should be helping to prepare them for. Where Yancey focuses 
primarily on the representation of identity, Brady and Schreiber advocate portfolio 
development as a way for students to “embody – that is, to fully understand in the 
moment – their professional identities as technical communicators or the multiple 
roles they are capable of playing as they complete their education” (346). In addition 
to performing rhetorical memory work in which students produce “an inventory of past 
events intended as heuristics – as ways to invent content anew” (347), the authors 
advocate that students attend to their work “as affecting and being affected by 
others” (349). This involves participating in an on-going self-assessment that attends 
to “the role of emotion in work [as] a way to help students move from inventories to 
the invention of their professional identities” (349), very much embodying the 
performance that is otherwise represented by their portfolios. Their case study of one 
technical communicator, Brenda, who developed a professional portfolio in the form 
of a self-assessment in her place of employment, reveals how her attention to 
emotional dimensions helped her flesh out “the complexity of her work [that] was 
invisible to others in the organization” (354). While helping her develop an argument 
that rebutted criticism by one manager regarding her communication skills, her 
inventory of the many intricate details of her work, including the “affective nature” of 
much of her work, served as “an opportunity to invent a new organizational 
conception of what successful communication work could be” (355, 354).  
 As these examples illustrate, remix and remediation can help move 
composition and technical communication beyond the static forms and concepts that 
have for long informed writing pedagogy. Of particular import to this dissertation 
remix and remediation contribute to a mimetic model that can guide Rhet-Comp and 
Tech Com into the twenty-first century. Creating publicly-shared digital portfolios 
brings what is learned inside the classroom into the digital public sphere. Conceiving 
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of the portfolio as an embodied performance, a kind of ongoing play, helps students 
understand that identity itself is essentially fluid. As we have learned from imitatio, 
representations of identities are always being transformed, remediated, and remixed 
in order to engage new occasions and audiences. In this way does mimetic 
representation blend reciprocally with mimetic expression across multiple modalities 
and media, from the digital to the cognitive. 
  
Beyond Argument: Toward a Rhetoric of Influence 
I will conclude both this chapter and this dissertation with a consideration of how the 
mimetic-multimodal theory I have developed might be used to broaden the current 
rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many programs in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. As 
stated earlier, that pedagogy very much emphasizes persuasive argumentation, a 
relatively linear transmission-based model in which rhetors are conceived as 
constructing arguments with the objective of persuading audiences to adopt a certain 
perspective or take some kind of action. In the classical model upon which this 
paradigm is based, rhetors draw from their conceptual toolbox a number of 
prefabricated devices - rhetorical appeals, enthymemes, anaphoras and epistrophes – 
to help them achieve the desired telos of the argument: a persuaded audience. 
Textbooks adjust this model to meet the demands of the academy, emphasizing 
formats and methodologies that promote a largely empirical research-based form of 
argumentation of the kind evident in the CWPA’s and ATTW’s modeling material. In 
this section I will argue for broadening this paradigm to include rhetoric conceived 
more generally, and much more experientially, as influence. 
 What I mean by a rhetoric of influence can be illustrated in example I borrow 
from the compositionist Byron Hawk. In his 2004 article “Toward a Post-Techne; or, 
Inventing Pedagogies for Professional Writing,” he draws on Martin Heidegger’s 
revision of techne to distinguish between “doing as action,” which I associate with 
conceptual thinking and rhetorics of persuasion, with “doing as enaction,” which I 
associate with experiential awareness and a rhetoric of influence. “Just being in a 
situation,” he writes, “enacting what the body knows, doing what the body does, 
linking that body up to that context” of the situation is doing as enaction (387). He 
then provides a simple example to illustrate what he means by this: 
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[A]s a new professor I did not come into my department trying to immediately 
change things to the way I thought they should be. Rather, I did my best to 
integrate myself into the institutional and curricular structure. But in doing so, 
that situation is changed. Courses have happened that wouldn’t have happened 
otherwise. Arguments have been made that wouldn’t have been articulated. 
Advising practices have changed. Conversations have changed. The situation is 
becoming something other than (more than?) what it would have been in my 
absence. (387) 
Hawk’s example of what he calls post-techne50 bears significant similarity to what 
Davis calls originary rhetoricity, the “suggestive influence” of an originary 
persuadability which she likens to Lacouthe-Labarthe’s “constitutive mimesis” and 
Borche-Jacobsen’s “mimetico-affective contagion” (24-35, 33). By moving through our 
worlds and interacting with the people who inhabit them, things happen, arguments 
are made without recourse to conscious deliberation – a point demonstrated quite 
effectively, I feel, by Haas and Witte’s case study with which I conclude the previous 
chapter.  
I contend, like Davis and Rickert, that the conditions generated by our 
seemingly innocuous movement through the world – conditions that are central to 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception – constitute a distinct form of rhetoric. 
I say distinct because it is not heavily Aristotelian rhetoric that has been handed down 
through the traditional canon – that is, a rhetoric of persuasive argumentation; rather, 
it is more like rhetoric conceived through a Heideggerian lens of techne (Hawk tells us 
that the “ic” in rhetoric “implies techne, or the combination of art and technique”), 
which “puts abstract, technical knowledge [transmitted conceptually] and lived, 
habitual knowledge [acquired experientially] on equal footing” (Hawk, “Toward a 
Post-Techne, 374). A similar balance is struck by mimesis, according to Kenneth Burke, 
who tells us in Attitudes Toward History that “in pronouncing the two ‘m’s,’ with 
approval, the Greek philosopher did not merely conceptualize, but also acted. His 
word, you might say, would be more like a dance than like a concept” (243; emphasis 
in the original). 
 We have encountered this before in the parallel I made between the dual-
meaning of mimos and Auden’s question about how to separate the dancer from the 
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dance. The same goes in for self and other in all our interactions, which Merleau-Ponty 
and Gallese both assert are intercorporeal as well as intersubjective. Intersubjectivity, 
according to Gallese, should be “viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity” since it 
is our bodies in interaction with the bodies of others, not their “selves,” that leads to 
social identification (“The Two Sides of Mimesis,” 13; emphasis in the original). As he 
has pointed out, from the moment we are born, our bodies, through our body 
schemas, are mimetically attuned to the intentions of others through embodied 
simulation, producing a “shared body state” (Gallese, “Intentional,” 144). Rhetoric 
emerges from this shared space. For Burke, rhetorical communication is enabled not 
though some abstract spirit but though palpable substance. Our shared 
“consubstantiality” power the intentions (his word: “motives”) that arise through our 
interactions. “In being identified with B,” he writes in A Rhetoric of Motives, “A is 
‘substantially one with a person . . . [y]et at the same time he remains unique, an 
individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct 
substance and consubstantial with another” (20-21). 
In earlier chapters I referenced Gibb’s example, drawn from Daniel Stern, of 
how difference is produced in moments of “cross-modal” imitation – what she calls 
“mimetic communication” between a mother’s shimmy and her infant’s cry. There is a 
rhetorical dimension to this interaction: where the mother, according to Gibbs, “is 
attuned” to the baby’s actions, the baby “knows how to solicit the mother’s 
attention” through actions which, in later months and years, are accompanied by 
language (197). This “affective attunement” facilitated by our “mimetic capacity for 
synchrony” with others (197) is not conscious persuasion so much as it is an embodied 
expression of influence. Similarly, and in language that echoes Hawk’s distinction 
between doing as action and doing as enaction, the philosophy scholar Paul Dumouchel 
explains how 
mimesis, unlike explicit imitation, of one person by another, is never 
something that one agent does to another, but something that people do to 
each other, something that always involves reciprocally more than one person. 
… This reciprocal influence takes place at the pre-individual level. In this 
sense, mimesis takes placed at a level at which agents are not subjectively 
aware of the influence they exert on each other. (79).  
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It is interesting that Dumouchel attaches pedagogical significance to this pre-
individual mimesis by reminding us of how even explicit imitation that results from 
instruction, such as learning a craft or sport, “typically disappears into the experience 
of doing whatever it is that you are doing” (77-8). This language echoes Hawhee’s 
description of ancient Greek mimetic pedagogy as habituation, when “knowledge of 
fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious” (142), a vital component in a 
rhetorical training that “exceeds the transmission of ‘ideas,’ and rhetoric the bounds 
of ‘words’” (160). 
A rhetoric that exceeds the bounds of words and transmission of ideas is what I 
am calling a rhetoric of influence. It springs from the domain of experiential 
knowledge and points to a bodily dimension of communication that, despite 
theoretical interest in recent years by rhetorical scholars, has not made a significant 
impact at the level of programmatic initiatives and curricula where persuasive 
argumentation continues to serve as the dominant model. At this level, it may be 
worth conceiving of the rhetoric of persuasion as an example of what Peter Brown 
calls articulate power, something that is “defined and agreed upon by everyone (and 
especially its holders!)”; but there is also inarticulate power, “forms of influence less 
easy to pin down” that are intangible or imponderable, sometimes even unacceptable 
or “difficult to understand” (qtd. in Covino, 2).51  
In the realm of rhetoric, the late scholar Michael Calvin McGee calls the 
tradition that has commandeered rhetoric for centuries “idealist” and offers his 
“materialist perspective” as an alternative (19).Throughout much of its history, argues 
McGee, rhetoricians thought of writing, literature, and oratory as specialist “art” 
forms and appreciated the ability to persuade or inform audiences. Up through even 
the 1950s, persuasive oratory was a particular “art” form, and rhetoric – with its 
ancient literature consisting of advice – was conceived as a “body of principles” on 
how to become proficient in that art (20-1). This “artistic” idealism privileged rhetoric 
to such an extent that rhetoricians developed an “incredible sensitivity” to any 
description of rhetoric – likening it to a knack, for instance52 - that detracted from its 
artistic status as oratory of the “ethics of teaching students the techniques of 
persuasion” (21). Aristotle, he claims, did not speak from experience but, rather, 
“arrived at descriptions of internal motivations and mental processes by inference 
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from observing the function of Greek communication in societies,” and his basic 
conceptual formula – consisting of a speaker, speech, audience, occasion, and 
purposeful change – resulted in a “product-model of rhetoric” (22). “Audience” for 
Aristotle, in McGee’s view, was just a lump of clay, important “only in having 
properties resistant to the creative touch of the ‘speaker’” (22). The result was a 
highly conceptualized  account of rhetoric in which a “speech” and its canonical 
components (invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery) are grounded in 
nothing more than a “mental process.” In his materialist account of rhetoric, any 
“speech” is part of a larger phenomenon encompassing speaker, the speaking, the 
audience, occasion, and change all of which are grounded in “the moment of 
experience” (23). 
I believe that we need to move in the direction McGee, Davis, Hawk, Rickert, 
Cooper, Brady, and an increasing number of other scholars are pointing to. We need to 
conceive rhetoric as being in a watershed moment, a paradigm shift, in which the 
traditional conceptual (“idealist,” transmission-based, symbolic) account of its being 
the “art of persuasion” needs to be, at the very least, balanced with one that attends 
to its experiential (“materialist,” reflexive, affective) dimensions. We need to 
recognize the limitations of the argumentative model. As the political theorist Hannah 
Arendt puts it, through speech and action we insert ourselves into a web of relations, 
“a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and every process is the 
cause of new processes” (190). Within such fluid circumstances, the telos-driven 
objective for any action will always be tapered by an awareness of its inevitable 
“boundlessness” (190). Hence the doing of an action for Arendt is not a far cry from 
Hawk’s account of doing as enaction in that action always “depends on the resonance 
which it finds in the medium of relations and the ‘innumerable conflicting wills and 
intentions’ into which it is inserted” (184). 
Rhetoric could benefit from this notion of resonance, which Joseph Dunne 
describes as the degree to which one’s “action strikes a chord in others who will co-
operate with it and carry it along to completion.” The power of action is not a 
property of the agent “as it is the whole constellation in which he acts” (93). It is time 
to acquaint students with a rhetoric that does not aim always for the human heart 
(pathos) and human mind (logos) with the end-purpose (telos) being to persuade. A 
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rhetoric reconceived as mimetic and multimodal – phenomenologically embodied and 
always-already engaged with material existence – contributes to a rhetoric of 
influence.  I prefer the term influence because it allows us to retain rhetoric’s 
traditional adherence to persuasion (as in “the speaker influenced him to change his 
vote”) by subsuming that concept, hence freeing rhetorical action from its direct 
investment in appeals. Because it moves beyond a linear transmission view of 
communication, it opens rhetoric up to the very real role played by contingency and 
chance in communicative acts. It is entirely possible, for instance, for the 
unanticipated expression on the face of a single audience member to so affect a 
rhetor that the entire tenor of a speech may not be delivered as intended even though 
the linguistic utterances remain exactly as scripted. In this sense, the rhetor/audience 
distinction is blurred with the audience influencing (“persuading”) the rhetor just as 
much as the rhetor seeks to influence the audience – a simple example of reversibility 
not unlike Merleau-Ponty’s (subject) touching his own hand (object) and being touched 
back (neither/both). A rhetoric of influence can account for feedback loops in those 
complex ecologies we call rhetorical situations. It allows for rhetors to touch and be 
touched back by the “concrete others” who comprise a particular audience, allowing 
for the enactment of what Cooper calls “responsible rhetorical agency” (“Rhetorical,” 
441-2). 
 There are other reasons why I prefer influence to the term persuasion. First, it 
is less tied to the argumentative imperative assumed by some rhetoricians53 that 
insists that all communication has some pushy persuasive purpose. While some scholars 
(Rickert and Davis, for instance) have attempted to broaden the term persuasion, it is 
nonetheless hampered by its etymology, which means to “strongly” [per-] “urge” [-
suadere] to the point of “inducing [someone] to believe (something).”54 Armed with 
logos, pathos, and ethos, the rhetor marches into a sociopolitical agon with a 
hylomorphically constructed argument in hand, her ultimate goal or telos: to convince 
or persuade. Influence, on the other hand, retains a sense of movement – in- (into, in, 
on, upon), -fluere (to flow) – and allows us to move beyond the sense of agon as a site 
or argumentation to what Hawhee describes as an experiential encounter, a 
“gathering of forces – cultural, bodily, and discursive – thus complicating the easy 
portrayal of rhetoric as telos-driven persuasion” (16). As such, it promotes a pedagogy 
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that situates students in environments with which they gradually couple, learning by 
doing, by playing, by writing and reading and listening and speaking across multiple 
communicative media, unburdened by the imperative that their communications must 
ultimately serve to convince others to accept specific claims. 
 A rhetoric of influence, I feel, gives to the fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com 
the opportunity to take into account how our bodies influence and are influenced by 
the human and nonhuman bodies with which we interact as we move through the 
ultimately material worlds we inhabit. Its reflexivity opens us up to others in ways 
transmission-based persuasion does not by recognizing how communication emerges in 
the intercorporeal interface between bodies. This interface serves as a nexus for 
multiple sensory and perceptual modalities whose moments of integration generate 
significance, “meaning,” thanks to the function that Merleau-Ponty described as 
mimesis – an ancient concept that I hope I have shown is as relevant today as it has 
been to so many teachers, rhetoricians, and philosophers throughout its long history. 
Putting our bodies at the center of any pedagogy, rhetorical or not, requires that we 
attend to the kind of knowledge generated in that nexus. I have termed this 
embodied, affective, materially engaged knowledge experiential and believe that it 
should play a much more integral role in how we teach writing and communication. 
Bringing to students’ attention the existence of this knowledge – how it operates, how 
it is used, how it facilitates learning at all levels, including highly conceptual levels – is 
not so much a matter of instruction but of attunement. While to some this may sound 
like a radically new way to think about education, in many ways, as I have shown, it is 
quite ancient. As we move deeper into our so-called Information Age of technological 
sophistication, it is vital that we cultivate our innate sense of mimetic attunement 
with the world to which we are fundamentally anchored by our bodies’ sensory-motor 
schemas and the knowledge generated through that attunement. It is, after all, the 
knowledge we acquire experientially that so often helps us to navigate our world’s 
sundry conceptual complexities. 
  
  
                                                            
1 Robert J. Connors provides a history of the discipline in his 1982 article “The Rise of Technical Writing Instruction in 
America” (reprinted in Central Works in Technical Communication, Eds Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart A. Selber, 
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New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 3-19). This history documents the relationship between the 
emerging field of technical writing and the English departments in which so much of it took place. He concludes that 
as the 1980s open there will still be “arguments being made that the technical writing course should be taken out of 
the hands of English teachers, but these arguments are as old as technical writing instruction itself and will likely 
prove no more effectual now than they were in the 1920s,” and he foresees with much accuracy how “technical 
writing will be an acceptable field of study for English graduate degrees in many schools by the end of the decade” 
(17). 
2 For example, the popular textbook Everything’s An Argument by Andrea Lunsford, John J. Ruszkiewicz, and Keith 
Walters is described as showing students “how to analyze all kinds of arguments — not just essays and editorials, but 
clothes, smartphone apps, ads, and Web site designs — and then how to use what they learn to write their own 
effective arguments” (Available: 
http://www.bedfordstmartins.com/Catalog/product/everythingsanargumentwithreadings-sixthedition-lunsford. 
Accessed: June 27, 2014). The Allyn & Bacon Guide to Writing (6th ed. 2010), another popular textbook, is described as 
“widely praised for its groundbreaking integration of composition research and a rhetorical perspective to writing and 
reading” (Available: http://www.pearsonhighered.com/educator/product/Allyn-Bacon-Guide-to-Writing-The-Brief-
Edition/9780205823154.page. Accessed: June 27, 2014).  The 7th edition of Diana Hacker’s classic A Writer’s Reference 
(now co-edited by Nancy Sommers) includes a new sample argument paper that “shows students how to support an 
argumentative thesis, address counterarguments, integrate visuals, and document sources” (xviii; Boston: Bedford St. 
Martins, 2010). 
3 Sample syllabi from instructors of technical writing and communication classes currently available at the ATTW 
website provide evidence of the dominance of rhetorical pedagogy in the field. The three syllabi offered for 
“Communication Theory” are explicitly rhetorical. The summaries of several syllabi for undergraduate “Technical 
Communication” also indicate rhetorical approaches that students took in those classes. (Available: 
http://attw.org/teaching/course-syllabi-and-materials. Accessed: June 25, 2014). 
4 In the preface to his most recent edition (4th) of his widely-used textbook Technical Communication Today, Richard-
Johnson Sheehan tells us that the book “is grounded in a solid core of rhetorical principles that have been around for 
at least two and a half millennia. In fact, these core principles hold up surprisingly well in this Information Age and are 
perhaps even more relevant as we return to a more visual and oral culture” (xxi; 4th ed. Pearson Education, 2012).  In 
Strategies for Technical Communication in the Workplace, Laura J. Gurack and John M. Lannon describe technical 
communication to students as “persuasive and truthful” and lists persuasion as one of three “primary purposes of 
technical communication” (7-8; 2nd ed., Pearson Education, 2013). And Paul V. Anderson, in Technical Communication: 
A Reader-Centered Approach, describes the “two essential qualities” of effective technical writing as usefulness and 
persuasiveness (9-11) and returns to both qualities in many chapters (8th ed. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
2014). 
5 A good example of this can be found at the popular Purdue OWL website, which many university writing instructors 
send their students to for reference. “An argumentative paper,” the website tells us, “makes a claim about a topic and 
justifies this claim with specific evidence. The claim could be an opinion, a policy proposal, an evaluation, a cause-and-
effect statement, or an interpretation. The goal of the argumentative paper is to convince the audience that the claim 
is true based on the evidence provided.” (Available: https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/545/01/. Accessed: 
June 29, 2014). 
6 I see the “current paradigm” as reflective of the WPA Outcomes Statement for First Year Composition. “Rhetorical 
Knowledge” is the first outcome described in this statement. It is defined as the student’s ability to “focus on a 
purpose,” “respond to the needs of different audiences,” “use conventions of format and structure appropriate to the 
rhetorical situation,” and other skills so that they meet the “expectations of writing in their fields. The statement 
emphasizes the importance of “the uses of writing as a critical thinking method”; “the interactions among critical 
thinking, critical reading, and writing;  and that students should be able to “understand a writing assignment as a 
series of tasks, including finding, evaluating, analyzing, and synthesizing appropriate primary and secondary sources.” 
(Available: http://wpacouncil.org/positions/outcomes.html. Accessed June 7, 2014). In addition, the WPA’s current 
“Assessment Gallery” provides an idea of the extent to which persuasive argumentation has become the standard 
bearer for academic discourse in composition programs. The Assessment Gallery is a section on their website that 
provides model assessment protocols (called “assessment narratives”) of student writing programs. One of these, 
Frederick Community College, identifies the purpose of students’ composition as threefold: “informing, arguing, 
persuading.” The narrative of Seattle University’s Writing in the Disciplines (WID) assessment narrative draws on 
observations by composition theorists like Susan Peck MacDonald in its emphasis on “disciplinary argument” as the 
ideal to which they contrast “pseudo-academic writing.” Since several departments stress the importance that its 
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students develop argumentative abilities, “faculty need to teach disciplinary methods of inquiry, research and 
argument in their sophomore- and junior-level courses through better assignments and instruction.” According to 
faculty at Carleton College, writing skills that augur success include “writing thesis-driven arguments,” an “essential 
aspect of college writing” that their assessment attends to. Stepping a bit outside the box is the University of 
Kentucky, whose narrative notes how its most recent learning outcomes “reflected the new emphasis on critical 
inquiry and experientially-based research and writing, a shift from its former and more narrow focus on argument and 
exposition.” (Available: http://wpacouncil.org/UK. Accessed: June 7, 2014). 
7 In Chapter 3, I describe how the “law of propriety” (to prepon) was applied to occasions in which the larger 
argument was promoted by the rhetor’s evocation of an historical event. This evocation sought to “enact” the event 
as a felt experience. The occasion of the telling hence mimetically simulated the occasion being enacted, if only for a 
moment. I view these moments in which rhetors sought to palpably enact a historical event as epideictic in that they 
attended to the affective dimensions of those particular audiences on those particular occasions. 
8 For one example, see Chapter 11 of The Essentials of Technical Communication (Elizabeth Tebeaux and Sam Dragga, 
Oxford UP, 2010). In the section “Choosing Visuals to Enhance Your Purpose and Your Meaning” (258-64) a number of 
sample PowerPoint slides are given to illustrate the do’s and don’ts of using this presentation software program. The 
examples, both good and bad, do not stray from the basic templates provided in the program, replicating bulleted 
lists, which conform to the “guidelines” given by the authors that presentations “must be simple, and they must be 
clear and easy to understand” (258). Richard Johnson-Sheehan’s Technical Communication Strategies Today, Pearson, 
2001) provides similar sample slides consisting of bulleted lists in which minor topics are bulleted under main topics 
(235-44). Mike Markel’s Technical Communication (10th ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012) provides a sample slideshow 
presentation that, while certainly well structured, is less beholden to built-in templates and widely employed 
conventions (611-20). 
9 This citation, along with the indented one below, comes from Ingold’s introduction to his book and not from the 
chapter in which the sawing action is described at length. I quote these lines because they provide a nice summary of 
the chapter’s three themes. 
10 The quote by Parmenides comes from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1009b. The paraphrase of Empedocle’s fragment by 
M.A. Wright is of a sentence from same passage in Aristotle, which Hawhee provides a direct citation of (57): “For 
Empedocles says those changing their bodily condition (hexin) deem to change their thought (phronesin).” Wright’s 
paraphrase can be found on page 235 of his book Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1981. 
11 This and the following citation come from Haskins, 26-7. 
12 We are all homo ludens (“man the player”) if you believe, as Huizinga does, “that genuine, pure play is one of the 
main bases of civilization” (5). If that is true, then mimesis is indeed – as Rene Girard has argued, in his own way (see 
Chapter 3) – central to the development of human civilization. 
13 I retain the alternative English spelling physis in the previous sentence since it is embedded in a direct citation but 
use phusis in my own sentence to maintain consistency with my use of this term throughout this dissertation. 
14 We should recall here that Gadamer also believed that rhetoric developed from a “native talent for practical 
mastery,” “a natural power that everyone possess to some degree” (“On the Scope,” 20-1) as I noted in Chapter 3. 
15 Please note that I am focusing here on one of the less well-known instances of non-aesthetic mimesis in Aristotle (I 
mention the others in Chapter 2) -- mimesis as applied to learning in general and not necessarily to the creation of art. 
16 In addition to Gadamer, Schweiker look to Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida as thinkers who “have reopened the 
discussion of mimesis and its problems” (22). 
17 Agricorp is a pseudonym. 
18 I should note that Huizinga does not associate this faculty with mimesis but instead with methexis, which he 
associated with identification and not mimetic “representation” (a footnote indicates that he is drawing on 
information from Jane Harrison’s Themis: A Study in the Social Origins of Greek Religion, Cambridge, 1912, p. 125). 
The function of a cultic rite, for example, cannot be called mimetic because it “is far from being merely imitative; it 
causes the worshippers to participate in the sacred happening itself” (15). Clearly, Huizinga subscribes to an 
extremely narrow and conventional definition of mimesis here. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, mimesis 
has long been associated with identification – Plato’s great aversion to it, in fact, stemmed from this quality – and I 
believe that Huizinga’s definition of play conforms very much to many instantiations of mimesis that I have covered in 
this dissertation. 
19 Embodied cognition argues “that perception, cognition, and action, rather than being separate and sequential 
stages in human interaction with the physical world, in fact occur simultaneously and are closely entwined” 
(Birchfield, et al, 2). 
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20 SMALLab provides an overview of their history, team, and mission – replete with videos of their products in use by 
students – at their website: smallablearning.com. 
21 The authors list novice level tools such as Star Logo, Scratch, and Lego Mindstorms, among others (5) 
22 This definition is borrowed from J. Jenkins, et al. Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media 
Education for the 21st Century, MacArthur Foundation, 2006. 
23 The product is described in great detail by the authors (10-12). A video demonstration may be found online as well 
and is currently (May, 2014) available at SMALLab’s You Tube page: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16QEop2fF4Y 
24 This text comes from one of SMALLab’s introductory videos on the YouTube page for Arizona State University’s UTO 
Academic Technologies.  See “Smallab Centripetal Force Lesson” (0:24/8:22) at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFiXtcXRpVE. 
25 See the Online Etymology Dictionary entry on information: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=information 
26 The Macy Conferences were a series of meetings held between 1941 and 1960 that brought together scholars from 
a wide variety of scientific fields and disciplines with the aim of promoting unity and communication between the 
sciences. The subject of defining information was especially important for the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, 
which were held between 1943 and 1954, where much discussion focused on mathematical and nonmathematical 
definitions of “information.” The authors credit N. Katherine Hayles fruitful exploration of these discussions in her 
book How We Became Posthuman (7, 9). 
27 For just one example, Mike Markel’s widely used textbook Technical Communication includes an entire chapter that 
serves as a base for several genres of technical documents described later in the text. The chapter, “Communicating 
Persuasively,” begins with this proclamation: “Technical communication, like any other kind of writing, calls for 
making persuasive claims and supporting them effectively” (183). The modified thesis, the claim, is “the idea you are 
communicating” and the “conclusion you want your readers to accept.” It is supported by “right kinds of evidence,” 
the “information you want your readers to consider,” including commonsense argument, numerical data, examples, 
and expert testimony (189).  (10th ed., Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012). 
28 This quote comes from a passage Drexler provides on his blog from an article published in the magazine Science (11 
April 2003: Vol. 300 no. 5617 pp. 286-290) by Frances S. Collins, et al.  
29 All references to Drexler’s discussion come from an article posted on his blog Metamodern: The Trajectory of 
Technology called “The Data Explosion and the Scientific Method” (November 25, 2008). Accessed: May 5, 2014. 
Available: http://metamodern.com/2008/10/25/the-data-explosion-and-the-scientific-method/ 
30 These passages from her letters can be found at the profile of Barbara McClintock on the National Library of 
Medicine’s website. Accessed: May 5, 2014. Available: http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/LL/p-nid/52 
31 Fleckenstein writes that McClintock’s ability to “immerse herself in the material context of her corn plants” was 
made possible through a “deep reverence and capacity for union with that which is to be known.” Her feeling for the 
organism “dissolves the boundaries between self and other, creating a being-in-a-material-place that comprises corn 
plants and scientist” (296). 
32 McClintock’s data-driven approach was so open, in fact, that some of the patterns that emerged from the multiple 
data sets she was working with, while not germane to the designated objectives of her experiments, were of great 
importance to researchers in other fields. For example, one data set involved the geographical distributions of 
particular chromosomal types. As with other data sets, “she began to discern patterns” that would make it be 
possible to trace the migratory patterns of the people who settled and traded in the Americans. Because corn is a 
crop and therefore dependent on human intervention, “the biological history of the maize plant would permit a 
reconstruction of the migratory history of humans” – a discovery that would be of great interest to anthopologists but 
not to cytologists (182). 
33 Ruth Berman, a feminist critic of Western scientific traditions, describes McClintock’s view of scientific work as 
“profoundly materialist.” She argues against the proclamation by some of McClintock’s admirers and detractors that 
the biologist was a kind of mystic because her methods and thinking did not conform to the “mechanistic mode.” 
Mystics “pull away” from the material world in which McClintock immersed herself: “McClintock’s knowledge flows 
directly from her daily contact and interaction with her maize plants. She knows – by sight, smell, touch, and a variety 
of conscious and nonconscious observations – all the details of all of her organism’s daily lives. She immerses herself 
completely in her material, its changing environment, and the many stresses that affect it. This material communion 
includes careful observation, experiment, and analysis. This is not mysticism; this is complete materialism” (248-50; 
emphasis in the original). 
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34 It may be fruitful to think of these collectibles as things that “gather,” as a bridge for Heidegger (“BDT,” 150-2), and 
of the students’ immersive experience as a way to “dwell” in a certain world so that later they may “build”—in this 
case, produce their multimodal project—from their locations in that world (157). 
35 Here I hope you will recall earlier references to theories in cognitive neuroscience that posit our body’s sensory-
motor system as inherently multimodal (Gallese and Lakoff, 2). 
36 Language is said to “exploit” that multimodality (Gallese and Lakoff, 2) while simultaneously allowing for a 
segregation from “the original multimodal perceptive world” even though, at the level of intercorporeal 
communication, we can never “annihilate the shared we-centric space” of that original world (Gallese, “Mirror,” 529). 
37 This acronym is mine and I should perhaps explain the spelling of these terms. “Oracy” is a shortened version of 
what is more popular called “oral literacy.” It was coined by the British education researcher Andrew Wilkinson in the 
1960s and is discussed at length in the book Oracy Matters: The Development of Talking and Listening in Education ( 
Eds. Maggie MacLure, Terry Phillips, Andrew Wilkinson, Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1988). Although in 
this text oracy includes listening, other scholars – for example, Cynthia E. Selfe – use aurality as a blended term for 
both skillful listening and oral production.  Because orality is associated with the mouth and not the ears, I am 
reluctant to collapse it oral production into aurality or aural skills in oracy despite the close relationship between both 
modalities. The term auracy is mine and means aural literacy or literacy in listening. The term visuacy, for visual 
literacy, is relatively new with its first official instantiation apparently occurring in a report conducted on behalf of the 
Australian Government and released in 2008 by its Department of Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations. 
The report, composed by Diana Davis, a visiting senior professorial research fellow at Australian National University, is 
available online (accessed June 22, 2014) at this url: 
http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/36372/NRVE_Final_Report.pdf). 
38 Although less common now, freshman composition courses in the decades leading up to the 1990s included 
reading and writing about literature. This was commonly the case with the second class of a two-semester sequence 
in freshman writing. Pedagogical theories about the teaching of literature and reading were seen as supportive of the 
English component of this general education curriculum. The work of Rosenblatt and other reader response theorists 
are featured in The Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to the Information 
Age (Ed. Theresa Enos, Routledge Press, 1996). 
39 Following John Dewey and other pragmatist theorists of education, Rosenblatt felt that the term “interaction” 
unduly separates subject from object “because it implies separate, self-contained, and already defined entities acting 
on one another – in the manner, if one may use a homely example, of billard balls colliding” (17). I should point out, 
though, that her description of transaction very closely approximates how the term interaction is often used in 
phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and this dissertation: “’Transaction’ designates, then, an ongoing process in 
which the elements or factors are, one might say, aspects of a total situation, each conditioned by and conditioning 
the other” (17).  
40 He borrows this concept from Richard Lanham. 
41 You may recall from Chapter 1 how Merleau-Ponty illustrates style and expression through the example of the term 
“rogue.” Before reading Stendhal, he has a general familiarity with what “rogue” is. As he reads about Rossi the 
revenue man, the “sedimented” knowledge of “rogue” that he began with breaks up, “the cross-references multiply,” 
until there is an entirely new expression of rogue (PoW, 102). 
42 She offers rhetorical listening as being, among other things, a “performance that occurs when listeners involve both 
their capacity and willingness . . . to locate identification in discursive spaces of both commonalities and differences” 
(204; emphasis in the original). This identification is a purely conscious act, the aim of a “strategic idealism” based on 
a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, not mastery” in engaging with others (205). While the ethical implications 
of this approach are admirable, ultimately rhetorical listening as described in her article is a highly conceptual 
endeavor unrelated to actual aurality. 
43 Rosenblatt describes aesthetic reading as less concerned “with the information being acquired than with the 
experienced meaning” (38) and with readers’ “continuing awareness of the text” in terms of both signs and symbols 
(29). When students are encouraged to read not just for disembodied information but with an awareness of the 
material text in front of them, they will begin to notice how written language works. Marks of punctuation 
(semicolons, dashes, quotation marks) and grammatical structures (subordinate clauses, modification) do not always 
need to be learned conceptually by consulting writers’ handbooks. By close, sensitive, mimetic/aesthetic readings of 
texts, students will begin to pay attention to things that often slip by, the so-called Lower-Order Concerns. Instructors 
can, using a handbook or a grammar website, explicitly teach students that, in MLA style, a full-stop is placed inside a 
closing quotation mark except when the citation is followed by a parenthetical citation, in which case the full stop 
come after the closing parenthesis. But students who are mimetically attuned to the material operations of language 
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can learn this on their own, experientially, by simply looking at and listening to the text while reading it. For example, 
“She… she said what?” can reveal how quotation marks, question marks, italics, and ellipses function in written 
discourse.  
44 Yancey’s assertion references observations made by Marshall McLuhan and, later, by Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin 
in their book Remediation (Cambridge: MIT, 2000) 
45 In language that might remind one of the theories of Baudrillard, Gebauer and Wulf end their exhaustive study of 
mimesis with this comment about the “contemporary tendency for everything to be turned into an image,” which 
speaks to the narrowing of the gap between empirical and mimetic worlds in visual culture that is itself one of twelve 
dimensions they identify with mimesis: “The ultimate result is that everything becomes art, becomes a play of images 
that no longer refer to anything, that no longer function as models, but are equivalent to nothing but themselves. The 
distance between the mimetic and the prior world, the intermediary space, ceases to exist once mimesis has become 
all-encompassing, and the mimetic and the other world collapse into each other. The total extension of mimesis is 
simultaneously  its end” (320). 
46 Cooper cites Kress’s article “Gains and Losses: New Forms of Texts, Knowledges, and Learning,” Computers and 
Composition (22:1), p. 20, and McCloud’s book Reinventing Comics: How Imagination and Technology are 
Revolutionizing an Art Form (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 32. 
47 She borrows this term from Richard Young and Edwin Steinberg’s “Planning Graduate Programs in Rhetoric in 
Departments of English,” Rhetoric Review 18:2, 2000: 390-402. 
48 An alternative was to have a single class devoted to digital technology, but given recent cultural shifts that are 
transforming the fields of rhetoric and composition they felt that it should be included “as both a method and 
concept throughout the program” (7). 
49 This quoted phrase comes from a direct quotation provided by Yancey from Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s 
Remediation, Cambridge: MIT, 2000, p. 19. 
50 The theory of mimesis that I develop in this dissertation has close conceptual parallels with techne as described by 
Martin Heidegger and revamped as “post-techne” by Byron Hawk. According to Hawk, in Heidegger’s view of techne, 
the subject is situated “as a body in a complex network of relations that influences the body and is influenced by the 
body” (“Toward a Post-Techne,” 374). When one composes in these ambient environments “techne emerges only 
through enacting relationships,” driven not from one’s conscious mind but from the situation itself (384). He labels 
this emergent form of techne “post-techne” to distinguish it from accounts that limit techne to instrumentalist 
functions. 
51 The original sources is Brown’s book Religion and Society in the Age of Augustine, Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers (Reprint Edition, 2007), p. 124. 
52 The denigration of “knack” by rhetoricians eager to preserve the elevated status of rhetoric as “art” needs to be 
interrogated. In ancient Chinese – specifically Taoist – philosophy, the spontaneous wuwei spirit embodied in a 
crafter’s skill is translated as “knack.” Joseph Needham tells us how in Taoist thought materials as variable as wood 
and clay and crude metals could only be worked by people “who learnt from decades of experience, to know the 
signs, the ‘smell,’ the physiognomy, of the materials suitable for [their] purpose.” This knowledge was conceived as 
what we call knack: “The craftsman could not express his procedures in logical terms. In fact, he could not explain at 
all; he could only show. . . . Apprenticeship was subjective and personal, not a matter of intellectual understanding, 
not at all the appreciation of mathematical functions describing the behaviour of deeply analyzed physic-chemical 
entities.” The Shorter Science & Civilization in China: 4, Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 23 
53 The title of the popular textbook Everything’s an Argument quite succinctly captures this reductive view of rhetoric. 
54 Online Etymology Dictionary, “persuasion,” http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=persuasion (Accessed 
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